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Abstract: 
This thesis examines the complex, interdisciplinary nature of counterinsurgency in the 21
st
 
century by assessing the whole-of-government, population-centric approach that the Dutch 
Armed Forces and Government took to combat the Taliban in Uruzagn, Afghanistan from 1 
August 2006 to 1 August 2010. The Dutch approach resulted in increased security, as well as 
increased political and economic capacity in the three districts of Uruzgan where they focused 
their efforts. By the end of Task Force Uruzgan, the Government of Afghanistan had increased 
its majority control from 0 percent of the population to approximately 60 percent, and the 
Afghan National Security Forces were in a better position to combat to the Taliban after the 
Dutch withdrew from the province. Overall, the Dutch approach to counterinsurgency made a 
significant positive impact on the security structure in Uruzgan.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The terrorist attacks on the morning of September 11, 2001 set in motion a series of events that 
would lead to the “War on Terror” and American-led invasion of Afghanistan to topple the 
Taliban government that had been supporting al-Qaeda. Thirteen years, billions of dollars, and 
thousands of lost lives later, the United States military is just now withdrawing from a conflict 
that will most likely be seen in the years to come as a failure. It is important to note, though, that 
while the overall mission in Afghanistan may be looked at as unsuccessful, there have been 
pockets of successful counterinsurgency. These lessons, the result of over a decade of sacrifice, 
should not be forgotten, as future conflicts will invariably involve non-state challengers to fragile 
and failing states.  
 
Karl Eikenberry, who was the Commanding General of the Combined Forces Command-
Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007 and the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011, 
notes that, according to the current American counterinsurgency doctrine, success could be 
achieved if forces focused on protecting the population, increasing government legitimacy, and 
aligning American strategies with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. To these ends, Eikenberry 
argues, “COIN failed in Afghanistan.”1  The Dutch experience in Afghanistan, therefore, comes 
as a surprise. Looking beyond Afghanistan, their localized success eclipses that of most 
counterinsurgency campaigns. According to the study by published by the RAND Corporation 
Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies, of the 71 counterinsurgency campaigns 
that were completed between the end of World War II and 2010, only 29 can be considered 
victories for the counterinsurgency forces.
2
 This adds analytical importance to the strategies and 
tactics employed in Uruzgan, as they buck the trend of most counterinsurgency campaigns.  
 
Of the limited literature there is on successful counterinsurgency operations, some case 
studies have situational factors that make generalizations difficult. The best example of this is the 
Malayan Emergency, often considered a shining example of counterinsurgency done right. John 
Nagl, author of the book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, uses the British experience in 
Malaya as one his two cases, the other being the American experience in Vietnam, and examines 
the success achieved by the British in combating the Communist insurgency.
3
 Sergio Miller 
describes the Emergency as a situation where the circumstances were unique, where “[t]he 
advantages were almost all on the side of the authorities: British-Malay relations were 
harmonious; governance was good; the judicial system was fair; the police were loyal and 
competent; and the [Malay] Federation was excited at the prospect of independence.”4 There are 
certainly lessons to be learned from the Malayan Emergency, such as those found by Nagl, “but 
Malaya as the exemplar for modern counter-insurgency is a dead letter. … The unique conditions 
                                                 
1
 Karl Eikenberry. "The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan." Foreign Affairs. (2013): 
61. 
2
 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill and Molly Dunigan. Paul, Christopher. Paths to Victory: 
Lessons from Modern Insurgencies. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013. 
3
 John Nagl. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005). 
4
 Sergio Miller. "Malaya - the Myth of Hearts and Minds."Small Wars Journal. (2012) n.pag. 
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of the Malayan Emergency are unlikely to be repeated.” 5 Other case studies that are often 
examined, for the reasons why they failed or succeeded, include Western responses to colonial 
uprisings and communist insurrections during the 20th century. Moving forward, scholars will 
look to the Iraq War and the War in Afghanistan for lessons. 
 
Within Afghanistan, the military and government personnel of Denmark have 
experienced a level of success above and beyond the national norm while operating in Uruzgan 
province. In Uruzgan, the Dutch implemented an approach to counterinsurgency that focused on 
providing security to the population and building the political and economic infrastructure that 
would support development for the Uruzgani people. This population-centric approach comes is 
derived from lessons learned from operations in their former colonial holdings, as well as 
fighting in a limited capacity in Iraq and Afghanistan prior to 2006.
6
 The Dutch became involved 
in the military coalition that struggled against the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, operating 
in the Uruzgan province in south-central Afghanistan. Uruzgan presents a rare analytical 
opportunity. The province experienced only limited military involvement from the American-led 
multinational military coalition before the Dutch arrived in 2006. As a result the Dutch were able 
to work on a relatively blank canvas, shaping the direction of the counterinsurgency as they saw 
fit as the lead nation in the province until the end of Task Force Uruzgan in August 2010, as the 
Dutch withdrew as the result of issues in Dutch parliament.  
 
 There has been a good amount of information published on Uruzgan, Afghanistan and the 
counterinsurgency work done by the Dutch Armed Forces. These writings include government 
reports and internal briefings made public, governmental or non-governmental organization 
publications that analyze progress, and articles published in academic journals, news reports, and 
historical narratives. Of the literature written on Uruzgan, Afghanistan and the Dutch military, 
none is theory-informed. One of the contributions to the literature that this paper makes is to 
examine this case study through the lens of counterinsurgency theories.  
 
 Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 2006-2010 forms the main case study that this paper will 
use, and the case study will cover the four-year period of Dutch control. Examining one province 
over multiple years will result in more confident conclusions based on deeper analysis. This 
paper will utilize what Stephen Van Evera calls congruence procedure type 2, which is when an 
“investigator makes a number of paired observations of values on the IV [independent variable 
and the DV [dependent variable] across a range of circumstances within a case. Then the 
investigator assesses whether these values covary in accordance with the predictions of the test 
hypothesis. If they covary, the test is passed. The greater the amplitude of the DV’s covariance 
with the IV, the greater the theory’s importance.”7 Congruence procedure type 2 is especially 
useful for studying cases of counterinsurgency, as situational factors, such as population 
dynamics, political systems, or geography are held constant. These situational factors make 
comparisons across cases of counterinsurgency difficult, as noted above in the discussion of the 
Malayan Emergency. 
                                                 
5
 Miller, “Malaya.”  
6
 Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, The Roots of Dutch Counterinsurgency: Balancing and Integrating Military 
and Civilian Efforts from Aceh to Uruzgan, The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, 119-129. 
7
 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997), 61-
62. 
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Many scholars and practitioners put a heavy weight on specific tactics and details of past 
counterinsurgencies. But what are they looking for? It seems that many are searching for the 
perfect counterinsurgency strategy applicable regardless of conditions. What should be apparent, 
but is often not, is that each case exists in its own sphere. States that follow best practices and are 
learning organizations may still fail depending on situational factors. There are, depending on the 
model used, some universally applicable strategies – but thinking of these strategies without the 
local context is inherently flawed. 
 
This thesis explores the complex, interdisciplinary study of counterinsurgency in the 21st 
century, and makes a contribution to the literature by testing the counterinsurgency best-practices 
established in the analytical frameworks of David Kilcullen and Christopher Paul et al.’s study 
Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies to see which analytical framework is best 
able to explain the Dutch experience in Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 2006-2010. The Dutch 
approach to counterinsurgency involved a whole-of-government approach, in which civilian and 
military actors worked together to increase security and provide increased political and economic 
development. With the Dutch military being under-studied, it is important to examine their 
development-first approach to counterinsurgency, as their total commitment to this philosophy 
differs from many of the other nations engaged in Afghanistan. The increase in overall stability 
and security in Uruzgan indicates that the Dutch counterinsurgency methods have value, and 
further examination may lead to new conclusions about how to implement development-first 
counterinsurgency. This thesis attempts to bring to light the importance of the Dutch approach to 
counterinsurgency.  
 
From a high-level, there were several important findings that resulted from the study of 
the Dutch in Uruzgan, Afghanistan during Task Force Uruzgan. First, in the three districts that 
the Dutch focused their counterinsurgency efforts on, there were several gains. There was an 
increase in the security and stability in the districts, allowing the Government of Afghanistan 
more control and influence on the population. In addition, there were improvements in the 
economic and political capabilities in these districts. This includes improvements in the 
agricultural, educational, and low-level political legitimacy across the focus districts. 
Additionally, the Dutch method of using its normal soldiers to provide security, while using its 
more highly trained special forces for kinetic actions against the Taliban allowed a greater 
increase in overall security.  
 
In the sections that follow, this paper will examine the important analytical frameworks 
of counterinsurgency, setting an analytical base by briefly looking at the work of David Galula 
and other prominent scholars of counterinsurgency. Then, the paper will transition to the two 
analytical frameworks that form the basis for analysis of the Uruzgan case study: David 
Kilcullen and Christopher Paul et al. The next section of the paper will cover the three-part case 
study concerning the Uruzgan province of Afghanistan, and finally concludes with the best-
practices analysis of the case study and conclusions and recommendations. 
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Chapter 2: Counterinsurgency Theories and Frameworks 
 
The theory section of the paper will have four parts. The first part describes the variables, 
hypotheses, and theories that this paper adopts for the analysis of the Uruzgan case studies. The 
second part is a literature review that describes some of the most important works on 
counterinsurgency. This section helps to provide context for the third and fourth parts, which are 
the analytical frameworks based on the work of David Kilcullen and the authors from the RAND 
Corporation – Christopher Paul, Colin Clark, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan – respectively.  
 
Research Methodology 
 
Before moving forward in this section, it is important to operationalize several definitions 
to provide clarity. An independent variable is the causal phenomenon being examined. A 
dependent variable is what is impacted by changes in the independent variable. These two 
variables provide the underpinning of laws and hypotheses. A law is “an observed regular 
relationship between two phenomena,” while a hypothesis is “a conjectured relationship between 
two phenomena.” This paper focuses on causal hypotheses, in which it is known, or conjectured, 
respectively, that: A causes B. A theory is “a causal law… or a casual hypothesis… together with 
an explanation of the causal law or hypothesis that explicates how A causes B.” If a theory 
cannot, in Van Evera’s words, be “arrow diagramed,” meaning an established pattern showing 
the relationship from independent variable, through intervening variables, to the dependent 
variable, then it is not actually a theory. This means that when it comes to political science, most 
things that are termed “theory” are not actually theories, but rather analytical frameworks. These 
frameworks help to provide structure to how we interpret events, but they cannot really be used 
to accurately predict events based on a specific set of circumstances. This paper will test 
hypotheses on best practices in counterinsurgency based on the analytical frameworks of David 
Kilcullen and Christopher Paul et al. The testing of laws will not occur in this thesis. The 
hypotheses will be tested in the case study of the Uruzgan province of Afghanistan. This process 
will be described below.
8
 
 
Within the context of in this paper, the independent variable (IV) being tested is the 
application of best-practice counterinsurgency techniques. A best practice is a strategy or tactic 
that should, or should not be, implemented, as it is thought that such practices will be beneficial 
for the counterinsurgency campaign. These best practices will be explicitly identified in chapter 
two, and then further defined and analyzed in chapter six. Victory is defined by David Galula as 
“the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the 
population but maintained by and with the population;”9 by the authors from the RAND 
Corporation as “the government stayed in power, the country remained intact, and no major 
concessions were granted to the insurgent at the end of the conflict;”10 and by David Kilcullen as 
                                                 
8
 All citations in this paragraph from: Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 8-15. 
9
 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2006. Print. 54. 
10Christopher Paul et al., “Paths to Victory,” 17.  
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the return of “the parent society to a stable, peaceful mode of interaction – on terms favorable to 
the government.”11  It is important to note an additional definition of victory that is forwarded by 
Kilcullen: “In modern counter-insurgency, victory may need to be re-defined as the disarming 
and reintegration of insurgents into society, combined with popular support for permanent, 
institutionalised anti-terrorist measures that contain the risk of terrorist cells emerging from the 
former insurgent movement.”12 This second definition more readily highlights the inherent 
difficulty of defeating an insurgency.  
 
Given, though, that this thesis will be examining a period of time during the middle of a 
counterinsurgency and not the final stages of one, assessing whether or not victory was achieved 
is both premature and frankly useless from an analytical stand point. Therefore, this thesis will 
not be assessing victory, but rather stabilization. Stabilization is the creation of conditions 
mirroring those of victory, but occurring during the middle of a larger conflict. My definition of 
stabilization is based on David Kilcullen’s first definition of victory, as: the movement of the 
province toward a secure, peaceful mode of interaction on terms favorable to the government.  
 
The general hypothesis being tested is as follows:  
 
Increase in Best Practices (IV)  Movement toward Stabilization (DV) 
 
According to this hypothesis, if best practices are followed by a counterinsurgent then the 
counterinsurgency campaign will eventually be victorious. There are, however, situational 
factors that can influence the ability of the counterinsurgent to succeed, such as the nature of the 
counterinsurgent government, the nature of the insurgency, population dynamics – essentially all 
factors within a given society.
13
  
 
Within the IV, there are two sets of authors, Christopher Paul et al. from the RAND 
Corporation and David Kilcullen, whose analytical frameworks of counterinsurgency can be 
used to create best practices. This paper will test the following specific hypotheses, based on 
their best practices, against the Uruzgan case studies. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
Increase in David Kilcullen’s Best Practices  Movement toward Stabilization 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
Increase in Christopher Paul et al.’s Best Practices  Movement toward Stabilization 
  
                                                 
11
 David Kilcullen, “Deiokes and the Taliban Local Governance, Bottom-up State Formation, and the 
Rule of Law in Counterinsurgency, ” in Counterinsurgency, (Oxford University Press, 2010), 216.  
12
 David Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency Redux," Survival, 48, no. 4 (2006): 123. 
13
 In a related field, Lisa Morje Howard examined United Nations’ Peace Keeping Missions and found 
that one of the factors that lead to success is that the conditions on the ground are not overly difficult. For 
more information, see: Lisa Morje Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
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The best practices mentioned here will be explicitly noted later in this chapter, after examining 
background counterinsurgency information, in the two analytical frameworks in question. 
Detailed descriptions of the best practices can be found in chapter six.  
 
   
LIMITATION TO THE STUDY 
 
There is something that needs to be clarified about these hypotheses. It should be self-evident 
that the general hypothesis being tested is, under normal circumstances, usually valid: with 
almost everything in life, success is more likely when you perform the actions that tend to lead to 
success. Success in counterinsurgency is not guaranteed, as it is possible for a counterinsurgent 
to do everything correctly and still lose. Considering this, though, the general hypothesis of this 
thesis should not trouble the reader. The focus of this paper is not to test and reinforce the 
analytical underpinnings of the hypothesis, as this is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the 
focus here, and what is actually being tested, is which of the two series of best practices best 
explains observations.  
  
The case study being examined is just a small pocket of good practices in the middle of a larger, 
multidimensional conflict involving armed forces from all over the world. While the Dutch did 
see some success in combating the Taliban, in the long run their efforts did not make a 
considerable impact on the overall status quo in the war. It is important to remember the 
conversation that was held between American Colonel Harry Summers and Vietnamese Colonel 
Tu, in which Summers said, “You know, you never beat us on the battlefield,” to which Colonel 
Tu responded, “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.”14 To use a holistic analogy, the Dutch 
in Uruzgan treated a single injury on a badly wounded patient. Further, the patient was already 
suffering from an underlying condition that was slowly killing it from within – an ineffective and 
out of touch central government doing too much in a state without a strong culture of a central 
authority, low literacy rate, and only the minimal spread of modern technology.
15
 
 
The intent of this study is highlight the strategies and tactics of the Dutch counterinsurgency 
efforts in Uruzgan and provide a method of analysis that can hopefully provide future scholars 
and practitioners of counterinsurgency an insight into the Dutch experience. This study is not 
intended to solve the problem described above, in which the relative success of Dutch personnel 
failed to adequately impact the overall security structure in Afghanistan. That problem lies well 
beyond the scope of this project. By only examining whether or not the Dutch were able to 
provide stability, rather than be victorious or succeed, I hope to avoid the deep analytical issue 
inherent in studying an isolated case that lasts for four years in the middle of a thirteen year long 
war.   
 
Literature Review  
 
When considering counterinsurgency it is important to define the time period, as 
technology has a major impact on the ability of both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent to 
                                                 
14
 Colonel Harry Summers, “Interview with General Frederick C. Weyand About the American Troops 
Who Fought in the Vietnam War,” 12 June 2006.  
15
 Special thanks to Christopher Paul for providing this analogy to me.  
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wage war. Generally, writings on counterinsurgency can be broken into two separate time 
periods. The first set was written after the wars of national independence following World War 
II, and are referred to as classical counterinsurgency. The second set is more contemporary, 
having been written in the 21
st
 century, and takes into account the impact of modern technology 
and globalization on the ability to conduct counterinsurgency, and are called post-classical 
counterinsurgency. The two sets of writings, while distinct in time period written, are not 
necessarily exclusive. The classical counterinsurgency literature is by no means dated and still 
remains relevant today, especially given how much of the post-classical literature has a basis in 
the classical literature.  
 
 The most prominent author on 20
th
 century counterinsurgency is France’s David Galula. 
Galula, who graduated from the French military academy Saint Cyr in 1939, fought in North 
Africa, Italy and France during World War II, and then participated in irregular wars in China, 
Greece, Indochina, and Algeria. In 1964, three years before his death, he published a book titled: 
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.
16
 The ideas that Galula discusses focus on 
combating insurgencies in the post-colonial, Cold War world.  
 
 Galula’s classical counterinsurgency framework is rooted in the lessons of 130 years of 
French colonial warfare. To begin the book, Galula first describes general ideas about 
revolutionary wars, and then goes on to write a description of insurgency warfare. The logical 
reasoning behind the second and third chapters, titled “Prerequisites for a Successful Insurgency” 
and “The Insurgency Doctrine”, respectively, is that in order to successfully counter an 
insurgency, you must understand its nature. It is for this reason that Mao Zedong, Vo Nguyen 
Giap, and T.E. Lawrence are recommended reading for counterinsurgents; and it is apparent 
from reading Galula that he had read Mao’s treatise “On Guerrilla Warfare.”17  
 
 According to Galula, there are two stages of a revolutionary war, the phrase that he uses 
to describe a conflict between a host government (counterinsurgent) and the challenger 
(insurgent) – this language helps to show the influence that the French colonial warfare 
experience had on Galula. “An insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step 
by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the 
existing order.”18 The first stage is the cold revolutionary war, where the actions of the insurgent 
are non-violent and (mostly) legal. Combating an insurgency at this juncture mainly includes 
police-style work of collecting intelligence and infiltrating the organization.  
 
The transition to the hot revolutionary war, the second stage, is when the government 
needs to involve the military in order to effectively combat the insurgency. Here, Galula 
describes what he calls the four “laws” of counterinsurgency, although they are not laws as the 
term is defined above, but rather fundamental principles crucial to success. The four laws are: the 
support of the population is necessary for successful counterinsurgency; support is gained 
through an active minority; support is conditional; and that intensity of efforts and vastness of 
means are essential.
19
 These laws form the backbone of his framework. Galula created an 8-step 
                                                 
16
 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare.  
17
 Mao Zedong, and Samuel B. Griffith. On Guerrilla Warfare. Thousand Oaks, USA: BN, 2007. 
18
 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 2. 
19
 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 52-54. 
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process, derived from the laws, that if followed would lead a counterinsurgent force to victory. 
He acknowledges that a rigid application of the 8 steps in every case study is potentially 
dangerous, while also claiming that deviating from the order he established “under normal 
conditions… [will violate] the principles of counterinsurgency warfare and of plain common 
sense.”20 While not always needing to start at step one, as circumstances may allow the 
counterinsurgent to start farther down the line, Galula does reemphasize the linear nature of the 
process.  
 
At the time it was published, the classical theory of counterinsurgency was the dominant 
paradigm for effectively combating an insurgency.  Yet, as David Kilcullen has developed in his 
work, the world has changed in many ways since they were published. Most counterinsurgents 
are no longer combating communist insurgencies in post-colonial states, but rather multinational 
Islamic insurgents. Further, the diffusion of information and communication technology brought 
on by globalization has had a significant impact on combating insurgencies. There are of course 
contemporary examples that buck this trend, where the classic model of counterinsurgency is the 
best fit, such as in Columbia, but for most of today’s world an adjusted approach is needed. This 
trend will be addressed further in a future section.
 21
 
 
Another author who has contributed to the counterinsurgency literature is retired Army 
Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl.  Nagl’s 2002 book, titled Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: 
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, compares counterinsurgency strategies 
and tactics of the British in Malaya and the United States in Vietnam. Through the comparison 
Nagl posits that one of the most critical factors in successful counterinsurgency is organizational 
learning. According to Nagl, “the key to organizational learning is getting the decision-making 
authority to allow such innovation, monitor its effectiveness, and then transmit new doctrine with 
strict requirements that it be followed throughout the organization.”22 Central to an 
organization’s ability to learn is its culture. The history of an organization determines how it 
functions: the British military has fought colonial wars that had required innovation, while the 
modern American military has engaged in mostly conventional wars. Overtime, these histories 
have contributed to organizational cultures that allow for more or less innovation or success in 
counterinsurgency. If the counterinsurgent government and military are learning organizations, 
Nagl believes, the chances of success are increased.
23
 
 
U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 was written by 
committee, and focuses both on theoretical examinations of counterinsurgency as well as small-
scale tactics. First published on December 15, 2006, and downloaded over 1.5 million times in 
the first month, Field Manual 3-24 had an incredible impact on both American policy and 
counterinsurgency strategy. It was designed to prepare the United States for future 
counterinsurgency campaigns, and to help direct policy change in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, 
the creation of the field manual also demonstrates how the U.S. Army has, at least in some 
respects, become a learning organization. According to David Betz, “while the new 
                                                 
20
 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 56.  
21
 David Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency Redux." Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 48.4 (2006): 111-
130. 
22
 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 195. 
23
 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 217. 
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counterinsurgency field manual is thorough, serious, and stands in sharp contrast to the political 
rhetoric concerning the ‘War on Terror’ of the last few years, it is not without failings, chief 
among them that it is pervaded by concepts drawn from Maoist-style People Revolutionary 
Warfare, which is not the sort of insurgency now being faced.”24  
 
One of the most important things to come out of Field Manual 3-24, according to John 
Nagl, is Figure 5-1, reproduced below: 
 
“Example logical lines of operations for a counterinsurgency” 
 
This chart emphasizes how combat operations are only a minimal part of counterinsurgency, and 
how success depends on a comprehensive and multidimensional approach.
25
 
 
BACKGROUND ON DAVID KILCULLEN 
 
David Kilcullen, an Australian soldier-scholar, has written extensively on the modern 
dynamics of counterinsurgency. Kilcullen reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the 
Australian Army and served in counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations in East Timor, 
Bougainville, and across the Middle East. Kilcullen came to the United States and became a 
member of the burgeoning counterinsurgency community, and contributed to the creation of 
Field Manual 3-24. In 2007, Kilcullen was the Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor for General 
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David Petraeus, the Commander of the Multinational Force –Iraq. Throughout this time, 
Kilcullen had been busy writing and authored several influential pieces. 
 
Of the articles, essays, and books written by Kilcullen, of which there are many, this 
paper focuses on a few – the influential pieces that speak directly to combating insurgencies in 
today’s complex environment. There is no one comprehensive piece detailing Kilcullen’s 
thoughts on counterinsurgency, in the way that Galula’s ideas are presented; this paper will 
compile his works into a more workable format. 
 
Published in 2010, Kilcullen’s book Counterinsurgency is an annotated collection of his 
essays and articles. Included in the collection are some, but not all, of Kilcullen’s most 
influential pieces The introduction to the book, Understanding Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency, discusses the high-level dynamics of counterinsurgency in terms that would 
be understandable to a novice. One of the most important contributions coming out of the 
introduction is the inclusion of what he refers to as his “two fundamentals” of 
counterinsurgency.
26
  These two fundamentals will be discussed at length as a part of the next 
section. The second piece in the book, Twenty-eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level 
Counterinsurgency, was designed to help company-level counterinsurgents make sense of FM 3-
24 and understand how to apply its lessons.
27
 The third section of the book, Measuring Progress 
in Afghanistan, addresses the challenges that governments and militaries face when trying to 
assess progress in counterinsurgencies and offers suggestions as to improve intelligence 
operations.  Deiokes and the Taliban: Local Governance, Bottom-up State Formation, and the 
Rule of Law in Counterinsurgency was a lecture given by Kilcullen in 2009, in which the author 
addresses alternatives to the current top-down approach to state-building utilized by the United 
States in Afghanistan and Iraq. The last, and longest, section of the book Countering Global 
Insurgency provides an alternative framework for viewing the War on Terror –Kilcullen says 
that treating Al Qa’ida as an insurgency and utilizing advanced counterinsurgency techniques 
provides a better way to address the threat than an enemy-centric approach.  
 
Kilcullen published his arguably most important contribution to the literature in 2006, 
titled Counterinsurgency Redux. Here, Kilcullen examines the relevance of classical-
counterinsurgency frameworks to the modern world, and forwards that, based on field evidence, 
new developments in counterinsurgency thought must be developed in order to address the 
dynamics of modern insurgencies. At the end of the paper Kilcullen suggests seven different 
ways which modern counterinsurgency differs from the past. 
 
One of Kilcullen’s most popular pieces is his book, The Accidental Guerrilla. In it, he 
posits a hypothesis on how al Qa’ida, among other groups, gathers support and resources. 
Essentially, al Qa’ida moves into a region, and over time embeds itself within and makes 
alliances with the local population, then exports violence that will (inevitably) provoke a 
Western overreaction, and in the aftermath of the Western response, harness the emotions of the 
population in order to gain support for its movement. Kilcullen forwards that there is not much 
                                                 
26
 David Kilcullen, “Understanding Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” in Counterinsurgency, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 3.  
27
 David Kilcullen, “Twenty-eight Articles of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” in Counterinsurgency, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 29-49. 
Majkut 16 
 
widespread support for al Qa’ida’s ideology amongst traditional tribal societies – but these 
societies will band together and support al Qa’ida in the wake of foreign intervention. The 
hypothesis proposed in this book is not completely relevant to this paper, as this is a tactic of al 
Qaeda and not the Taliban. But what is relevant, and has now become part of counterinsurgency 
canon, is that overreaction in the wake of an attack – especially when these reactions result in 
civilian casualties, is detrimental to the counterinsurgent’s cause.28  
 
The following section of the paper will take an in-depth look at David Kilcullen’s writing 
and combine his individual pieces into one coherent framework.  
 
David Kilcullen’s Analytical Framework 
 
“… the key is to first diagnose the environment, then design a tailor-made approach to counter 
the insurgency, and - most critically - have a system for generating continuous, real-time feedback from 
the environment that allows you to know what effect you are having, and adapt as needed.”29 
 
An insurgency is “a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state (or a 
group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers.”30  
The non-state groups, or insurgents, are an organized movement that challenges the legitimacy of 
the established political order through political and military means. “[I]nsurgents challenge the 
state by making it impossible for the government to perform its functions, or by usurping those 
functions – most commonly, local-level political legitimacy; the rule of law; monopoly on the 
use of force; taxation; control of movement; and regulation of the economy.” 31 
 
 “The center of gravity of an insurgent movement – the source of power from which it 
derives its morale, its physical strength, its freedom of action, and its will to act – is its 
connectivity with the local population in a given area.”32 While it is preferable for the insurgent 
to have the full, unconditional support of the population, lesser degrees of support, maintained 
through rule-of-law, force, or fear, are sustainable. Without support – actively, passively, or 
tacitly given – the insurgency will eventually wither, as the support is necessary for recruits and 
freedom of movement.
33
 If an insurgency has a strong, outside-source of funding (such as foreign 
donations or the sale of narcotics), then they have a decreased, but not eliminated, reliance on the 
population. Their connectivity to the population is what makes insurgencies vulnerable. While 
insurgents are able to withdraw and avoid military confrontation as they choose, the population 
is easy to find. Insurgents cannot withdraw from a political assault, leaving two options: one, to 
wait it out, or two, to directly confront the counterinsurgent. Political assaults are the non-
military actions, such as the promotion of civil-liberties or free and fair elections, taken by the 
counterinsurgent to combat the influence of the insurgency. Insurgents must react to political 
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assaults on the population or fear that their permanent isolation will result in their movement’s 
failure, and that further allowing these political assaults cede the initiative to the 
counterinsurgent. 
 
The dominant political authority (the state or an occupying power) combating the 
insurgency is known as the counterinsurgent. Counterinsurgency “is an umbrella term that 
describes the complete range of measures that governments take to defeat insurgencies. These 
measures may be political, administrative, military, economic, psychological, or informational, 
and are almost always used in combination.”34 Counterinsurgency cannot exist without 
insurgency, as its definition implies the inherent presence of an insurgency. The main goal “in 
counterinsurgency is to return the parent society to a stable, peaceful mode of interaction – on 
terms favorable to the government.”35  The second clause in that sentence is the most important, 
as it is possible for the society to return to peaceful interactions on conditions that are 
unfavorable to the counterinsurgent. Classical counterinsurgency had been the dominant 
framework for addressing insurgencies, from the time they were created to present day. While 
much of what has been written still remains highly relevant, there have been significant changes 
in the global environment. “But much is new in counter-insurgency redux, possibly requiring 
fundamental reappraisals of conventional wisdom."
36
 
 
First and foremost, the method of engagement is different in post-classical 
counterinsurgency. In classical counterinsurgency, only the insurgent is able to initiate a conflict; 
in post-classical, there have been several examples, most notably Afghanistan and Iraq, where 
the counterinsurgent was the force that directly initiated the insurgent. Secondly, the goals of the 
insurgencies differ. It is assumed that insurgencies want to supplant the counterinsurgent and 
install a new government in their place. “[I]nsurgency today follows state failure and is not 
directed at taking over a functioning body politic, but at dismembering or scavenging its carcass, 
or contesting an ‘ungoverned space.’… [In some cases] “there is no apparent strategy to seize the 
instruments of the state. The insurgents seek to expel foreigners, but have little to say about what 
might replace the national government.”37 Insurgents will still utilize tactics of provocation and 
exhaustion to drive out the counterinsurgent, but “this is a ‘resistance’ insurgency rather than a 
‘revolutionary’ insurgency. Insurgents want to destroy the… state, not secede from it or supplant 
it.” 38  Insurgencies today do not comprise an united front, such as the Viet Minh against the 
French in the Indochina War, but rather consist of dozens of competing groups – which may in 
fact be more, rather than less, difficult to defeat.  
 
 Third, an important factor in the changing dynamics of modern wars between insurgents 
and counterinsurgents is globalization. Globalization, including the 24-hour news cycle and the 
prevalence of cheap communications technology, has changed the dynamic of information 
between the two forces. Insurgents are able to easily publicize their message to a worldwide 
audience, attracting moral, financial, and physical support from global backers. The focus in 
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counterinsurgency on producing a single narrative is even more important, as the ease with 
which insurgents can manipulate information and play to a global audience is exponentially 
increased in the post-classical era.
39
 By successfully adopting these new sources of information, 
insurgents can defeat the counterinsurgents in the court of public opinion, further creating issues 
of morale in the counterinsurgent’s population.40 In addition, the Internet has created a virtual 
sanctuary for insurgents – a relatively safe space where members can gather to discuss strategies 
and tactics, and push propaganda, while also seeking outside support – that are far beyond the 
reach of counterinsurgents. “Internet-based financial transfers, training and recruitment, 
clandestine communication, planning and intelligence capabilities allow insurgents to exploit 
virtual sanctuary for more than just propaganda. Classical counter-insurgency theory has little to 
say about such electronic sanctuary.”41 
 
  Finally, the economics of insurgencies have changed, specifically the relationship 
between the insurgency and the population.  The economic relationship between insurgents and 
the population is exactly the opposite in some modern insurgencies. For example, in Iraq the 
insurgents’ primary funding sources in 2004 were courier infiltration and access to buried 
caches. The insurgents were wealthier than the population, and routinely paid poverty-stricken 
locals to conduct attacks for cash. Thus, efforts to isolate the insurgents (intended, based on 
classical theory, to hurt the guerrillas and protect the population) had precisely the opposite 
effect, starving and this alienating the population while leaving the insurgents largely 
unaffected.”42 In addition to this, globalization has made drug trafficking, foreign donations, 
corruption and extortion much more effective, allowing insurgent groups to survive with only the 
tacit approval of the population. One potential response to this concept is for the 
counterinsurgent to address the outsides sources of funding through eradicating the drug trade, 
reducing government corruption, or tracking financial transactions. 
 
 As a result of these changing dynamics in post-classical counterinsurgency warfare, there 
are seven new basic principles.

 These principals are as follows: 
1. “In modern counter-insurgency, the side may win which best mobilises and energises its global, 
regional and local support base – and prevents its adversaries doing likewise. 
2. In modern counter-insurgency, the security force ‘area of influence’ may need to include all 
neighboring countries, and its ‘area of interest’ may need to be global. 
3. In modern counter-insurgency, the security force must control a complex ‘conflict ecosystem’ [in 
which there may be more than one insurgent group] – rather than defeating a single specific 
insurgent adversary. 
4. In modern counter-insurgency, a common diagnosis of the problem, and enablers for 
collaboration, may matter more than formal unity of effort across multiple agencies. 
5. Modern counter-insurgency may be 100% political – comprehensive media coverage making 
even the most straightforward combat action a ‘political warfare’ engagement. 
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6. In modern counter-insurgency, ‘victory’ may not be final – ‘permanent containment’ may be 
needed to prevent defeated insurgents transforming into terrorist groups. 
7. In modern counter-insurgency, secret intelligence may matter less than situational awareness 
based on unclassified but difficult-to-access information.” 43 
 
These new principles are more a matter of high-level strategy rather than tactics. For 
counterinsurgents on the ground, issues such as “final victory” or overall “area of influence” 
matter little. Taken aggregately, though, these principles have a large impact on success in a 
post-classical counterinsurgency environment.   
 
Another important thing for counterinsurgency, both classic and post-classic, involves the 
mindset of the population. To a certain extent the population’s top priority in a conflict between 
an insurgent and counterinsurgent is their safety. “[P]eople will do almost anything, and support 
almost anyone, to reduce that feeling of fear and uncertainty by establishing a permanent 
presence, through a predictable system of rules and sanctions that allow people to find safety by 
compliance with a set of guidelines. Even if those guidelines are harsh and oppressive, if people 
know they can be safe by following a certain set of rules, they will flock to the side that provides 
the most consistent and predictable set of rules.”44 This implies that one of the top goals for 
counterinsurgents is to establish a full-spectrum, normative system of control over all aspects of 
the conflict area. A further implication of this mentality is the importance of bottom-up, rather 
than top-down, state building, as local governments are inherently better at establishing this 
normative system of control within a conflict area than a central government. Experience in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa show that “bottom up, civil-society-based programs 
that focus on peace-building, reconciliation, and the connection of legitimate nonstate 
governance structures to wider state institutions may have a greater chance of success in conflict 
and postconflict environments than traditional top-down programs that focus on building the 
national-level institutions of the central state.”45 
 
With all of this in mind, there are two fundamentals of successful counterinsurgency. The 
first is “to understand in detail what drives the conflict in any given area or with any given 
population group.”46 Gathering and analyzing intelligence effectively is critical to the second 
fundamental. The second fundamental is “to act with respect for local people, putting the 
wellbeing of noncombatant civilians ahead of any other consideration, even – in fact, especially 
– ahead of killing the enemy.”47 The second fundamental is a cornerstone of “heart and minds” 
counterinsurgency, but respecting and protecting the population used in conjunction with proper 
intelligence gathering results in more effective counterinsurgency. These two fundamentals 
apply equally to classic and post-classic counterinsurgency cases. The following two subsections 
will analyze these two fundamentals of successful counterinsurgency in detail by combining 
elements relating to the fundamentals from the various works authored by Kilcullen.  
 
THE FIRST FUNDAMENTAL - INTELLIGENCE 
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 Proper intelligence analysis in counterinsurgency has three components: discovering 
what you need to know, acquiring information on the ground, and properly assessing progress. 
There are multiple layers of intelligence – from understanding the conflict area as a whole to 
ground-level intelligence that identifies insurgent caches or hideouts – which invariably makes 
gathering and analyzing intelligence a labor and resource intensive task. Additionally, there is a 
fundamental problem relating to knowledge. The complex nature of counterinsurgency limits the 
amount of knowledge any one person or organization can have, and “even if we could know it 
fully, our knowledge would be a mere snapshot that would immediately be out of date.”48 But, if 
the counterinsurgent is able to effectively manage their intelligence operations, the task of 
combating an insurgency and gaining the allegiance of the population is much more attainable.  
 
 First, the counterinsurgency must have a clear understanding of the conflict situation in 
order to have a chance at combating the insurgency. At a higher level, there are three aspects of a 
conflict that must be understood. The first is the nature of the insurgency. The type of 
insurgency, whether or not it is seeking to overthrow the state, scavenge the remains of a failed 
state, or to simply create chaos, impacts the nature of the counterinsurgency response. Secondly, 
it is critical to acknowledge the nature of the government either conducting the 
counterinsurgency or being supported by an outside force.  Differing structures of government 
can have different approaches to counterinsurgency, with autocratic governments having more 
leeway with tactics than democracies. Thirdly, counterinsurgents must learn about the 
environment the conflict takes place in, such as the geography, political climate, and especially 
the population dynamics.
49
 Comprehending these three different aspects of the conflict will give 
the counterinsurgency a better high-level understanding of the nature of the threat facing the 
government.  
 
 Second, there are measures that should be taken at the tactical-level to improve the 
performance, safety, and effectiveness of the counterinsurgency forces. Counterinsurgents must 
be experts on their area of operations – knowing everything from ancient grievances to the 
topography – as this information plays into the population’s collective psyche. Further, only 
though understanding the full history and social dynamics of an area can a counterinsurgent truly 
mobilize the population to their cause. To better facilitate the acquisition of this knowledge, 
counterinsurgents must organize themselves to effectively collect, analyze, and distribute 
knowledge on a frequent basis. This information, once gathered, should be collected and stored 
in multiple forms – both in digital and paper copies for redundancy – as it will improve the 
current operational group’s effectiveness, as well as better prepare the successor group’s ability 
to succeed. It is important for the counterinsurgents to directly interact and question the 
population in their area of operations to identify their needs; the most useful, and actionable, 
information can come directly from those who you are seeking to protect.
50
 
  
 The third part of successful intelligence operations is proper assessment. Things that need 
to be considered when assessing progress are overall trends within the war, the 
counterinsurgent’s progress against the stated campaign goals, and the performance of 
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individuals and organizations against best practices.
51
 One method of assessing progress and 
analyzing intelligence that has been validated by field experience is the district stabilization 
approach. This approach has three phases. The first phase involves assessing the area of 
operations and identifying the main drivers of violent conflict. In the second phase, triage, the 
counterinsurgent must prioritize the problems currently facing them by examining whether or not 
the problem is actually creating instability, is currently being exploited by the insurgency, and 
whether or not the counterinsurgency can make meaningful progress addressing it in a viable 
timeframe with current resources.  Finally, in the audit phase, the counterinsurgent must review 
all of its activities and determine the effectiveness of past actions and whether or not to redirect 
future resources to other identified priority stabilization targets.
52
  
 
 An important aspect of the audit phase that must be addressed is the dynamics of metrics. 
Counterinsurgents must look beyond the typical metrics of enemies killed or total amount of 
SIGACTs to “surrogate indicators that allow them to detect deeper trends in the environment that 
may not be directly observable.”53 This will have a two-pronged affect. First, organizations act 
based on what success is measured against – meaning that if an organizations bases “success” on 
the amount of money spent, the agents within the organization will be incentivized to spend their 
entire budget without considering the effectiveness of the spending – and addressing this issue 
may help generate an organization-wide shift in tactics. Second, analyzing the correct 
information allows for a better read on whether the current strategy and tactics are effective and 
can lead to organizational learning and better performance over time.
54
  
 
At its most fundamental level, though, proper intelligence gathering and analysis can help 
counterinsurgents win the battle of adaptation. “[C]ounterinsurgency is at heart an adaptation 
battle: a struggle to rapidly develop and learn new techniques and apply them in a fast-moving, 
high-threat environment, bringing them to bear before the enemy can evolve in response, and 
rapidly changing them as the environment shifts.”55 Effectiveness is directly correlated to 
adaptation, as highly effective actions will become obsolete more quickly because the opposing 
side must counter it or face serious consequences to their strategy. In counterinsurgency, the 
most dangerous enemy is not necessarily the one with the best weapons, but rather the group that 
is the most adaptive.
56
 “This means that the adaptational [sic] dynamic (‘survival of the fittest’) 
also applies to us: we must adapt and evolve faster and better than the [insurgents]… in order to 
survive. Our armies must be flexible, versatile, and agile, but adaptability goes far beyond the 
military sphere: out whole approach to counterinsurgency must be characterized by continual 
innovation.”57 
 
With a focus on proper intelligence gathering and analysis, and honest assessments of 
strategy, tactics, and overall campaign progress, the counterinsurgent will be better prepared to 
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handle the challenges of counterinsurgency warfare. These processes will enable more effective 
security, reconstruction, and political operations across the theatre.  
 
THE SECOND FUNDAMENTAL – POPULATION CENTRIC TACTICS 
 
 As noted above, the second fundamental of successful counterinsurgency is putting the 
well being of the non-combatant ahead of capturing or killing the enemy. This fundamental is 
essentially synonymous to the “hearts and minds” approach to counterinsurgency, in which the 
strategic and tactical focus is not enemy-centric – like in conventional war where killing or 
capturing the enemy is key – but rather population-centric. A population-centric approach entails 
a focus on providing security to and addressing the needs of the population, and successful 
implementation requires strategic and tactical innovation. 
 
 It is important to clarify the concept of “hearts and minds,” as even though the concept is 
a powerful aspect of the current narrative of counterinsurgency, it is easy to misinterpret it. The 
casual use of the term, especially given the resurgence of counterinsurgency as a topic, has the 
potential to alter the way the concept is viewed. The “hearts and minds” approach to 
counterinsurgency does not involve generating good will form the population through bribes in 
the form of handouts or social programs. Rather, “‘hearts’ means persuading people their best 
interests are served by your cause; ‘minds’ means convincing them that you can protect them, 
and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has to do with whether people like 
you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts.”58 Throughout the Iraq War, it has 
been claimed that American counterinsurgents have used money, especially impractical big 
budget items, as a tool to buy loyalty from the population, which has proved ineffective within 
the context of “hearts and minds.”59 
 
“But make no mistake: counterinsurgency is war, and war is inherently violent.”60 But 
when considering killing enemy combatants, it is important to distinguish between the two 
different types of insurgents. The reconcilables are typically those who are not ideologically 
committed and joined the insurgency for other reasons, such as a form of income, and could be 
convinced to lay down their weapons. The irreconcilables are those insurgents who are 
ideologically committed to the cause and could not be convinced to stop fighting. It is beneficial 
if the counterinsurgent can manage to separate the two classes of insurgents and only kill those 
active, irreconcilable combatants where there is no chance to bring them back, as an insurgent 
that is converted back is much more valuable than one that is dead.
61
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A good counterinsurgent is an armed social worker and is capable of both protecting the 
population and killing the enemy.
62
 The first priority is providing protection to the population 
and establishing security. From here, counterinsurgents are able to identify the needs within a 
community and then mobilize the resources to address these grievances. Priority should be given 
to providing the population first with its basic needs – food, water, shelter, etc. – and then 
progressing through Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.63 This, at its most basic level, will allow the 
counterinsurgent to build networks and mobilize the population against the insurgency. If the 
counterinsurgent is able to succeed in this process and mobilize the population, then the 
insurgents will have no choice but to go on the offensive or else risk potentially losing the 
population for good. The counterinsurgency should focus on its own plans and only confront the 
enemy when they get in the way. This policy, beyond helping to reduce the number of civilian 
casualties, has an important psychological effect. The population sees the insurgents as an 
aggressive, attacking force looking to disrupt the safety and security of the community, and sees 
the counterinsurgent as defending the collective interests of the community. “If we [the 
counterinsurgents] want people to partner with us, put their weapons down, and return to 
unarmed political dialogue rather than work out their issues through violence, then we must 
make them feel safe enough to do so, and we must convince them that they have more to gain by 
talking than fighting.”64 Getting insurgents to this step is crucial. Every insurgent who is willing 
to put down their weapon is more valuable then capturing them, and capturing is more valuable 
than killing them. A converted enemy does not create more insurgents, as many recruits to 
insurgency groups occur over anger of a loved one being killed. Further, a converted insurgent 
may start a trend. If other insurgents see that they are treated well and are able to protect their 
own interests by putting down their weapons that it may lead to an increase in other insurgents 
following suit.
65
 
 
 Inherent in the concept of protecting the population, but not specifically mentioned, is 
the concept of trust between the counterinsurgents and the population. One of the best ways to 
develop trust is to learn what grievances the population actually have and then follow through 
and address the complaints. Starting small and addressing these concerns will show the 
counterinsurgents commitment to help and begin to develop a trusting relationship. “Trust is a 
function of reliability. … Dependability is key – local people must believe that you will follow 
through and deliver on promises in a reliable manner. Over time, the predictability and order that 
you create through dependability makes people feel safer and encourages them to work with 
you.”66 Dependability, in conjunction with moral conduct, creates an atmosphere where victory 
could be attained. Being a reliable partner, through following through with promises made that 
address local grievances and protecting the population from insurgent attacks, the “hearts and 
minds” of the population can be won.  
 
 
BEST PRACTICES IN DAVID KILCULLEN’S COUNTERINSURGENCY FRAMEWORK 
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 Based on Kilcullen’s fundamentals and his analysis of the dynamics of post-classical 
counterinsurgency, there are 4 best practices that can be used to assess the strategy and tactics of 
a counterinsurgency campaign. Some are based on the two fundamentals, while others are 
derived from what is described above. They are: 
 Understand the conflict area, and what drives the conflict at a local level – possess 
and utilize advanced intelligence operations. 
 Willing, and able to, adapt tactics based on circumstances in the area of operation. 
 Putting the wellbeing of noncombatants ahead of killing or capturing the enemy – 
utilizing population-centric tactics.  
 Utilize bottom-up state building to increase political, social, and economic 
capabilities.  
  
These are the best practices that will be used when assessing the hypothesis that an increase in 
best practices will lead to a movement toward the victory condition.  
 
 
Christopher Paul et al.’s Analytical Framework 
 
 This section of the paper focuses on the results from the RAND Corporation’s study 
Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies by Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, Beth 
Grille, and Molly Dunigan.
67
 In this study, the authors examined all of the completed 
insurgencies between 1944 (the end of World War II) and 2010. In this time period there were 71 
different wars between insurgents and counterinsurgents, but the authors of the study eliminated 
12 case studies based on a variety of factors, leaving 59 cases.
68
 Historical narratives for all 71 
cases were developed. The 59 cases that survived situational elimination were then analyzed to 
test the importance of 24 different counterinsurgency concepts – such as “hearts and minds,” 
“clear, hold, build,” and “crush them” – that were derived from the established literature on 
counterinsurgency. Through this analysis, the authors were able to discover which of these 
concepts accurately correlated to victory. A scorecard was developed based on these concepts, 
against which the case studies were scored, to examine trends. The authors sought to learn which 
approaches to counterinsurgency were most effective, and not just in a limited number of case 
studies but in as large, and analytically relevant, set of data as possible. This analysis resulted in 
strong historical conclusions of counterinsurgency tactics rooted in a large-n study of 
counterinsurgency.  
 
 The authors from the RAND Corp. define counterinsurgency as “efforts taken by a 
government and its security forces (or the security forces of supporting partners or allies) to 
oppose an insurgency.”69 Something that the authors wanted to ensure was clear, though, was 
that counterinsurgency in and of itself does not presuppose a distinct strategic or tactical 
approach or theory. Rather, they say that the term simply denotes that “there is an insurgency and 
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there is someone who wishes to fight it.” 70 There are various ways of combating an insurgency, 
both successfully and unsuccessfully, and that the current connotation of counterinsurgency as 
exclusively involving population-centric tactics limits the analytical approach to the topic. 
 
As far as insurgencies go, the authors define them as “an organized, protracted politico-
military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, 
occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”71 The classical 
approach to counterinsurgency forwards the logic that the population is the insurgent’s most 
important source of tangible support. While this was certainly the case in many classical and 
contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns, the authors forward a slightly modified 
interpretation here. While the population may not be the sole source of the insurgent’s strength, 
the importance is that they are deriving resources from some source. Therefore, “the insurgents’ 
continued ability to maintain their tangible support (recruits, weapons and materiel, funding, 
intelligence, sanctuary) is more important than where that support comes from (the population of 
an outside actor) in determining the outcome of an insurgency.”72 The importance of this 
conclusion will be examined in depth below.  
 
Another concept that most people believe about insurgencies, that the authors critically 
examine, is that every insurgency is unique. While true at the ground level, meaning that the 
domestic conditions where each insurgency takes places are inherently unique, at the level of 
analysis that the researchers looked these individual differences were irrelevant. These 
differences “may make it harder or easier to do the things that must be done in order to prevail 
but… these things remained constant across the cases studied.”73 The specific actions mentioned 
above will be discussed in detail below. 
 
Generally there are two different approaches to conducting counterinsurgency. The first 
is enemy-centric. This approach treats counterinsurgency as a conventional conflict, with the 
main objective being to defeat the enemy.
74
 The authors of the study classify this as the iron fist 
approach to counterinsurgency. The second approach, similar to what would be termed 
population-centric by other authors, is called motive-focused counterinsurgency. Motive-focused 
counterinsurgency involves addressing not only the concerns and problems that generated the 
insurgency to begin with – such as an occupying power, the desire for national separatism, or 
political corruption – but also the sources of the insurgency’s resources. The counterinsurgency 
can limit the insurgent’s ability to generate resources by going directly after the population or 
outside actors giving the resources, and by limiting the opportunity of the population to give 
these resources in the first place.
75
 
 
Taking the previous points into consideration there are two main dichotomies to consider 
in counterinsurgency. The first is the target of the action: the active insurgents or the sources of 
insurgent support. The second is the style of actions taken: kinetic military actions or those 
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designed to diminish the motives driving the insurgency. The iron-fist approach typically 
comprises kinetic actions against active insurgents, while the motive-focused approach involves 
actions against the insurgent’s support base and action’s based on diminishing motives.76 
 
Both the iron fist and motive-focused approaches to counterinsurgency can lead to 
success. In the 44 cases where the government took an iron fist approach, the counterinsurgents 
won 17 times (38%); in motive-focused cases, the counterinsurgent prevailed 11 out of the 15 
times (73%). But, as the numbers indicate, the motive-focused approach to counterinsurgency 
succeeds dramatically more often than the iron fist approach.
77
 Of the cases where the iron fist 
approach was successful, many involved the counterinsurgent addressing some of the 
insurgency’s motives, although their primary focus was on kinetic actions. In order for a 
counterinsurgent to be successful, they must be able to strike a balance between the types of 
targets and the actions used to address those targets.
78
 
  
The authors warn, though, that the scorecard should not be looked to as a source for 
counterinsurgency theory or tactics. Rather, the scorecard “should be a useful diagnostic tool to 
assess whether a given COIN strategy within a given context is on the right track and to identify 
some issues that may not be sufficiently addressed by a given strategy, or short comings in 
implementation.”79 In addition to the best-practices comparison, the analysis section of this thesis 
will use the scorecard to look at the overall effectiveness of the Dutch approach.  
 
The scorecard, in combination with analysis of the 24 core counterinsurgency concepts, 
leads to very interesting and applicable analysis. The most important factors for counterinsurgent 
success are: 
 
 Commitment and Motivation 
 Tangible Support Reduction 
 Flexibility and Adaptability 
 At least two of the following: unity of effort, initiative, and 
intelligence. 
 
“In the 59 core cases, every winning case implemented these four concepts, and no losing case 
had all four of them (so, together they are prime implicants, perfectly discriminating the cases by 
outcome).”80 Commitment and Motivation refers to the level of commitment by the 
counterinsurgent forces and government to actually defeating the insurgency. All cases in which 
this factor was lacking (17) were defeats for the counterinsurgents. Tangible Support Reduction 
is the ability of the counterinsurgency to impact the insurgent’s ability to access the resources 
that allow it to function. While in many cases this can be directly correlated to the population, in 
some contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns the source of support could be narcotics 
trafficking or outside donations. Flexibility and Adaptability refers to how well, or poorly, the 
counterinsurgency is able to acknowledge and change tactics based on the actions of the 
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insurgency. In the decisive phase of each counterinsurgency win, the counterinsurgent forces 
adapted their techniques.
81
   Further, the presence of the first two above concepts, commitment 
and motivation and tangible support reduction, were also prime implicants. Every successful 
counterinsurgency campaign had both of these two factors present– campaigns that had only one 
of the two resulted in counterinsurgency losses.
82
  
 
 At the end of the paper the authors list a series of recommendations that 
counterinsurgents should follow, all based on their analysis of the case studies. First, is that the 
counterinsurgent force have enough conventional military superiority that the insurgents were 
forced to fight as guerrillas. Second is to reduce the insurgent’s tangible support. Third is to 
recognize that source of the insurgency’s resources does not necessarily have to come from the 
population. Fourth, once the counterinsurgent force begins to use good practices they must be 
prepared to continue these practices for six or more years. Fifth is to avoid the iron fist approach 
to counterinsurgency and instead focus on the motive-based approach. Finally, the authors 
propose that counterinsurgents must have the capability to pursue multiple lines of operations 
simultaneously, as successful counterinsurgency requires input from various organizations 
operating at the same time.
83
 
 
BEST PRACTICES FROM CHRISTOPHER PAUL ET AL. 
 Based on the analysis by Christopher Paul at al., this paper will utilize the follow as 
indicators of best practices: 
 Commitment and Motivation 
 Tangible Support Reduction 
 Flexibility and Adaptability 
 The presence of at least two of the following: unity of effort, initiative, 
and intelligence. 
 
Each section of the case study will be examined to determine whether or not the counterinsurgent 
forces adequately achieved these goals.   
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Chapter Three: Afghanistan, Uruzgan, and the Taliban: A 
History  
 
“Ask those ancient Greek and Macedonian ghosts to reflect upon our situation today, and they might feel 
strangely at home. The old dictum “plus ça change, plus c’est la eme chose” (The more things change, the 
more they remain the same) ought to be the official motto of Afghanistan.”84 
  
Political Map of Afghanistan
85
  
 
 
This section of the paper contains the introduction to the two parts of the case study that 
the best practices of David Kilcullen and Christopher Paul et al. will be tested against. Before 
moving onto the case studies, though, it is important to develop a clear background on 
Afghanistan. This chapter will examine: the history of Afghanistan, from ancient times to the 
American War in Afghanistan; the history of the Taliban; information relating to the history, 
tribal dynamics, and overall demographics in Uruzgan; and the history of the Taliban activity in 
Uruzgan.  This information will place the case studies into context and allow for deeper, more 
meaningful analysis. 
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HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN  
 
What follows is a very brief description of the history of what will become Afghanistan. The 
purpose of this section is to give the reader a better understanding of how the modern state of 
Afghanistan formed. This section will highlight the many ethnically and culturally diverse 
groups that have ruled Afghanistan, and helps to explain why Afghanistan is today such a diverse 
state.  
 
Based on its location, Afghanistan has been the gateway between Europe and Asia. 
Throughout its early history what is known today as Afghanistan was conquered by four separate 
empires: Darius I of Babylonia around 500 B.C.; Alexander the Great of Macedonia in 329 B.C.; 
Mahmud of Ghazni in the eleventh century; and Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century. These 
four conquerors highlighted the frequency with which Afghanistan was preyed upon by the 
strongest militaries that the world has seen.  
 
For instance, take the conquest by Alexander the Great, whose experience in Afghanistan 
offers an eerie comparison to the American War in Afghanistan. At the time of his conquest, the 
area known today as Afghanistan was called Bactria. “From the perspective of the native 
peoples, Alexander and his followers represented an intrusive, alien culture offensive to local 
traditions. … Many Persians rejected Alexander’s claims of legitimacy as a liberator, they 
questioned the sincerity of his efforts to respect Persian religion and to promote a true 
partnership with local princes.”86 Alexander and his soldiers were able to conquer Bactria, but 
only after fighting, and losing, many pitched battles against local tribes.
87
 Yet, after the conquest 
of Bactria, discontent began to arise amongst the Greek and Macedonian soldiers, as the style of 
war they had been trained to fight – winning major, set piece battles between two or more armies 
– were not what faced them. After initially conquering the standing armies of Bactria, 
Alexander’s forces faced small roving bands of insurgents. Alexander’s soldiers were forced to 
“juggle awkwardly the jobs of conqueror, peacekeeper, builder, and settler,”88 responsibilities 
that mirror the many roles that modern day counterinsurgents must perform in order to have a 
chance at success.  
 
It was only until the 1700’s that the area known as Afghanistan today was united into a 
single state. Throughout the seventeenth century several different Arab groups invaded 
Afghanistan, resulting in the spread of Islam throughout the area. In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century the United Kingdom, in an effort to simultaneously protect its interests in India 
and thwart Russian expansionism, tried to extend its reach into Afghanistan. The Afghani people 
and the UK soldiers would fight three wars (1838-42, 1878-80, and 1919-21).
89
  At the end of the 
first Anglo-Afghan War, 4,500 Anglo-Indian troops and their 12,000 camp followers fled from 
Kabul toward India, as the Afghan leaders had promised to let them go. It became clear that they 
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were not going to follow through, and began picking the helpless soldiers and civilians off.
90
 
Following the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the British supported Amir Abdul Rehman as the new 
leader of Afghanistan. Known as the “Iron Amir,” Rehman used British resources to crush 
political opponents and attack non-Pashtun tribes across Afghanistan.
91
 After the Third Anglo-
Afghan War, Afghanistan was officially recognized as an independent state.
92
  
 
 Afghanistan’s new ruler, Amir Amanullah Khan, immediately began a program of 
socioeconomic reforms to help make Afghanistan a more modern state. In 1926 Khan declared 
Afghanistan a monarchy, with himself as its king, which generated public backlash against not 
only the government but also the reforms, as some of these were contradictory to traditional 
tribal customs. Anti-government uprisings began to occur across the state, and by 1929 Khan 
abdicated the throne and left Afghanistan. A new monarch, Zahir Shah, assumed power in 1933; 
Shah’s rule lasted for forty years, and during this time the state is stable. Afghanistan was official 
recognized as a state by the United States in 1934. 
93
 
 
 In 1953 the pro-Soviet General Mohammed Daoud Khan became prime minister, and 
brought about further social reforms and looked to communist countries for aid. By 1956 the 
Afghan and Soviet governments had become friendly, with Krushchev agreeing to give 
Afghanistan aid. Between 1956 and 1978 the Soviet Union gave Afghanistan USD 1.26 billion in 
economic aid and USD 1.25 billion in military aid.
94
 In 1973 Daoud organized a coup d’état, 
forced the King, who had been in Rome seeking medical treatment, into exile, declared 
Afghanistan to be a republic, and began governing the state as president.
95
  Another coup 
occurred just five years later in 1978, with Daoud, his family, and his bodyguards all being 
massacred.  Communists Nur Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal became president and 
prime minister, respectively. The Afghani state was based on nationalism, socioeconomic justice, 
and Islamic religious principles.  While Afghanistan maintained friendly relations with the 
Soviet Union, the leaders of the new state declared independence, rejecting direct Soviet 
involvement in the internal affairs of the Afghan state.
96
 
 
Chaos reigned in Afghanistan when President Taraki was murdered at the order of 
Hafizullah Amin, one of Taraki’s coconspirators. The general population was unsettled. The 
socioeconomic reforms begun by the new regime in Kabul had upset the conservative Islamic 
population, which began an armed revolt that same year. In June of 1978 the mujahedeen 
movement was started, and began conducting guerrilla warfare against the government. 1979 
was a major year in Afghan history. The American Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs 
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was killed, which results in the United States withdrawing its substantial financial assistance.
97
 
Afghanistan was in turmoil, with the weak communist government struggling to fight off the 
mujahedeen. Seeing instability in the communist government, the Soviet Union decided to 
invade Afghanistan to help support the faltering regime.
98
 According to Stephen Tanner, “[t]he 
Soviet invasion achieved that rarity in Afghan history: a unifying sense of political purpose that 
cut across tribal, ethnic, geographic, and economic lines. That purpose was to repel the 
Soviets.”99 
 
The new president, Hafizullah Amin, was killed during the initial invasion, and the 
Soviets installed Prime Minister Babrak Karmal as president. After surviving the initial 
onslaught of the Soviet military, the mujahedeen were able to rally and successfully fought both 
the Soviet and Afghan government forces. Soviet forces originally intended to bolster and 
support the weak Afghan military, but ended up in open combat against both them and the 
mujahedeen. By 1986, the United State, Britain, and China began providing arms to the 
mujahedeen through the Pakistani government and military. In 1989 the United States, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union signed peace accords at Geneva, while the anti-government 
guerrillas continued to fight against the still communist president Dr. Mohammad Najibullah. 
The communist regime in Kabul fell in 1992, and an Islamic state is officially founded and is led 
by Professor Burhannudin Rabbani as the new president.
100
 
 
Meanwhile, back in 1984, Usama Bin Laden made his first documented trip to 
Afghanistan to see the struggle between the mujahedeen and communists first hand. In 1988, al 
Qa’ida was officially formed in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Even after 
the fall of the communist government and the establishment of an Islamic state Afghanistan is 
still not at peace. The state had been ravaged by war, drought, and famine for over a decade, as 
local strongmen continued to exploit the population and fight amongst themselves for resources 
and power. In 1995 the Taliban, an Islamic militia group, is gaining strength and promises peace 
and stability through following traditional Islamic principles. The Taliban follows through with 
the promise, enforcing Islamic law though public punishments and executions. In September 
1996, the Taliban become the official government of Afghanistan, ruling as the Islamic Emirate 
of Afghanistan. Throughout this time, al Qa’ida continues to operate from bases established in 
the state.
101
 
 
On 11 September 2001 al Qa’ida members highjack four commercial airlines and crash 
them into the World Trade Center Towers in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington D.C., 
and the fourth crashed in a field in Pennsylvania due to passenger intervention. The United States 
demanded that the Taliban extradite Usama Bin Laden to the United States to stand trial for the 
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9/11 attacks, as well as expel al Qa’ida from Afghanistan. The Taliban’s refusal results in 
American and British planes bombing al Qa’ida and Taliban targets throughout Afghanistan on 7 
October 2001. American Special Forces were the first on the ground in Afghanistan and 
partnered with Northern Alliance troops, which eventually took Kabul on 13 November 2001 as 
the Taliban retreated from the city. The fall of Kabul was the beginning of the end for official 
Taliban governance in Afghanistan, and by 7 December 2001 the Taliban is officially considered 
defeated. It is generally considered that at this time that senior Taliban and al Qa’ida leadership 
fled Afghanistan completely and took refuge in the mountainous border region of neighboring 
Pakistan. Fifteen days later Hamid Karzai, a royalist and ethnic Pashtun from the Popalzai tribe, 
is sworn in as the leader of the Afghan Interim Authority, which was the basis of Afghan 
sovereignty while the process of drafting a constitution and elections were taking place. 
 
To help facilitate the process and provide security, the United Nations, in Security 
Council Resolution 1386, authorized “the establishment for 6 months of an International Security 
Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul 
and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the 
United Nations can operate in a secure environment.”102 The International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) operated beyond the original six month time frame established by the United 
Nations. On 11 August 2003 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took control of 
ISAF, and in October 2003 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510 authorized the 
expansion of the ISAF beyond Kabul to the rest of Afghanistan.
103
 By October 2006 ISAF had 
taken complete control of all military operations in Afghanistan, as the American-led 
international coalition in eastern Afghanistan transferred its authority to ISAF.
104
 
 
 According to author Seth Jones, there are two main factors that resulted in the insurgency 
that developed after the initial invasion of Afghanistan and the ousting of the Taliban from 
power. The first is weak governance, which created an environment that drove the local 
population to seek out another source of security and stability. The newly created Government of 
Afghanistan (GoA), riddled with corruption, was unable to provide basic services, and was 
further undermined by the international forces operating in Afghanistan. The second important 
factor in the rise of the insurgency was the religious ideology of the insurgent leaders. This 
ideology will be discussed at length below, but the ideology had a broad appeal. “Afghanistan’s 
insurgency was caused by the synergy of collapsing governance and a virulent religious ideology 
that seemed to fill the void.”105 
 
History of the Taliban 
 
“We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1,400 years ago and jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of 
the Prophet and we are only carrying out what the Afghan people have wanted for the past 14 years.” 
-Mullah Wakil, aid to Mullah Omar.
106
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The Taliban emerged at the end of 1994 from the chaos that resulted from the withdrawal of the 
Soviets in 1989. The mujahedeen, not just content to have defeated the Soviets, continued to 
struggle against the communist government of President Najibullah in Kabul. At the end of 1994 
“the country was divided into warlord fiefdoms and all the warlords had fought, switched sides 
and fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals, and bloodshed.”107 This was 
particularly hard to swallow for some of the mujahedeen fighters who had struggled for over a 
decade to oust the communists from power. Mulla Hassan is quoted by Author Ahmed Rashid as 
saying, “whenever we [the founders of the Taliban] got together we would discuss the terrible 
plight of our people living under these bandits. We were people of the same opinions and we got 
on with each other very well, so it was easy to come to a decision to do something.”108 After 
many lengthy discussions, the various discontented groups established the guiding principles of 
the Taliban movement, which remain the stated goals of the group even today. These are: to 
restore peace to Afghanistan, to disarm the population, to enforce Sharia law, and to defend the 
Islamic character of Afghanistan. The movement’s name was chosen very strategically. A talib is 
a student, with taliban being the plural. “By choosing such a name the Taliban… distanced 
themselves from the party politics of the mujahedeen and signaled that they were a movement 
for cleansing society rather than a party trying to grab power.”109 
 
 Mullah Mohammed Omar was chosen by the founding members to lead the Taliban. 
“Some Taliban say Omar was chosen as their leader not for his political or military ability, but 
for his piety and his unswerving belief in Islam. Others say he was chosen by God.”110 Of the 
founding members of the Taliban, Mullah Omar was the “first amongst equals.”111 Omar, who 
lived in Tarin Kot, Uruzgan during the 1980s, came from an undistinguished family but was 
raised very religiously. While there are many stories describing how Omar was able to 
effectively mobilize the population to the Taliban cause, there is one that is considered highly 
credible. In 1994 a neighbor from the village of Singesar, where Omar was living, came to him 
and reported that a local warlord had abducted two teenage girls and had brought them back to 
his base where they were repeatedly raped. Mobilizing a group of 30 men Omar raided the base, 
freeing the girls and hanging the commander. Omar continued to translate dispute resolution and 
local problem solving into legitimacy and influence. He only asked of those he helped to support 
him in his struggle. On 12 October 1994 the Taliban captured the small town of Spin Baldak, an 
important transportation hub on the Afghan-Pakistan border. Less than a month later on 3 
November 1994 the Taliban launched an attack against Kandahar and captured the city with only 
sporadic fighting, as the commander, Mullah Naquib, is believed to have taken a substantial 
bribe from the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISS). In the process of capturing the second 
largest city in Afghanistan, the Taliban acquired substantial military equipment, including tanks, 
helicopters, and six MIG-21 fighter planes. By December 1994 over 12,000 Afghans and 
Pakistanis had joined the Taliban in Kandahar.
112
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 Immediately after gaining control of Kandahar the Taliban began implementing the 
strictest interpretation of Sharia law ever seen in the Muslim world. In this interpretation, all men 
were required to grow long beards; recreational activities, such as television and sporting events, 
were destroyed or canceled; and the rights of women were severely restricted. In Kandahar 
Mullah Omar was nominated by the leaders of the Taliban to become Amir-ul Momineen – or 
Commander of the Faithful – a title that would give him the authority to lead the jihad and rule 
over the soon to be renamed Emirate of Afghanistan.  On 4 April 1996 Mullah Omar appeared 
on top of a building in Kandahar draped in the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed, removing it 
from its shrine for the first time in sixty years. In doing this, Omar sought to gain not only more 
legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghani people but also in the eyes of Muslims across the world. 
113
 
 
 Throughout 1996 the Taliban had been ruthlessly shelling the capital city of Kabul. In 
addition, on 25 August 1996 the Taliban led a surprise assault on the eastern city of Jalalabad, 
and by 24 September 1996 they had captured the provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, and 
Sarobi. Immediately following the capture of Sarobi, a full assault was scheduled against Kabul. 
Military leaders in Kabul, knowing they couldn’t defend against a full assault from all sides, 
ordered a full withdrawal from the city. The Taliban tortured and finally killed former President 
Najibullah, who had been hiding in a United Nations compound within the city. 
114
 
 
  There would be continued fighting across Afghanistan, with previous government forces 
continuing to battle against the Taliban, but by the beginning of February 1997 there was only 
one area still seriously resisting the Taliban. The northern part of Afghanistan had had a high 
level of autonomy with the Afghan government; the high level of natural resources in the region 
allowed regional leaders to leverage the central government for autonomy, as the government 
needed the revenue derived from the resources. The warlords in control of northern Afghanistan 
were the only ones still resisting the Taliban and would have to be crushed in order to assure the 
complete conquest of the state. The Taliban arrived in the north and began to disarm the Uzbek 
and Hazara population, capturing many of the Northern provinces.
115
 But on 28 May 1997 the 
Hazara revolted against the Taliban, and by July the Taliban suffered nearly 3,000 casualties and 
3,600 men taken prisoner and in addition had been driven back out of the north.  Fighting would 
continue over the following year, as both the Taliban and the northern troops massacred each 
other, while in the rest of the world looked on in horror.  
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The Taliban in Uruzgan  
 
Map of Uruzgan Province and Surrounding Provinces
116
 
 
 
Uruzgan is one of thirty-four provinces in Afghanistan. It is located in central Afghanistan, and 
borders Kandahar to the south, Zabul and Ghazni to the east, Day Kundi to the north, and 
Helmand province to the west. The current borders of Uruzgan were created on 28 March 2004, 
right before the presidential elections. The current borders reflect a change made by President 
Hamid Karzai, who took a large portion of northern Uruzgan and created the Hazara majority 
province of Day Kundi.
117
According to the Government of Afghanistan, Uruzgan has seven 
districts: Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud, Chora, Chenartu, Char China, Gizab, and Khas Uruzgan.  
 
The Taliban presence in Uruzgan dates back to the anti-Soviet resistance. In particular, 
the resistance in Uruzgan developed out of local religious networks that were utilized to mobilize 
the population against the changes made by both the communist Afghan government and the 
their Soviet supporters. These groups organized themselves locally in mahaz or jebha (fronts), 
and operated independently at the beginning. As the war progressed, the mahaz were co-opted by 
the various mujahedeen groups based in Pakistan, which provided resources and stability 
necessary for the conflict to continue.  The ideological basis for these groups ranged from 
socioeconomic, to religious, to simply a desire for power. For the local militant commanders 
alignment was determined more by personal connections and chance of success, and the arms 
they were able to provide, rather than ideology. As a result, alliances between local commanders 
and the mujahedeen groups were only temporary, with some commanders entering into alliances 
with multiple groups at once. The vast number of local commanders also ensured that there was 
never a highly centralized base of power, with power being dispersed amongst the commanders 
and their support networks.  
 
The Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan in 1989, and the official communist 
government was removed from power in 1992. The next two years the state was in chaos, as 
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mujahedeen leaders fought amongst themselves to secure power and resources. The Taliban took 
control on Kandahar in 1994 and subsequently moved through Uruzgan with little resistance. 
The population was so worn-down by the years of instability that the prospect of law and order – 
even law and order based on a very strict religious code – was more appealing than the 
lawlessness under the mujahedeen leaders. Most of the local resistance leaders were coopted into 
the Taliban structure, either officially joining the Taliban or entering into an agreement to be left 
in peace. Even the local leaders that were from the “wrong” tribe were not treated very harshly. 
 
 When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and toppled the Taliban 
government the local leaders in Uruzgan were originally hesitant to support Hamid Karzai. As 
the invasion picked up steam, some of the local commanders and village leaders saw the writing 
on the wall and finally came to support the Karzai government. Like what happened across 
Afghanistan, in Uruzgan “under the Karzai regime… former Taliban fighters and marginalized 
tribes were targeted and mistreated by the pro-government strongmen and their international 
allies.”118 After the fall of the official Taliban government in December 2001, Uruzgan was one 
of the first provinces to have resurgence in the Taliban movement. The appointment of many of 
the corrupt pre-Taliban commanders to positions of power resulted in resentment from a good 
portion of the population. “According to scholar Antonio Giustozzi, at least 20 of the first group 
of 32 provincial governors appointed by the Karzai government were militia commanders, 
warlords or strongmen, while smaller militia commanders populated the ranks of district 
governors.”119  
 
 In early 2002 Jan Mohammad Khan was appointed governor of Uruzgan as a result of 
tribal connections in the central government.  Mohammad Khan had a very close relationship 
with the Karzai family, and as a result was able to leverage the relationship to have many friends 
and allies appointed to positions of power. The network established by Mohammad Khan was 
widely known to utilize fear and violence as a method of control and used their positions of 
power to target rival political leaders as well as former Taliban commanders who had agreed to 
lay down their arms and cooperate with the government. This was a part of a cycle of violence 
common in Afghanistan, as those just coming into power sought to strengthen their position by 
marginalizing and weakening rivals.   
 
While a part of the general Taliban movement, the Taliban forces operating in Uruzgan 
have their own unique characteristics. They are a part of the Kandahari Taliban, and overall they 
receive instructions from the Quetta shura in Pakistan, which attempts to direct overall Taliban 
activities. “This insurgency is a rather unruly collection of local commander networks that 
alternatively cooperate with, coexist with, and fight each other. … The Taliban shadow 
administration in the two provinces is often dominated by local strongmen, who may or may not 
have formal positions within the insurgency.”120 To try and keep some semblance of order, the 
Taliban shadow administrators use a hierarchical organization system and local inspections to 
reduce the level of graft and overall corruption. The Taliban administration in Uruzgan has “a 
provincial governor (wali), district governors (woleswali), a host of security and military 
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commanders, a court system linked to the religious networks, and an extensive and rather lose 
network of groups of fighters that are organized in so-called units (delgai) and cells (otaq).
121
 
Most of the positions in this administration are filled by military commanders, reflecting the 
current status of the Taliban in Uruzgan as still an armed insurgency and not a firmly established 
competitive government. The Taliban in Uruzgan uses a system of taxation to raise funds, 
forcing all businesses and farmers to pay a percentage of their earnings. In reality, though, this 
system of taxation is more closely related to extortion or protection money paid to a local 
strongman.    
  
 In Uruzgan there are three distinct insurgent networks currently operating. The first is in 
western Uruzgan, and includes the districts of Deh Rawud and Char China and extends into 
northern Helmand and southern Day Kundi. This network is important because it is a critical 
route in the drug trade. The second network includes eastern and central Uruzgan and expands 
into the northern regions Zabul and Kandahar provinces and southwest Ghazni province. This 
area includes important supply routes to Pakistan. The third network includes eastern Zabul and 
has links to Pakistan. For the most part, the divide between the three different networks is based 
on the tribal and geographic characteristics of the networks. What is important to note about the 
three networks is that there is very little official cooperation between them, with the groups 
operating in parallel to each other and reporting individually to the Taliban shadow governor.
122
 
This has two major implications. First, is any counterinsurgent operating in Uruzgan needs to 
recognize and understand the differences between the networks and needs to approach their 
intelligence collection and operations to reflect this dynamic. Second, this divide has 
implications for overall counterinsurgency strategy, as the counterinsurgent must address each of 
the three networks on their own.  
 
 One of the most important things to understand about the Taliban in Uruzgan is the 
manner of support that the average Taliban soldier receives. According to interviews done by the 
New America Foundation, “locals described how the commanders received money for 
ammunition and other expenses, but that the foot soldiers tended to be fed by the local 
population”(emphasis mine).123 This dynamic plays a very important role in how a 
counterinsurgent goes about fighting the insurgency. As noted in the theory section on page X, 
David Kilcullen says that the source of support for modern insurgencies does not necessarily rely 
on the population as exclusively. The reliance of the Taliban soldiers on the population indicates 
that the Dutch would need to be attentive to this dynamic as one of the key aspects of insurgent 
support. 
 
Uruzgan – History, Tribes, and Demographics 
  
Uruzgan is one of thirty-four provinces in Afghanistan. It is located in central Afghanistan, and 
borders Kandahar to the south, Zabul and Ghazni to the east, Day Kundi to the north, and 
Helmand province to the west. The current borders of Uruzgan were created on 28 March 2004, 
right before the presidential elections. The current borders reflect a change made by President 
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Hamid Karzai, who took a large portion of northern Uruzgan and created the Hazara majority 
province of Day Kundi.
124
 Uruzgan has seven districts: Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud, Chora, Chenartu, 
Char China, Gizab, and Khas Uruzgan. 
 
 The current population and tribal makeup is the result of past demographic policies by 
Afghan rulers. Uruzgan was once dominated by the Hazara tribe; the Hazara are the result of the 
Mongol invasion, as the tribe was created by the ancestors of Mongols who married into the 
local tribes. (Taliban Book).  In the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century Afghan kings resettled Pashtuns into 
Uruzgan which displaced the Hazara. King Ahmad Shah Durrani’s goal was to secure his rule, 
and to do this he needed to weaken the Pashtuns. He therefore resettled much of the Pashtun 
population across Afghanistan, as this would decentralize their power base and make 
coordination more difficult. There was internal fighting in Afghanistan, and Iron Amir Rahman  
thanked the Durrani tribe for supporting him and defeating rebel Hazara and Ghilzai tribes by 
giving them some of their defeated foes’ land. As a result of these policies Uruzgan has a diverse 
population.
125
  
 
 The majority of the population in Uruzgan is part of the two main Pashtun tribes. In 
general, Pashtuns are descended from Qais, one of the Prophet Mohammed’s companions. While 
they consider themselves Semitic, anthropologists believe the tribe to be of Indo-European origin 
but have coopted and assimilated other tribes through history. The two main factions are the 
Durrani and the Ghilzai. The Durrani, formerly known as the Abdali, claim to be descended from 
Qais’ eldest son Sarbanar; the Ghilzai claim to be descended from Qais’ second son. Other 
smaller Pashtun tribes claim to be descended from Qai’s third son. As the Durrani and the 
Ghilzai migrated into Afghanistan, they began to fight each other because of disputes regarding 
land. (Taliban Book). It is important to note, though, the views that modern Afghans have of 
tribal competition. According to interviews done by the New America Foundation, most Afghans 
do not see the conflict between tribes as a long-term, historic battle between tribes for power. 
Instead, they “describe [the conflict] in terms of a confrontation between oppressors (zalem) and 
the oppressed (mazalum).” (BoA, 3). This process is cyclical, as those in power will use their 
position to strengthen their own base while simultaneously marginalizing their enemies. This 
dynamic similarly plays out between the various sub-tribes for control and power. The first two 
charts show a breakdown of both tribal populations in Uruzgan, and act to highlight the wide 
variety of tribal affiliations in Uruzgan.  The second two charts show district-level estimates of 
the population.  
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Overall Tribal Affiliation in Uruzgan, Afghanistan, as of 2009. 
 
 
 
Tribal Affiliation in Uruzgan, Afghanistan by district, as of 2009 
District  Zirak Durrani  
Panjpai 
Durrani  
Ghilzai  Other  
Tirin Kot (90,000)  
Popalzai (20%) 
Achekzai (10%) 
Barakzai (15%) 
Mohammadzai 
(5%) Alkozai 
(2%)  
Alizai (2%) 
Nurzai (1%)  
Hotak (20%) 
Tokhi (10%) 
Suliman Khail 
(5%) Other 
Ghilzai (8%)  
Sayed, 
Quraish, 
Hazara (2%)  
Deh Rawud 
(78,750)  
Popalzai (15%) 
Achekzai (2%) 
Barakzai (5%) 
Alkozai (5%) 
Mohammadzai 
(2%)  
Nurzai (30%) 
Khogiani (7%) 
Alizai (1%) 
Ishaqzai (1%)  
  
Kakar (2%) 
Babozai 
(30%)  
Chora (72,000)  
Achekzai (71%) 
Barakzai (26%)  
    
Ghilzai, Sayed 
(3%)  
Chenartu (30,000)  
Popalzai (75%) 
Achekzai (11%) 
Barakzai (6%) 
Alkozai (1%)  
Nurzai (2%) 
Ishaqzai (1%)  
Taraki (3%) 
Hotak (1%)  
  
Char China 
(84,000)  
Achekzai (16%)  Nurzai (70%)      
Gizab (59,000)  Achekzai (78%)    Tokhi (1%)  Hazara (21%)  
Khas Uruzgan 
(80,000)  
Achekzai (60%) 
Barakzai (8%) 
Popalzai (1%)  
    
Wardak (2%) 
Non-Pashtun 
Hazara 
(27%), Tajik 
(1%) Sayed 
(1%)  
Total  57.50% 18.50% 9% 
Hazara 
(8%) Other 
Pashtun 
(6%) Other 
(1%)  
Zirak Durrani 
(Pashtun) 57.5%  
Ghilzai (Pashtun) 
9%  
Panjpai Durrani 
(Pashtun) 18.5%  
Hazara 8.0%  
Achekzai 35.0%  Hotak 4%  Khogiani 1.0%  
Sayed/Quraish/Tajik 
1.0%  
Popalzai 10.5%  Tokhi 2.5%  Nurzai 17.5%   
Barakzai 9.0%  
Suliman Khail 
1.0%  
Other Pashtun 6%  
 
Mohammadzai 1.5%  Andar 1.0%  Babozai 5.0%   
Alkozai 1.5%  Taraki 0.5%  Kakar 0.5%   
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Uruzgan Population Estimates
126
 
 
District 
TLO 2008-
2009 
Estimate 
TLO 2011 
Estimate 
CSO/UNFPA 
Estimate 
2011 
CSO 2012-
2013 
Estimate 
Tirin Kot 90,000 125,000 96,400 99,700 
Deh Rawud 78,750 57,400 57,400 59,400 
Chora 72,000 53,480 48,000 49,700 
Chenartu 30,000 14,000 12,100 12,500 
Khas Uruzgan 80,000 53,200 53,200 54,900 
Gizab 59,000 63,500 63,500  - 
Char China 84,000 55,500 55,500 57,300 
Total 493,750 422,080 386,100 333,500 
 
Settled Population of Uruzgan province by Civil Division. Urban, Rural, and Sex 2012-2013
127
 
         
District   Rural     Urban   Rural And Urban 
  Female Male 
Both 
Sexes 
Female Male 
Both 
Sexes 
Female Male 
Both 
Sexes 
Total 157.1 166.8 323.9 4.7 4.9 9.6 161.8 171.7 333.5 
Tirin Kot 44.8 48.6 93.4 3.1 3.2 6.3 47.9 51.8 99.7 
Deh 
Rawud 
27.1 29 56.1 1.6 1.7 3.3 28.7 30.7 59.4 
Chora 24.3 25.4 49.7 - - - 24.3 25.4 49.7 
Char 
China 
28.2 29.1 57.3 - - - 28.2 29.1 57.3 
Khas 
Uruzgan 
26.6 28.3 54.9 - - - 26.6 28.3 54.9 
Chenratu 6.1 6.4 12.5 - - - 6.1 6.4 12.5 
 
 
When talking about demographics in Afghanistan it is important to note the issues 
inherent with acquiring accurate information. First, Afghanistan is in a state of war, and there are 
therefore issues of casualties, refuges, and voluntary migrations as a result of insecurity that can 
affect population estimates. A second factor is that Uruzgan is highly rural, with some districts 
having populations spread thinly across them, making an accurate census difficult. When 
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thinking about population it is better to think of them as estimates compared to completely 
accurate data. Keeping this in mind, what follows is a series of charts by various organizations 
detailing their population estimates in Uruzgan. These estimates come from The Liaison Office, 
an Afghan non-governmental organization, and the Central Statistics Organization (CSO), a part 
of the Afghan government that is supported by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFP).  
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Section Two: The Case Study 
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Preface 
 
This section of the thesis covers the case study against which the two analytical frameworks will 
be tested. The time period covered in the case study is from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010; 
this time period corresponds to the beginning of the Dutch deployment in Uruzgan to their 
withdrawal four years later. This preface to the case study describes the overall Dutch approach 
to counterinsurgency and its relation to other counterinsurgency strategies, provides a general 
timeline of events in Uruzgan over the four years of the Dutch mission, and outlines the structure 
of the case study.  
 
 The overall objectives of the Dutch mission were laid out in specific documents created 
by both the Dutch Armed Forces and the Dutch government. An important document that 
described the plan was the Uruzgan Campaign Plan (UCP). The latest installment of the UCP 
came out in 2010, and very accurately describes the Dutch mission. The document described the 
overall plan for the Dutch in Uruzgan as: 
 
the TFU [Task Force Uruzgan] campaign objective, within the context of 
the UCP, as a part of ISAF, in partnership with ANSF [Afghan National 
Security Forces], and in coordination with GIROA [Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan], United Nations Assistance Mission 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the International Community, is to 
contribute to a reliable and effective government that can bring the 
government and the people closer together, and is able to provide a 
stable and secure environment and development progress in Uruzgan, in 
due course, without ISAF support.
128
   
 
In addition, one of the guiding principles of Dutch counterinsurgency in Uruzgan was 
reconstruction wherever possible, fighting whenever unavoidable. While this seems a strange 
operational philosophy for a military, it makes sense in the context of Dutch society and culture. 
War is almost considered a taboo word in Dutch society, and as a result the Dutch engagement in 
Afghanistan was billed not as a military mission associated with the American-led Operation 
Enduring Freedom, but rather as a reconstruction mission. The Dutch military would work 
extensively with the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Development and Aid 
in their effort to rebuild Uruzgan.
129
 The development-first approach was pushed heavily by the 
Dutch government as a way to convince Parliament to enter the war, as the organizational culture 
of the Dutch government is one that shies away from war. In fact, “the military struggled with 
the discussion about whether it was a mission for fighting or for reconstruction because they 
faced both challenges and were not allowed to use the term COIN [counterinsurgency].”130 The 
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Dutch military has primarily been used as a peacekeeping force; it was only until being deployed 
that their approach to security truly took shape, as it evolved over time and became more 
cohesive. Once deployed, the military’s “security first” approach allowed early gains to be made, 
facilitating the work done by civilian personnel focused on building political and economic 
capacity.  
 
 The Dutch approach to counterinsurgency is firmly rooted in the population-centric 
philosophy and follows what is called an ink spot approach.
 131
 The ink spot approach is when the 
counterinsurgents focus their personnel into concentrated areas, typically those with dense 
populations – in this case the three most populated districts of Chora, Deh Rawud, and Tirin Kot. 
Once the counterinsurgents have consolidated their gains in these areas they attempt to extend 
their influence out from these centers into neighboring regions. The reason this is called the ink 
spot approach is that the strategy resembles spots of ink that have splashed onto paper – landing 
in one area and slowly diffusing out into the surrounding space.  
 
In each of the three focus districts, the Dutch employed a counterinsurgency strategy that 
centered on three main tenets. These tenets, referred collectively as the 3Ds and the 3D approach 
to counterinsurgency, are defense, development, and diplomacy. The first tenet is defense. The 
counterinsurgent will only be able to influence the population by clearing the area of insurgents 
and their political infrastructure and then providing security. The second and third tenets of the 
Dutch approach are development and diplomacy. Development refers broadly to the 
improvement of factors that contribute to an increase in the standard of living in the community. 
Activities in the development tenet range from the promotion of small businesses through micro-
loans to increases in schools or healthcare facilities. Diplomacy refers to building the political 
capacity of the government, both at the national and the sub-national level. In the case of the 
Dutch mission, dubbed Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), the political focus is on the provincial and 
district-level governments. This approach to counterinsurgency is a whole-of-government 
approach that utilizes both military and civilian personnel to succeed. The overall goal of 3-D 
counterinsurgency is to create a secure environment in which local and national governments are 
able to provide basic services to the population. 
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The Dutch 3D Approach to Counterinsurgency
132
 
 
 
 
 “With their approach that sees the provision of security as a precondition for 
development, which in turn contributes to long-term stability, the Dutch have begun slowly to 
turn around parts of Uruzgan.”133 This approach bears major resemblance to the clear-hold-build 
philosophy of counterinsurgency. The first stage, clear, involves the creation of a secure, 
physical and psychological environment through kinetic actions designed to clear the area of 
insurgents as well as dismantling the insurgent infrastructure that undermines the host-nation’s 
government. Second, hold involves the establishment of firm government control of the populace 
and area. This includes protecting the population, further eliminating insurgent presence, 
improving essential services, and reestablishing the host nation’s government presence. Build 
corresponds to generating legitimate support from the population through continued security and 
the development of the social and economic spheres.
134
 For the Dutch, there is a rough 
correlation between the 3-D approach to counterinsurgency and clear-hold-build.  The first, 
defense, corresponds highly with the first two stages of the clear-hold-build strategy of 
counterinsurgency. The second and third tenets correspond to build, as development and 
diplomacy are focused on fostering economic growth and building political capacity, 
respectively, in Uruzgan. This was not the original intent of the 3D approach, but as security 
increased it opened the door for greater overall participation and integration of the civilian 
personnel.
135
 
 
 When laid out in this manner the 3D approach seems relatively straightforward. “It is an 
approach in which the diplomatic, military and development spheres aim for coherence where 
their fields of activity overlap in their aim to address governance, security and development 
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issues.”136 Yet, amongst military and civilian practitioners in the field, coherence between the 
three tenets was not as easy as envisioned. There can be overlap between the three tenets which 
can lead to confusion. For instance, there was a difference of opinion between those individuals 
involved in the diplomacy sphere and those involved in the government section of the 
development sphere. These two sets of individuals had differing viewpoints, whether to focus on 
a top-down or bottom-up approach, and this led to wasted time and resources. There was another, 
more serious, factor that caused issues during the Dutch mission. On one end of the spectrum the 
Dutch military generally felt that “‘3D’ is not necessarily COIN [counterinsurgency], but a well 
implemented COIN strategy is ‘3D’, i.e. not implemented solely or primarily by the military.”137 
On the other end of spectrum are many of the NGOs and diplomats involved in building 
sociopolitical and economic capacity. These groups “see the approach as an organising (sic) 
principle for organisations (sic) aimed at security, good governance and development in order to 
create a secure enough climate for further development.”138 In many cases, these groups see 
being included as a part of the counterinsurgency operation as detrimental, as they can lose their 
sense of neutrality as a result. Over the course of the mission, integration and coherence between 
the three ‘Ds’ increased, allowing for a stronger and more unified approach. One pitfall that 
should be mentioned is that some members of the Dutch parliament became too involved in 
micro-level policy, which diplomats and members of the military say impacted overall 
effectiveness.
139
 Taking both the perception of the overall approach and the realities of the 
conflict in Uruzgan into consideration, this paper will operate under the definition that 3D is a 
whole-of-government approach to counterinsurgency.  
 
The case study is divided into two chapters. While the Dutch approach to 
counterinsurgency has three tenets (Defense, Development, and Diplomacy), there is an 
organizational logic of grouping the tenets into two chapters. These two chapters will contain 
information on the overall philosophy of the approach, specific examples of tactics, and progress 
made in the province over the four years. Finally, each section will end with analysis on the 
overall level of success for each phase. Assessment of the two analytical frameworks will be left 
until the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Defense 
 
“We’re not here to fight the Taliban. We’re here to make the Taliban irrelevant.”140  
Col. Hans van Griensven 
 
In 2005, prior to the arrival of the Dutch Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), Uruzgan was one of the 
most unstable provinces in Afghanistan. According to The Liaison Office (TLO)
141
, in 2005 the 
“insecurity was mostly confined to the mountainous districts of Gizab, Khas Uruzgan, and 
Shahiddi Hassas [Char China]
142… it has now [in 2006] spread to all districts.”143 The situation 
that the Dutch encountered in Uruzgan, then, was less than ideal. The Dutch approach to the 
defense of the Afghani people from the Taliban was firmly population centric, with emphasis 
being exclusively placed on avoiding civilian casualties and killing only those Taliban members 
or supporters who could not be won back. The Dutch were often noted by Afghans and other 
members of ISAF as placing too much emphasis on thought and consensus and not enough on 
kinetic action. This differed with two of the other main militaries in Uruzgan at the time. At the 
beginning of the Dutch deployment the United States was still generally focusing on an enemy-
centric approach to the conflict as Field Manual 3-24 had yet to be published; the Australian 
approach was mixed, as they utilized a more enemy-centric approach to combat in addition to a 
heavy focus on construction and development.
144
 In addition to the population-centric approach 
to counterinsurgency, the Dutch placed a heavy focus on training the Afghan National Army 
(ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) in order to bolster their capabilities and ensure the 
potential for security after their eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan. 
 
 It is important to first discuss the types of legal regimes that formally restrict the actions 
of armed forces in combat zones. The two legal regimes described below are the formal military 
restrictions that exist within the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and thus apply to Dutch 
counterinsurgency in Uruzgan. First is human rights law, which seeks to protect individuals from 
the arbitrary power of states. The application of this can vary, including but not limited to 
violence by the state against individuals, withholding resources to endanger individuals, to false 
and long-term imprisonment and abuse. “With the respect to the use of force, or the detention of 
individuals, states are prohibited to deprive a person of the right to life (by killing) or his liberty 
(by detention). Only in very exception situations, and if so, only under strict conditions, may a 
person by killed or detained.”145 Standing somewhat in contrast to this is the Law of Armed 
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Conflict, which seeks to find a balance between the realities of war and the principle of basic 
humanitarianism. Under the Law of Armed Conflict, individuals not participating actively in the 
conflict (civilians and those armed combatants who have laid down their weapons) are protected, 
but the soldiers are allowed to conduct other wartime actions as long as they keep in mind the 
first provision. While it can be assumed that all modern militaries take this into consideration, 
the Dutch earnestly set out to be as judicious as possible about their use of force. The 
comprehensive regulation of the use of force and the enforcement of these legal regimes when 
applicable in Afghanistan by the ISAF highlights the importance of legitimizing the use of force 
by the Afghan government and the international military actors.
146
 By adhering to these legal 
regimes and being attentive to the rule-of-law reinforces the credibility of the Dutch 3-D 
approach as adhering to population-centric tactics. 
 
 The Dutch use of air power in Uruzgan provides strong examples of the adherence to the 
legal regimes described above. According to Dutch pilots, the rules of engagement (ROE) as 
originally designed provided clear guidelines for when or when not to fire the aircraft’s weapons 
systems, but were not so limiting as to restrict the use of arms in only the most specific 
situations. Dutch pilots became aware of a new technique that was established by the Taliban, in 
which they would force civilians to fire at Dutch soldiers or aircrafts by holding their family 
hostage. Returning fire in this situation is tricky, as the men firing at the aircrafts are endangering 
the aircraft but are not part of the insurgency. Understanding this dynamic, the Dutch operators 
constrained their use of weapons system until they were able to consult with their legal advisors, 
whom assuaged them of their fears and allowed the pilots to use their best judgment. Still, Dutch 
pilots hesitated to use kinetic action as a first response, as they found non-lethal means of 
intimidation to be just as effective in certain circumstances. They found that the mere presence of 
ISAF aircraft would be enough to scare the enemy away; if that did not work, the pilots can 
conduct a show of force, in which they circle the area of operations at a high speed, manually 
increasing their noise output. The final non-lethal intimidation technique to be conducted before 
opening fire on the enemy is to fire intentional warning shots wide of the targets.
147
 The Dutch 
hesitation to use lethal force unless absolutely certain helped the Dutch Armed Forces to limit 
the amount of avoidable civilian casualties and restrict the deaths to only the irreconcilable 
Taliban members. The event described above also highlights the ability of TFU to successfully 
adapt to the changing tactics of the Taliban.
148
 
 
  As noted above and more fully developed below, the perception of Dutch soldiers in 
Uruzgan was mixed. The common sentiment was that “The Dutch don’t fight.” For Uruzganis in 
the district of Deh Rawud, this was seen as a positive statement, but in Chora, the sentiment was 
posed as a question: “why don’t the Dutch fight?” For those in Deh Rawud, it implies that they 
have a greater understanding of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, to reconstruct first and fight only 
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when necessary, as opposed to the view that the Dutch operated differently than the Australian 
and American forces operating in Uruzgan.
149
 This perception comes from the Dutch philosophy 
of only fighting whenever it is unavoidable. TFU was originally classified as a reconstruction 
mission, because if it was considered a fighting-first mission TFU would not have been accepted 
by the Dutch parliament; within Dutch society, fighting is not considered a desirable outcome or 
characteristic, and therefore the mission had very little domestic support from its beginning. As a 
result of the Battle of Chora, described below, in which there were substantial Afghan civilian 
casualties, the popularity of the mission decreased amongst the Dutch population at home.
150
  
 
One additional potential explanation for the perception that the Dutch do not fight is that 
at the beginning of TFU the regular Dutch military forces never left camp. The Dutch Korps 
Commandotroepen (Special Forces), in Uruzgan known as Task Force Viper (Viper), were vital 
to the success of the Dutch counterinsurgency as they handled the brunt of the kinetic operations, 
allowing the rest of TFU to handle basic defense and development projects. Originally, Task 
Force Viper soldiers were the only ones that went beyond the base camps into the valleys and 
into the distant villages; later on in the deployment, they were the only soldiers to deploy beyond 
the three districts focused on by the Dutch. Viper only operated in Uruzgan for the first two years 
of TFU, but throughout that time they had more enemy engagements than any other Dutch 
military unit.  The Dutch Special Forces were engaged in Uruzgan from March 2006 until 
August 2006 to prepare for the arrival of the rest of TFU and then stayed through December 
2007. It is not public knowledge why Viper was withdrawn at this time, but they returned in a 
mostly advisory and training role during 2008 for the new Afghan National Army. They left the 
province in 2008, and then returned again in March 2009 through the end of TFU in August 2010 
under the name of Task Force 55.
151
 Of the limited information currently made available about 
Task Force 55 it has been published that these Special Forces units captured five tons of 
ammonium nitrate, a substance critical in the creation of IEDs, over 2000 kilograms of 
ammunition, ten kilograms of homemade explosives, and over 1,500 small arms.
152
 The 
Australian and American Special Forces worked extensively with their Dutch counterparts to 
effectively raid Taliban hideouts throughout Uruzgan.
153
  
 
 Since the arrival of TFU, security has increased province-wide. In the three districts that 
the Dutch focused on with their ink spot approach, Tirin Kowt, Deh Rawud, and Chora, security 
greatly increased. As of 2010, the security situation in Uruzgan could be seen as an inverted U-
shape. In the districts that were consolidated under government control there is stability, just as 
the districts that are under Taliban control are stable. The districts that are still being contested 
by the Taliban and the Afghan and Coalition forces are the most unstable. 
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Stability in Uruzgan 
 
 
 In 2008, there was a general increase in violence across Afghanistan as the Taliban attempted to 
recover lost territory and local influence with increased instances of guerrilla attacks and 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs).  The chart below indicates the overall level of government 
control in each district of Uruzgan in 2006 and then again in 2010. As the security assessments 
come directly from the research done by The Liaison Office, I will use their description of the 
data: 
 
It “is a rough attempt to describe the level of access the government and 
the insurgency have today [2010] compared to 2006. … Percentages 
should be considered as indicative only and there are differences 
between daytime and night-time control. Furthermore, insurgency 
influence does not always constitute the physical presence of fighters but 
the ability of the insurgency to intimidate and summon people.”154 
 
Following the chart is a district by district assessment of the defense situation in Uruzgan during 
TFU, as measured by approximate levels of government access as independently measured by 
TLO.  
 
District 2006 2010 
Percentage 
of the 
population 
Tirin Kot 
30-
40% 
75% 
29.6 
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Deh 
Rawud 
20% 85% 
13.6 
Chora 20% 45% 12.7 
Gizab 0% 50% 15 
Char 
China 
2% 2% 
13.1 
Chenartu 
No 
Data
155
 
20-
30% 3.3 
Khas 
Uruzgan 
30% 15% 
12.6 
 
District-Level Security Assessment 
 
The following section examines progress in each of the seven districts of Uruzgan during TFU 
from 2006 to 2010. As a reminder, the three disricts that the Dutch focused their attention on 
were Deh Rawud, Tirin Kot, and Chora.  
 
DEH RAWUD  
Deh Rawud province experienced the greatest transformation during Task Force Uruzgan. 
Originally at only 20 percent government penetration, by the end of the Dutch engagement Deh 
Rawud would be the most secure district in the province. In 2007, ISAF and local forces drove 
the Taliban out from most parts. After driving the Taliban out, there was continued coordination 
between GoA representatives, ISAF, ANA, ANP, and local militias. This coordination resulted 
in the long term expulsion of the Taliban from the district. ISAF, ANA, and the ANP have 
established security across the province that has allowed for a nearly fully functional district-
level government. Importantly, there has also been an emphasis in the district on tribal balance, 
especially in the local shuras, which helped to create stability.
156
 
  
TIRIN KOT 
Tirin Kot had the highest level of government penetration when the Dutch arrived at between 30 
and 40 percent, which increased to 75 percent, making it the second most secure district in the 
province. During the four years of TFU, the Dutch and local forces were able to eliminate or 
reduce the number of Taliban strongholds across the district. The city of Tirin Kot is the 
economic center of Uruzgan, and therefore has many of the major roads in the province leading 
directly to and from it. As a result, road security in the district is a major concern. The Tirin Kot 
– Kandahar Highway has organized protection for general travelers, ISAF supply convoys, and 
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government officials every ten days; this protection is organized by Matiullah Khan.
157
 On days 
outside of the organized protection the road can be difficult for those affiliated with the 
government or international to traverse, as the insurgency sets up ad-hoc checkpoints along the 
highway. Individuals not affiliated with the government are able to traverse the road generally 
without trouble. The road from Tirin Kot to Deh Rawud is the safest road in the province and has 
patrols by the ANA and ANP. Finally, the road to Khas Uruzgan is relatively safe after leaving 
Tirin Kot, but aside from small pockets of protection outside Chenartu the road can be unsafe. 
While the number of Taliban in the district has been reduced, they are still quite capable of 
planting IEDs or launching raids against selected targets.
158
 
 
 A prominent example of cooperation between the Dutch and Australian Special Forces 
occurred in Tirin Kowt on 28 April 2006. Both units took positions overlooking the Taliban 
stronghold in the village of Surkh Murgab which is 15 km north of the Dutch base Camp 
Holland located in Tirin Kot. The operators were under small-arms fire and attacks from rocket-
propelled grenades and the order was given to retreat. As the Australians retreated the Dutch 
covered them, but during the retreat an Australian vehicle became stuck in mud and attracted the 
entirety of the Taliban assault. The Dutch operators opened a massive barrage of fire on the 
Taliban forces, driving them back and allowing for all of the Dutch and Australian forces to 
successfully retreat.
159
 
 
 An interesting development that occurred in Tirin Kot as security increased. The Dutch 
Marines stationed in the city began using mountain bikes to more efficiently patrol. The bikes 
offer two direct benefits. The first is that they are a practical way of moving faster within more 
remote areas of the city that are difficult to reach in the armored vehicles typically used on 
patrol. Secondly, the bikes make the soldiers appear more human and accessible to the 
population. Afghans have reportedly responded enthusiastically to this new initiative.
160
 A 
similar tactic that is used by the Dutch to increase their accessibility to the local populations is, in 
the more secure areas, to not wear helmets. This also projects an air of confidence. 
161
 
 
CHORA 
Chora fell under the control of the Taliban after two years of fierce fighting during 2006 and 
2007. In 2008, thanks to a concerted effort by the Australian army and help from the ANP and 
Matiullah Khan, the GoA was firmly in control of the center. There were further attempts made 
by the Australians and ANP to drive the Taliban out of the northern part of the district, but as of 
2010 there was no conclusive evidence that indicated the Taliban had been dispersed. There is 
also currently conflict in the district government, as the current governor, Daoud Khan, was in 
2010 competing with his uncle Shah Mohammad over control of the district. The Dutch and 
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Australians have thrown their support behind Khan, which has greatly upset the coalition of 
Popalzai strongmen in the district.
162
 In 2006, the GoA was in control of about 20 percent of the 
district, fell to near zero after the offensive by the Taliban, and by 2010 had rebounded to 45 
percent control. This makes Chora the fourth most controlled district in Uruzgan.
163
 
 
The Battle of Chora and its Implications 
 
 Chora was home to the largest Dutch military engagement since the Korean War, where 
Dutch soldiers and their Afghan allies repelled a large scale assault of an area they had partially 
cleared. The Battle of Chora began on 10 June 2007 when between 300 to 1,000 Taliban 
insurgents surrounded the insurgents, leaving the 60 Dutch soldiers and the handful of poorly 
trained ANSF in the district on their own. The Dutch requested reinforcements from the Afghan 
Ministry of the Interior, but the meager amount of reinforcements sent refused to go to Chora out 
of concern for their lives. On 16 June, just one day after a suicide bomb killed a Dutch soldier 
and five Afghan children, the Dutch and Afghan forces came under a sustained and organized 
attack.  The Dutch quickly moved the majority of its 500 soldier Battle Group into the district, 
and supported the soldiers with Howitzers, Apache Helicopters, and F-16s. In three fierce days 
of combat, the Taliban were defeated, sustaining over two hundred casualties, while only one 
additional Dutch soldier was killed, this time do to an accident with a mortar. Between 60 to 70 
Afghan civilians died during the fighting, with 15 being captured, tortured, and killed by the 
Taliban; the remaining 45 to 65 died as a result of Dutch bombardments, which occurred despite 
warning the population ahead of time of the assaults.
164
  
  
 The results of the Battle of Chora were that the GoA and the Dutch had successfully 
repelled the Taliban. Yet, the conduct of the Dutch military was immediately investigated by 
international groups because of the civilian casualties. ISAF Commander, US General Dan 
McNeill, claimed that the Dutch use of a Howitzer without a forward controller was a breach in 
the law of war; the Dutch denied this, saying that the use of modern, advanced Howitzers within 
a distance of 40km (the range they were in) did not necessitate the need of forward controller. 
While it was only a rumor and has not been substantiated, the Australian military apparently 
refused to take part in the battle, as they deemed it too risky for the civilian population. The 
Dutch commanders in charge of the mission were never prosecuted in the Dutch criminal justice 
system over their actions.
165
  
 
The critique that the Dutch were too heavy-handed was in stark contrast to the earlier 
reports by, amongst others, the British military that the Dutch were too concerned with their own 
safety and were cowards. The Dutch firmly refuted these accusations, and other scholars have 
also joined in to defend the Dutch in this regard. Part of the conflict within the Netherlands on 
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this topic revolves around the nature of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, as many in Dutch politics 
viewed TFU as development first, combat second.
166
 This ignores the basic fundamentals of 
Dutch counterinsurgency, as economic and political development cannot meaningfully occur 
without security.   
 
GIZAB 
At the beginning of 2006, Gizab was completely controlled by the Taliban, with TLO giving the 
government control over 0 percent of the district. This continued until early 2010, when a group 
of pro-government Pashtun forces
167
 reclaimed the district from the Taliban, driving them away 
from the main population center. This is particularly important, as this Pashtun force acted 
independently of the counterinsurgent force, operating without any political, military, or 
economic assistance. Afterwards, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), Dutch, and 
American soldiers took control of the district center. As of 2010, it could not be determined 
whether or not there was GoA influence outside of the district center. At the end of TFU, it was 
estimated that the GoA controlled 50 percent of the district, making it the third most controlled 
district.
168
 
 
CHAR CHINA 
For the GoA, the situation in Char China is bleak. The Taliban have effectively been in control 
of the province since at least 2006, with the TLO scoring the district as being 2 percent 
controlled by the government. There is only a very small section of the district center that can be 
considered under government control. According to Haji Naeem, the provincial council member 
for the GoA from Char China, “if you stand on the roof of the district government building in the 
centre of Char China and you call out ‘Talib!’ they will pop up and wave back.”169 During TFU, 
there has been no reported increase in security or development by Afghan or international forces. 
Residents of Char China regard the Taliban positively, and “speak highly of the mediating and 
governing skills of some of the insurgency leaders.”170 
 
CHENARTU 
The Taliban consider Chenartu a small part of Chora, and thus have not had an official shadow 
government installed in the area. Of all of the districts in Uruzgan, Chenartu was the only one 
not to be examined in 2006 by TLO, but it is safe to say that, based on their assessment in 2010, 
the GoA had a relative position of strength in the district as compared to the insurgency. In an 
educated estimate of the situation in Chenartu, the GoA controlled between 40 and 60 percent of 
the district. Over the course of TFU, a resident of Chenratu notes, “nothing has changed to the 
better, instead everything is getting worse day by day.”171 Behind this decrease in GoA strength 
lays a power struggle between the two Popalzai strongmen in the district. The Chief of Police of 
the ANP and the District Governor are actively struggling to gain the upper hand in controlling 
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the district. While the Chief of Police had the upper hand, the ANP have not been a stable force 
in the district, with several revolts against the Chief between 2006 and 2010. As a result of this 
conflict, security and stability have decreased district wide, opening the door for increased 
Taliban presence and influence. In 2010 the GoA’s penetration and influence in the district had 
decreased to between 20 and 30 percent.  
  
 
KHAS URUZGAN 
Security in Khas Uruzgan has been extremely limited during TFU. In 2006 the total GoA 
presence in Khas Uruzgan was at 30 percent. By 2010, the district government had lost 
significant ground to the Taliban, only controlling 15 percent of the district. Residents complain 
about how all aspects of life in Khas Uruzgan have deteriorated. The GoA presence in the district 
is limited to the areas surrounding the district center and near the American forward operating 
base (FOB) Anaconda. Otherwise, Khas Uruzgan is controlled by the Taliban. It is encouraging 
to note, however, that some Hazara and Pashtun elders are frustrated enough with the current 
situation to request military and logistical assistance from ANSF and ISAF in order to fight back 
against the Taliban. At the time of the Dutch withdrawal in 2010, the locals had not yet been 
armed, although the regional commander of the South based in Kandahar had promised his 
support.
172
 
 
Afghan Security Forces In Uruzgan 
  
At the beginning of 2006, the state of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in Uruzgan 
was extremely limited. The Afghan National Army (ANA) had only one kandak, the most basic 
military grouping in the ANA, of six hundred members assigned to Uruzgan. These soldiers were 
generally poorly trained and poorly armed, and faced an insurgent threat with nearly twice the 
number of soldiers. The kandak was based in Kandahar and was deployed to Uruzgan. In 2010, 
the tashkeel, the officially recognized number of paid positions authorized by the central 
government, listed 4,781 soldiers dispersed over five kandaks, all of which were stationed 
directly in Uruzgan. Of the 4,781 on the tashkeel, there are only ever about 4,000 available, as 
there will be around 600 on leave and another 200 to 300 soldiers that have gone absent without 
leave, abandoning their position in the ANA. The 1
st
 kandak is stationed in Deh Rawud, Char 
China, and Khas Uruzgan; the 2
nd
 kandak stationed in Chora and parts of Tirin Kot; the 3
rd
 
kandak is currently split into separate divisions located in all across Chora; the 4
th
 and 5
th
 
kandaks are deployed to Tirin Kot in Camp Holland, the main Dutch military base outside of 
Tarin Kot. Not included in this assessment of the ANA is the Special Forces kandak. There is a 
higher overall impression in Uruzgan of the ANA than of the Afghan National Police (ANP), as 
the ANA is typically better equipped, better trained, and generally more respectful of the rule of 
law.
 173
   
 
 In Uruzgan the Australians played a large role in the training of the ANA. For instance, 
The Second Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force (MRTF-2) arrived in Uruzgan in 2009 to 
provide security for the election and train local security forces. The first aspect of the strategy 
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was to mentor the 4
th
 ANA Kandak in order to conduct successful counterinsurgency strategy 
without aid.  The MRTF-2 followed a philosophy of respect first, rapport second, and patience in 
pursuit of the outcome. To accomplish this, they used a combination of bottom up training and 
top down direction of priorities and deliberate training plans to shape the ANA into a successful 
counterinsurgency unit. The bottom up aspect of the training involved partnered operations and 
patrols, in which five to seven Australian soldiers and between ten to twenty-five Afghan 
soldiers would conduct operations and patrols together. While these operations involved on the 
spot training, they MRTF-2 demanded success and high levels of competency from their ANA 
counterparts, challenging them to rise to the occasion and succeed.  The top down direction 
involved the deliberate planning of operations and patrols; once the MRTF-2 was established, the 
officers of the ANA were brought into these planning missions. Once comfortable with the 
competency level of the ANA commanders, the MRTF-2 gave primacy to their directive, thereby 
reinforcing the legitimacy of the ANA and the Afghan government.
174
 
 
Dutch Special Forces from Task Force Viper participated in training exercises for the 
ANA from 2007-2008 as a part of TFU’s Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team and then 
again as a part of Task Force 55 from March 2009 to September 2010. One example of Dutch 
Special Forces engagement in training ANSF came in May 2007. In the small district of 
Chenartu the Taliban had been placing significant pressure on the pro-ISAF militia, and there 
had been several skirmishes between the militia and the Taliban. After Viper moved into the 
area, they made contact with Taliban soldiers and initially drove them out. The operators reached 
the heart of Chenartu and engaged with local leaders and began teaching the local militias basic 
marksmanship and other necessary infantry skills. Viper soldiers began taking this newly trained 
militia out on combined training missions, and after a couple of weeks the enemy presence in the 
valleys surrounding Chenartu dissipated.  Viper was also a part of another combat and training 
mission in Mirabad, which lies between Chora and Tarin Kot.
175
 
 
 The Afghan National Police (ANP) has played an important role in stabilizing certain 
parts of Uruzgan. Between 2006 and 2010, there has been a steady increase in the amount of 
ANP forces in the province. The ANP has been able to effectively absorb local tribal militias in 
Tirin Kot, Chora, and Deh Rawud, turning them into legally sanctioned members of the force. As 
a reminder, security increased in the three districts they focused on. According to Provincial 
Police Chief Juma Gul Hemat, the then current number of police officers in the ANP was 
between 2,000 and 3,000; this number corresponds to the official tashkeel number provided by 
the GoA. The number of recruits would likely have been higher, but the tashkeel places an 
artificial limit on the amount of police officers allowed in Uruzgan. As a result, many new 
recruits were sent to other provinces that have a dearth of men. An interesting phenomenon was 
the large influx of Hazara recruits between 2006 and 2010. As a result of Taliban rhetoric and 
actions, in which the message directed at the Hazara was that they did not belong in Afghanistan 
and should either leave or die, many men from the Hazara tribe signed up with their local 
branches of the ANP. They want to prove to other Afghans that they belong, and that they are 
willing to make a stand and fight back against the Taliban. There have been some issues 
resulting from this influx of Hazara men. ANP officers are often paired with ISAF troops as they 
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conduct searches in private homes and businesses; if Hazara ANP officers are there when 
searching the house of a Pashtun family, there can be some tribal tensions and resentment that 
would not be present otherwise.
176
  
 
There have been considerable efforts by TFU to train and mentor the ANP. First, four 
members of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan were deployed to ANP units to 
act as advisors. Secondly, the Dutch established a Police Mentoring Program, based out of Camp 
Holland near Tirin Kot, where new ANP recruits are partnered with senior ANP constabulary 
forces and international military infantry in order to learn how to operate effectively. As of 2010, 
there were five Police Mentoring Teams deployed. Third was the American led Focused District 
Development training program, where an entire district’s police officers are taken in and expertly 
trained. Chora’s ANP forces were trained under the American program in 2010, and the overall 
impression in Chora was positive. The Dutch also initiated other programs, such as building the 
general police-training academy located in Tirin Kot, ANP regional stations and checkpoints 
throughout the province, and a provincial prison. These efforts by TFU certainly have made a 
significant impact on the overall security situation in Uruzgan, but Chief of Police Juma Gul 
Hemat was disappointed: during a six month period, 940 police officers were trained in Uruzgan, 
while 2,400 officers were trained in Helmand. While the training has certainly had an impact on 
the performance of ANP officers, the overall impression of the ANP is still negative, and 
significantly worse than the ANA.  “Their general reputation still revolves around drug 
addiction, ill-fitting uniforms, bad equipment, bribery, and extortion.”177  
 
 One of the most important figures in the security of Uruzgan province is Matiullah Khan. 
When the war began in 2001 Matiullah was a taxi driver; when TFU began in 2006, Matiullah 
was an illiterate highway patrol officer.  Yet in a few short years he became arguably the most 
important man in the province. Matiullah, a member of the Popalzai tribe, is the nephew or son-
in-law of Jan Mohammed Khan, the brutal and corrupt former governor of Uruzgan. “In little 
more than two years, Mr. Matiullah… has grown stronger than the government… not only 
supplanting its role in providing security but usurping its other functions, his rivals say, like 
appointing public employees and doling out government largess.”178 His personal militia, 
numbering around 2,000 men and called Kandak Amniante Uruzgan, cooperates with American 
Special Forces and provides protection along the vital Khandahar – Tirin Kot Highway, as noted 
above. Matiullah charges approximately USD 1,200 per large truck and USD 800 per small truck 
to travel the route. It is estimated that Matiullah earns USD 4.1 million yearly as a result of this 
business, which he uses to pay the men in his militia. He has negotiated a deal with the Ministry 
of the Interior to subsidize the salary of 600 of the 1,500 men in the militia who protect the 
highway, who earn about USD 240 per month, a considerable salary in Uruzgan. Matiullah and 
his men commonly work with American Special Forces in raids against the Taliban across the 
entire province.
179
  
 
 Even though what Matiullah Khan provides is crucial for the security structure in the 
state, his presence represents an overall troubling trend. A critical aspect of counterinsurgency is 
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building the official state structures – the national security forces and local government in 
particular – and Matiullah’s militia exists outside that sphere. The presence of his troops 
undermines the official state structures of the GoA, creating legitimacy issues surrounding the 
rule of law. Of particular note is that many of the men in the militia are former members of the 
ANA and ANP who still wear their official state uniforms while serving in the militia. Many 
leave the ANSF because Matiullah’s militia provides a better and more reliable source of 
income. The use of militias is just a temporary stop gap though. Major general Nick Carter, the 
commander of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan, said that “the institutions of the 
government, in security and military terms, are not yet strong enough to be able to provide 
security … But the situation is unsustainable and clearly needs to be resolved.”180 The long-term 
goal would be to absorb these private militias into the existing state structure.
181
 Uruzganis worry 
that Matiullah is just a parasite taking advantage of the situation and that he will not survive long 
beyond the international withdrawal. Yet Matiuallah said that “Oruzgan (sic) used to be the 
worst place in Afghanistan, and now it’s the safest … What should we do? The officials are 
cowards and thieves.”182 
 
 
 Assessment of the Dutch Approach to Defense 
 
Throughout Task Force Uruzgan the Dutch Armed Forces had a high level of success in 
increasing security in the province. In the three ink spot districts, Chora, Deh Rawud, and Tirin 
Kot, security and government penetration increased notably. While the GoA did not have more 
than 50 percent penetration in Chora, it is important to remember that throughout 2006 and 2007 
the district was home to intense Taliban activity and only through the combined efforts of Dutch, 
American, Australian, and Afghan forces was the Taliban pushed back. In 2006, the GoA had 
majority control of about 0 percent of the population according to TLO; in 2010 approximately 
60 percent of the population lives in a district where the GoA had a monopoly on the use of 
force. The Dutch presence in Deh Rawud was the most effective, with the Government of 
Afghanistan having a near monopoly on the use of power in the district with 85 percent 
penetration. Tirin Kot, the economic and political center of the province, also experienced 
increased security with the government controlling 75 percent of the district. One of the most 
surprising results throughout TFU was the major increase in security in Gizab. The province 
went from no GoA presence to 50 percent as a result of a spontaneous uprising by anti-Taliban 
Pashtuns. In the other three districts, Char China, Chenartu, and Khas Uruzgan, the security 
situation decreased. This is more than likely because the Dutch had little or no presence in these 
districts.  
 
The Dutch were also highly successful in increasing the capacity of Afghan National Security 
Forces. The Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army both saw an increase in the 
quantity of recruits. The training provided by Dutch, Australian, and American personnel was 
instrumental in achieving one of the overarching goals of the Dutch mission, which was to build 
                                                 
180
 Dexter Filkens, With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire, in New York Times 5 June 2010.  
181
 It should be noted that Matiullah Khan became the Provincial Chief of Police after the Dutch 
Withdrawal in August 2010, and that most of his militia was absorbed into the official state structure.  
182
 Dexter Filkens, With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire, in New York Times 5 June 2010.  
Majkut 59 
 
the formal security capacity in Uruzgan so that the ANSF would be capable of continuing on 
without direct support from outside actors.  
 
The counterinsurgency approach undertaken in Uruzgan emphasized the protection of civilians 
and limiting the use of kinetic operations unless absolutely necessary. This required the Dutch to 
adapt both their kinetic and non-kinetic operations in order to assure clarity over the rules of 
engagement and adjust to the ever-changing tactics of the Taliban.  
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Chapter Five: Development and Diplomacy 
 
“…But I suppose the patron meant that if you give a man a fish he is hungry again in an hour; if 
you teach him to catch a fish you do him a good turn." 
-Anne Isabel Ritchie 
 
Development 
Development of the area of operations (AOE) is one of the three pillars of Dutch 
counterinsurgency. For Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), the goal was to “promote stability in 
Afghanistan and support the authorities’ reconstruction efforts.”183 In Uruzgan, an emphasis was 
placed on building new or improving: basic infrastructure, bridges, schools, mosques, facilities 
for purifying drinking water, and medical services. Overall, the Dutch had ultimate say in the 
formulation of policy in regards to development, supplying the funds for nearly every project 
initiated in the province. While the Dutch organized the overall approach and directed its 
development, they did not, however, carry out the projects using Dutch personnel. Instead, the 
Dutch delegated the actual implementation of development projects to other actors, including the 
United Nations (UN), the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), Afghan and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and to the Australian military. The Dutch also understood 
that at a fundamental level, “the provision of security and development assistance go hand in 
hand, with the military providing an enabling environment for civilian development actors and 
development projects contributing to a more stable and secure environment.”184  
 
In addition to this, the Dutch utilized an under the radar approach to development, 
delivering small-scale aid to locals through intermediaries to ensure the safety of those receiving 
aid. This program, referred to as a ‘mini-National Solidarity Programme,’ involved Dutch 
personnel working with village shuras. Each shura would create a list of projects that their 
community wanted or needed, and over the next four months the village would receive 
installments of USD 1,000 per month. Critical to the success of this program was that the next 
installment would only be paid if there were noted progress made over the previous month, 
ensuring accountability. “So far the approach has been successful as communities feel that they 
have a measure of autonomy and decision-making capacity (and responsibility) in the 
development process. The program has also benefited the local economy through short-term job 
creation.”185 The most important aspect of this project, though, was its ability to deliver 
development aid to districts that were contested or controlled by the Taliban. This allowed 
development funds to be spread amongst the entire province. As of 2009, “none of these projects, 
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which include canal cleaning and reconstruction, water wells and hydro-dynamos, have been 
targeted by the insurgency.”186   
 
 This study recognizes that there are challenges to quantifying progress when it comes to 
development, as numbers do not simply provide all of the relevant information. On the whole, 
though, “residents did report improvements in the key areas of education, health care, 
agricultural development, and transportation (roads) since 2006, with more services reaching 
communities.”187 This section examines various development sectors to determine progress, 
looks at additional factors in development, and analyzes the methods used by the Dutch to 
develop Uruzgan. 
 
Development Sectors 
 
This section of the chapter discusses the various development sectors that the Dutch attempted to 
improve over the course of TFU. It is important to note that the sectors discussed here are by no 
means an entirely exhaustive list, but for the most part they represent the vast proportion of 
development efforts.  
 
AGRICULTURE 
Over the four years of Dutch involvement in Uruzgan, there have been significant gains made in 
the agricultural sector. Following the basic patterns of development shown elsewhere, the Dutch 
instituted projects ranging from large-scale distributions of seeds to small, under the radar micro-
credit programs aimed at helping increase agricultural production. On the whole, these projects 
can be considered a great success. 
 
 There are factors concerning agriculture in Uruzgan specifically and Afghanistan 
generally, which must be addressed before moving on to gains made between 2006 and 2010. 
The first set involves the overall nature of agriculture in Uruzgan. Subsistence farming is the 
primary economic activity of most Uruzganis, with a noticeable lack of large-scale agribusiness 
as seen in more developed states. In addition to this, Uruzgan is not located in a great place for 
inter-state trade, and the main road out of the province, to Kandahar, is not remotely close to 
being safe for the consistent distribution of goods. As a result of these conditions, subsistence 
farming may continue to be the norm.
188
 Weather also plays a large role in the ability of farmers 
to produce, as there can be large variations in the temperature and amount of rainfall.  The 
second involves the dynamics of opium production. The sale of illegal narcotics have been used 
to finance war efforts throughout history, including both the Viet Minh and France struggling 
over the vital opium trade in Indochina during the French-Indochina War.
189
 In Afghanistan, the 
production and sale of poppy, which is turned into opium, has been an incredibly valuable 
resource. For local farmers, the production of poppy in their fields is the most profitable cash-
crop available to them. This poses a challenge for counterinsurgents: they must be able to 
                                                 
186
 The Liaison Office, Three Years Later, 12. 
187
 The Liaison Office, Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan, 6. 
188
 The Liaison Office, Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan, 10. 
189
 Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam, (New 
York: Random House, 2013).  
Majkut 62 
 
convince the population to follow the rule of law and grow other, less profitable, agriculture. The 
culture and economics relating to opium production would be a challenge that the Dutch would 
have to face in order to improve agriculture and combat the insurgency. 
 
In 2006, there was an estimated 9,703 hectares (ha)
190
 used for poppy production in 
Uruzgan; in 2007 production dipped slightly to 9,204 ha, rose in 2008 to 9,939 ha, and slightly 
decreased in 2009. The decrease in production in 2009 was in response to decreasing opium 
prices and rising prices of wheat. But in 2010, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) released their assessment on opium production in Afghanistan. As a result of a 
disease that affected the opium crop in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, two major sites of 
opium production, the overall output of opium in Afghanistan decreased. As a result, prices have 
increased by 36 per cent to USD 4,900 per hectare (10,000 square meters).
191
 While it certainly 
varies, a hectare of opium can, in ideal situations such as those seen in Afghanistan in 2009, 
produce up to 56 kilograms of the drug.
192
 Yury Fedotov, the executive Director of UNODC, 
says that “in combination with the high price of opium, a low wheat price may also drive farmers 
back to opium cultivation.” 193 The high price of opium reinforces the desire of many of Afghans 
to use the cash crop as a method to increase their wealth. Trying to address opium production is a 
tricky matter because of the nature of supply in demand. As the counterinsurgents are able to 
convince the population to move away from poppy production, this lowers the supply and thus 
raises the price, driving farmers back to producing the drug because of how lucrative it is.  
 
 When the Dutch arrived in 2006, the agricultural sector of Uruzgan was in shambles. 
Irrigation canals were in terrible conditions, there was an over reliance on the production of 
poppy, and there was a serious dearth of livestock, as most had been killed as a result of combat. 
In order to combat these insufficiencies and improve the circumstances of Uruzgani farmers, the 
Dutch directed many varying agricultural programs. One example of an agricultural program 
used by the Dutch was the distribution of wheat seed and fertilizer to over 32,000 families. The 
widespread distribution of seeds is indicative of the reliance on subsistence farming, as the 
amount of individual groups receiving this assistance would have been lower if there were large 
agribusinesses in Uruzgan.
194
 An important aspect of the wheat distribution system was to 
provide a measure of food security to Urzganis, as many in the province had been adversely 
affected by high food prices and draught. In addition, the provision of wheat seeds and fertilizers 
helps to improve the local capacity for producing agricultural products.
195
 The wheat that is 
produced in Uruzgan is for local consumption. A second program was the distribution of 4,500 
chickens to 500 families. Each family received seven hens and two roosters which would 
facilitate a production of eggs for the family to eat or sell. These chickens were distributed 
mostly to widows with small children, as they provided a relatively easy source of nutrition and 
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income. A third program was the distribution of micro-credit to 2,295 members of the Islamic 
Investment and Finance Cooperatives (IIFCs) in Tirin Kot and Deh Rawud. These small loans 
helped to facilitate the ability of farmers to purchase seed and equipment for the upcoming 
growing season.
196
 The programs described here focused on lower-level economic development 
and helping to provide sustainable and legal, sources of revenue for Uruzgani families.  
 
Fourth and maybe most importantly, was the introduction of saffron in Uruzgan. 
Authorized by the Dutch government, a small Dutch company came to Uruzgan and controlled 
the entire supply chain of the valuable spice. The company first taught a select group of farmers 
about the substantial earning potential for producing saffron, and then expanded on the proper 
techniques for growing a high quality product. Next, the company distributed seeds and other 
necessary equipment to the farmers. Critically, the Dutch company guaranteed the farmers that 
they would purchase however much saffron they were able to produce, effectively alleviating 
doubt and guaranteeing income. There were 500 farmers participating in the program in 2010; 
for 220 of these farmers 2010 was their first year, indicating a rapid increase in the appeal of 
legal, high profit cash crop alternatives to poppy. In 2008 production reached 51.5 kg of saffron, 
in 2008 97.5 kg and in 2010 the company believed that production would be near 200 kg. The 
goal of the program was to continue to expand saffron production across Uruzgan, as the 
company was looking to expand cultivation areas by 300 percent by 2015. Since the program’s 
inception, the quality and quantity of saffron has increased after each growing season. The 
quality of the saffron is still low, with 90 percent being of a second or third order quality, in 2010 
10 percent of the saffron was of the highest quality, with this number only expected to increase 
as the farmers gain experience.
197
 For reference, the price of saffron, depending on its quality, 
can range from $1,100 to $11,000 per kilogram.
198
 
 
 The accomplishments in agriculture over the four years of the Dutch engagement were 
impressive. Since the Dutch arrived in 2006, “projects have promoted the distribution of 
improved seeds, fertilizers, saplings, poultry, agricultural training, including gardening training 
for women in Tirin Kot; construction of roads and dams; cleaning and digging of canals.”199 
Each of these activities contributed to positive gains in the agricultural sector. Even with all of 
the progress, though, farmers still look to opium production as an easy way to maximize profit. 
Some areas of Uruzgan have complied with the government ban on producing poppy, such as 
Deh Rawud in May 2010 and in Chora, where the local shura agreed to a ban as well. For 
reference, the population of Deh Rawud and Chora are 78,750 and 72,000, respectively. The 
majority of Uruzganis survive on subsistence farming, so it is fair to assume that at least 67 
percent of the individuals in these two districts were potential opium farmers, meaning there is 
over 100,000 less potential opium farmers. The high international price and demand for opium 
still drives production, though. But it seems that the Dutch development programs are working, 
as “Tirin Kot residents added that poppy cultivation would have been more extensive without the 
distribution of alternative seeds and saplings.”200  
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HEALTHCARE 
During their time in Uruzgan, the Dutch counterinsurgents were able to successfully overhaul 
and improve the healthcare system in the province. The efforts of the Dutch led to improved 
facilities, increased numbers of practitioners, and higher overall quality of the healthcare 
provided to residents of Uruzgan. 
 
 There were many different programs that the Dutch directed in Uruzgan. First and 
foremost, the Dutch, along with other foreign donors, funded two Afghan NGOs, Afghan Health 
and Development Services (AHDS) and Afghanistan Centre for Training and Development 
(ACTD). Both of these NGOs played a critical role in the development of the healthcare sector 
by increasing the technical skills of health care practitioners in Uruzgan. Second, and the area in 
which there was the most measurable progress, was the increase in health care facilities. As of 
2010, there was a Comprehensive Health Center (CHC) and or a Basic Health Center (BHC) in 
every district but Gizab.
201
 Between 2006 and 2010 there was an overall increase in CHCs and 
BHCs from nine to seventeen. Also, there was a large increase in the amount of smaller health 
center across the province; the amount doubled, from one hundred centers to two hundred. Each 
one of these centers had at least one community health worker, either male or female, who had 
the ability to treat low-level problems and could always refer up to one of the larger facilities if 
necessary. There was an overall increase in community health workers from one hundred and 
thirty to three hundred, with one third of these workers being women. Another significant 
contribution to the health care sector in Uruzgan was the creation of a midwife school. The 
midwife school was started to educate and train women to act as certified midwives in their 
community, and began with a capacity of twelve students. The first class of students graduated in 
spring 2010.
202
  
 
 The final and maybe most important development in the health care sector were the 
improvements that occurred at the Tirin Kot hospital. The hospital, which had prior to 2006 been 
operating as a district wide hospital, was upgraded to a provincial facility, indicating that it had 
increased capabilities. These upgraded facilities included, “an outpatient clinic, a blood bank, an 
operation room, a mortuary, a cholera ward, and a separate women’s ward.”203 These 
improvements were seen as important upgrades in the healthcare sector for the entire province, 
as it provides a higher quality facility that is easier to access for many citizens.
204
 
 
EDUCATION 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), education is a key to 
societal development as it reduces poverty and decrease childhood mortality rates; therefore, it 
makes sense that education would be a primary development sector for the Dutch to focus on. 
When discussing improvements in the educational sector, especially in a state like Afghanistan, 
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and Uruzgan specifically, an increase in the number of schools does not necessarily correlate to 
an increase in physical buildings. Many schools in Uruzgan exist in private homes or businesses, 
mosques, in tents, or outside. In fact, only 43% of students in Uruzgan consistently study inside a 
building. Keeping this in mind, there were still impressive developments in the educational 
sector during Dutch command of Uruzgan.  
 
 Uruzgan, when compared to other provinces across Afghanistan, has very low provincial 
wide enrollment for children in schools. On average, only twenty percent of school age children 
actually attend school, which is down from the national average of fifty percent. This picture 
becomes even bleaker if you exclude the Hazara dominated districts – as the Hazara tribe has a 
long standing history with education. But as a result of Dutch efforts, the educational sector in 
Uruzgan is improving.
205
 
 
In 2006, The Liaison Office (TLO) only knew of thirty four schools in the entire 
province, with only Tirin Kot, Khas Uruzgan, and Gizab having schools for girls. By 2010, there 
was a substantial increase, with one hundred and sixty six schools operating, of which seven 
were madrassas
206
, twenty nine were all-girl schools, and thirteen were co-ed schools. There 
were an additional ninety-four schools that had been closed, and fifteen that were not yet 
officially open; in this case, the schools were operational but had not been officially recognized 
by the GoA.
207
 In 2010, there were 42,772 total students in the province that attend school 
regularly, and there is an addition 5,234 students that go occasionally. 19,600 students go to 
elementary school, 15,200 go to secondary school, and about 18,700 go to high school. Of these 
numbers, there are approximately 6,800 girls attending school throughout all levels. Another 
important metric to look at in regards to education is the amount of teachers present in the 
province. There are no accurate numbers for the amount of teachers prior to 2006, but in 2010 
there were 1,126 teachers present in Uruzgan, with 67 of them being women.  Teacher training 
schools also exist in Tirin Kot and Khas Uruzgan, with a total of 425 future teachers enrolled.
208
 
 
The improvements made in the educational sector were substantial and important. There 
is still a large portion of the Uruzgani population that remains illiterate and uneducated – perhaps 
reflecting the history of subsistence agriculture as the leading economic activity in the province, 
as there is little time for children to attend school because they are needed at home to work. 
Regardless, there have been positive steps to creating an environment in Uruzgan where 
educational opportunities take a higher precedent.   
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GENDER EQUALITY 
Uruzgan is one of the most socially conservative provinces in the state. In Afghanistan, it was the 
only province “‘where no women candidates could be found to run for the three reserved female 
Provincial Council (PC) seats in the 2005 elections’ and that women ‘are deprived of education, 
health as well as employment opportunities.’”209 Increasing opportunities to women and enabling 
48.5 percent of the population of Uruzgan to have access to basic-needs facilities was a crucial 
aspect of the development policy of the Netherlands.  
 
 At the end of the Dutch mission in 2010 conditions for women were much better off than 
four years previously. Politically, there were two Pashtun women elected to the Provincial 
Council in 2009: Hilla, an NGO worker from Khas Uruzgan, and Marjana, a member of the 
Kuchi tribe from Tirin Kot. Hilla was further elected to the Meshrano Jirga (upper house of 
parliament), and in 2010 there was four women running for the Wolesi Jirga (lower house of 
parliament). While this is certainly an improvement since the last election, there is a certain 
caveat that needs to be considered. “In general, women in Uruzgan have not been participating in 
political netowrks and have only acquired political position with outside support. … Most people 
interviewed, however, argue that certain [male] leaders support women to improve their image 
rather than out of concern for the position of women.”210 It may not be important one way or the 
other if this is true; however, women are still becoming involved in politics in Afghanistan 
regardless of the intent of those pushing them into it, and progress begets future progress 
regardless of how it began. 
 
 There have been other opportunities that have opened up to women over the four year 
period as well. In addition to the women being trained as midwives, as mentioned in the 
education section, healthcare in general has become significantly more accessible. In 2010, 
women accounted for over 40 percent of all visitors to healthcare facilities; in 2004, the last time 
there was a measure of this metric, women visited healthcare facilities so infrequently that they 
did not factor into the statistics. There has been an increase in immunization for women from 26 
percent to 60 percent, and the use of family planning has risen from 4 percent to nine percent. In 
the educational sector, there has been an increase in the amount of schools for girls, and in the 
enrolment of girls into these schools. Consider, though, that “almost all of these girls or mixed 
schools are in the two districts with Hazara populations,” which have a long standing history and 
tradition of education.
211
 Finally, more and more women are going outside the house by 
themselves and shopping in the bazaars. This is a large step for many women, as in the 
conservative parts of Uruzgan many women are not allowed to leave the house without a male 
relative. There are estimates that about one hundred women per day are seen shopping in the 
Tirin Kot bazaar.  
 
 While far from perfect, there has still been a significant increase in the rights and 
opportunities afforded to women. As a result of the Dutch development policy, women have 
more rights than they had previously, and if trends continue they will have further opportunities 
in the future.  
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Additional Development Factors 
The Dutch approach to development focused on improving the various development spheres 
described above. In addition, there were other smaller, more focused programs aimed at specific 
development targets. This section examines these other programs as well as other factors that 
impacted development. 
 
 One negative consequence of the Dutch reconstruction plan involves the presence of 
corruption in Uruzgan. Graft and corruption has an obviously deleterious effect on development 
projects – kickbacks and bribes take away from the bottom line and hurt the budget. Beyond this 
concept of wasted resources, though, the necessity of bribes to complete even the most routine 
task hurts the overall quality of the work being accomplished. Simply, there is just less money 
available to complete the project, so often the quality of the materials used is lessened. The 
typical development plan will involve accepting the bid of a main contractor to finish the project. 
This contractor will then accept bribes from subcontractors to be included in the project.  In 
order to combat this both the Dutch and the Australians have been relying on direct contracting 
with local firms rather than through the multiple subcontractors to help mitigate the graft.
212
 
  
 The overall economic progress of the province should also be examined. The increase in 
security over the four years has led to a large increase in the number of businesses operating with 
the Tirin Kot bazaar, growth from nine hundred to two thousand. There has also been a 
corresponding expansion in the bazaars in Chora and Deh Rawud. The increase in development 
and the migration of families away from unstable districts in Uruzgan has led to an increased 
demand for housing in Tirin Kot. In the center of the city, for instance, homes are now around 
four times as expensive in 2010 as in 2006.
213
 The price of commodities has tripled, as most 
goods are imported into the region from neighboring Kandahar and Kabul; with roads being 
generally insecure, the price of goods has risen to reflect the insecurity. Two banks have opened 
up in the region: the Bank of Kabul in 2009 and Azizi Bank in 2010. There is an issue in 
Uruzgan, like much of Southern Afghanistan, over the accepted currency. “Dependence on 
Kandahar City markets leads to reliance on the Pakistani Rupee, the main currency of the 
province. The Afghan currency, the Afghani, is rarely accepted in stores, and is often exchanged 
at the same rate as the PKR, despite its higher value. The result is Uruzgan’s economy is more 
under the influence of Pakistan than oriented toward Afghan markets.” 214 
 
 One of the main consequences of the Dutch reconstruction plan stems from the use of an 
“ink spot” approach to counterinsurgency. By focusing on the three population centers in 
Uruzgan the Dutch had effectively abandoned the other districts to the Taliban, at the exception 
of some of the small scale under-the-radar development programs,. Across the province there 
has been no significant increase in the amount of income for individuals and families, even with 
all of the development programs instituted. In the communities that were barely touched by the 
development programs, however, there has been no increase in the economic situation.
215
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 An issue that was confronted the Dutch during TFU had to do with asymmetrical 
information involving technical knowledge. Dutch personnel were confronted with issues such 
as: just how do you build in Afghanistan? What is the impact of the heat, sun, and sand on 
building materials, and how does this impact construction? And where do you find all of the 
necessary supplies to construct things to a sufficient quality standard? These issues were 
sometimes painful for the Dutch to address, as many of the military officials who were put in 
charge of construction projects needed to verify information without any background knowledge 
in any form of engineering.
216
 Further, as the Dutch were new to the area in 2006, some Afghanis 
leveraged the situation for their own benefit, such as unqualified contractors winning bids for 
projects because the Dutch were unable to verify their capabilities. In order to combat this, the 
Dutch developed processes to gain a balance of information, including using technical personnel 
to interview contractors to ascertain their qualifications. In addition, references from past work 
were critical to the ability of contractors to win bids.
217
 By learning on the job and adapting their 
processes to match the realities of the mission, TFU was able to better able to foster 
development. 
  
THE IDEA PROGRAM 
 
 The Dutch IDEA-officers who operated in Uruzgan played an important role in 
stimulating small-scale entrepreneurial development in the province.  IDEA stands for the 
Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Activities. This unit consisted of reserve officers, 
whose employment in the private sector gave them experience in creating new businesses. They 
were deployed in three-month tours in Uruzgan to teach local Afghans how to start businesses. 
The unit was created in 2000 and is jointly controlled by the Dutch Armed Forces and the 
Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers. “The goal of IDEA are to build and 
develop sustainable local entrepreneurial capacity by advising and training entrepreneurs in post-
conflict rebuilding contexts and informing military commanders regarding instruments for 
private sector development.
218
 IDEA officers were deployed in Uruzgan starting in 2008, with 
one officer stationed at Camp Holland in Tirin Kowt and a second in Deh Rawoud.  
 
 When IDEA first comes into an area, the first goal is to establish local business 
development centers (BDC), which function essentially as a chamber of commerce for the local 
community. BDCs provide basic assistive services for local entrepreneurs, including advice and 
training and opportunities for them to build social networks within the local business community. 
Once established and functional, the IDEA officer then finds an NGO to take over operating the 
BDC to ensure that the center will survive long after the Dutch leaves the area. In Uruzgan this 
was the Afghan Centre for Training and Development (ACTD). A second part of the IDEA 
mission is to train entrepreneurs through the Start and Improve your Business-method, a method 
developed by the International Labour Organization. More than 200 Uruzganis were trained 
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using this method. Additionally members of the ACTD were trained to teach this entrepreneurial 
program so they would be able to continue training beyond the Dutch withdrawal. Third, the 
Dutch established a microcredit bank in Camp Holland in Tirin Kot in conjunction with the 
World Council of Credit Unions and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the end of TFU 
the bank had over 1,200 customers and had issued over USD 500,000 in loans to Uruzganis. 
Finally, IDEA officers acted as advisors to the Dutch military commanders, providing economic 
and social development plans to assist the overall development of Uruzgan. One example of this 
occurred in Deh Rawoud, where the IDEA officer recommended the development of a local 
judicial system in the district, as the rule-of-law is an important aspect of fostering economic 
activity.
219
 
 
 The IDEA officers in Uruzgan had to pay special attention to the local conditions in the 
province in order to have a hope of success. The only other locations that IDEA officers were 
deployed to were Bosnia and Baghlan, Afghanistan. Uruzgan differed greatly from both of these 
locations, as Uruzgan is poorer, lacks any industrial capability, and the primary economic 
activity is subsistence farming. Some IDEA officers referred to the economic landscape as 
“biblical.” As a result of these conditions, the typical programs developed by IDEA would not be 
entirely relevant in Uruzgan. The local traders in Uruzgan, who under normal circumstances 
would be the primary recipient of the training offered, were actually toward to the top of the 
economic hierarchy in the province. Therefore, the IDEA officers began to think of the 
subsistence farmers as the entrepreneurs they should focus on, showering the farmers with 
entrepreneurial advice rather than advice on how to increase farm production. Culture also 
played a significant role in the success of the IDEA project. The officers had to be attentive to 
tribal and ethnic differences, as these played heavily into the success of development projects. If 
two different craftsmen are contracted to do a job, and the two are from different tribes, 
especially tribes that are historically at odds, then completing the job becomes exponentially 
more difficult. Further, the IDEA officers had to accept the presence of power-brokers in the 
province, as without their assistance (and cut of the money) development would have been 
hampered.
220
 
 
Assessment of the Dutch Approach to Development 
 
The ultimate goal of reconstruction is not just the development of the Uruzgani economy, but on 
the prospect of sustained development without substantial aid from outsiders in Uruzgan. There 
has been substantial progress in the development of Urzgani economic and societal sectors, but 
the long term sustainability of these programs need to be examined. Will the Afghan government 
and the Dutch successors be able to continue the progress that has been made already? “The 
current situation in Uruzgan supports the statement that just providing aid does not increase the 
level of development in a state. … The process of development is important. The research area of 
developmental aid has indicated factors which empower the link between receiving aid (e.g., 
construction objects) and general development (e.g., reconstruction): sustainability, capacity 
building, local ownership and the grass roots approach.”221 These concepts are all linked. 
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Capacity building is the development of the incentives and skills in the local population to 
continue development long after the end of aid. In order to develop capacity building, local 
ownership of development projects is vital. The population must be a part of the decision-making 
process: what is the incentive to continue building schools if the population does not see their 
value? Considering this, the development plans must be linked to local needs, not the wishes of 
the development actor. By utilizing a grass roots approach and bringing forward development 
projects that originally stem from the population, the locals will take ownership of the task and 
will have the incentive to continue the development in the future.
222
   
 
In Uruzgan, the results of development in this regard are mixed. While income hasn’t 
risen in Uruzgan, the development programs directed by the Dutch in Uruzgan are impressive. 
They have established a 488 percent increase in the number of schools and a corresponding 
increase in the number of students regularly attending school, both boys and girls; there has been 
a significant increase in the availability of healthcare facilities and treatment options for men and 
women; and there have been positive steps made to move the agricultural sector away from 
poppy production and toward more profitable, and legal, products. Yet, “residents [of Uruzgan] 
say the main problem confronting the province is not a lack of development, but the continued 
weakness of the government. Locals see the development and reconstruction projects as 
something ‘foreigners’ do, while the state is largely deemed unresponsive to their needs.”223 This 
indicates that the potential for sustained development after the Dutch withdrawal in 2010 to 
continue is limited. Additionally, after the international withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end 
of 2014, the prospects look increasingly bleak. If security worsens and the Taliban make a 
comeback, then the NGOs conducting the development projects will be worse off in the future, 
sacrificing all of the progress. The population only really sees one government agency as 
effective: the National Solidarity Programme of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development (MRRD). As of 2010, the organization was directing development programs 
through local Afghan NGO Afghanistan National Re-Consruction Coordination in Deh Rawud, 
Chora, and in a smaller capacity in Chenartu. MRRD is directly operating in Tirin Kot.
224
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Diplomacy 
 
“I don’t see any problem in the policies but the problem is in the implementation of policies. All the 
policies are written and organized very well, but due to unprofessional and unskilled personnel, lack 
of resources in offices, and lack of monitoring of provincial and district level, formal and informal 
institutions by the central government, the policies are not implemented in a good way.” 
-Achekzai elder from Tirin Kot 
 
The third pillar of the Dutch approach to counterinsurgency is the focus on diplomacy and 
politics. Compared to the second and third pillars of defense and development, the specific focus 
of diplomacy is less straightforward. Diplomacy in the context of Dutch counterinsurgency is the 
focus on social and political factors that contribute to the establishment and perpetuation of a 
legitimate, non-Taliban, political authority.  
 
While it is possible to pursue development and defense in a somewhat independent 
manner and still have some success, the pillar of diplomacy relies upon the success or progress in 
the other two sectors. There are some factors that can be cleaned up and controlled within the 
government, such as corruption or nepotism, but in the end what concerns the population the 
most is security and development, things that in a war torn state are primarily controlled by the 
government. If the counterinsurgent government is responsible, or at least perceived as 
responsible, for overseeing increases in security and development in an area, then there will 
under normal circumstances be increased support for the government.  In modern 
counterinsurgency, almost all acts are political.  
 
 The Dutch approach to diplomacy in Uruzgan operated with an understanding of the 
importance of strengthening the host-nation’s governing ability and penetration. Politics in 
Afghanistan, though, entail different considerations and dynamics than politics in many other 
states in the world; the discrepancies between political systems are particularly great when 
comparing the Afghan political tradition to the Western-liberal democracies from which most of 
the ISAF member states come from. As noted in chapter three, Afghanistan is a state without a 
strong history of central government – especially a central government that had any real 
influence on the life across the state. In addition, Afghanistan, and Uruzgan in particular, has an 
extremely diverse ethnic and tribal population. While in the United States and other highly 
developed post-industrial states diversity is celebrated and there are general patterns of 
inclusiveness, in Afghanistan this is not the case. Ethnic and tribal divisions truly matter in 
politics, and if the counterinsurgent force ignores this factor they would be in trouble. Also, as 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the cycle of abuse in local politics is important: whenever a new tribe 
comes to power, they use their new strength to marginalize their opponents and cement their 
strength. When this tribe eventually loses their grip on authority the tribe that takes power 
continues the cycle. The Dutch recognized the nature of local politics, and “based [their 
approach] on understanding the local balance of power and including marginalized local elites in 
the Afghan government.”225 
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 An example of the importance of local political dynamics on overall success in the 
counterinsurgency can be seen through the actions of a Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) in 2007.  There were low levels of unrest amongst the population in a multi-tribal area, 
and the PRT decided to investigate before problems escalated, which could possibly open the 
door to Taliban influence. After investigating the area, it was clear to the PRT that the friction 
was generated by the dearth of water for irrigation purposes. The irrigation canals were failing as 
a result of damage from fighting and a lack of maintenance. Further, the history of the region 
was characterized by conflicts between the tribes – the origin of the dispute was unclear and lost 
to history. “The tribal disagreement was both cause and effect of the neglected canal as a fair 
distribution of water could only be achieved through cooperation between the neighboring 
tribe.”226 What originally appeared to be a technical problem was actually a complex inter-tribal 
dispute whose implications were critical to local stability.  
 
 In order to fix the problem, the PRT would have to address both the technical issue of a 
failing irrigation canal and assuage the inter-tribal conflict. The PRT needed to find a member of 
the local government to mediate the situation, as the Dutch personnel did not have an in-depth 
enough knowledge of the local dynamics to accurately address the situation. Also, in this 
circumstance the Dutch understood that it would be more important for the problem to be 
addressed by local actors rather than directly through their own actions. The mediator proposed a 
community-based group that was comprised of  members from both tribal groups; this idea was 
accepted by both tribes and was presented and accepted by the PRT. Once brought together, the 
tribes were able to work effectively together in order to achieve their overall goal. The PRT 
provided some of the resources needed for the project, such as shovels, which were provided in a 
non-overt manner. “In sum, the execution of the repair work on the canal and the agreement 
regarding the maintenance indirectly brought together different tribes, and (a section of) the local 
government. The PRT checked the progress of the work, but kept a rather low-profile during the 
mediation- and the repair-process.”  For those involved in the process, it highlighted how the 
government was actually capable of making a difference in their day-to-day lives.
227
 
 
 Arguably the most important factor in Afghani politics is the Karzai connection. 
President Hamid Karzai was a prominent Afghan before the fall of the Taliban, and was selected 
to lead an interim government during the 2002 loya jirga (grand assembly). When the first 
national elections occurred in 2004 Karzai won, and he then won the subsequent election in 2009 
for an additional five-year term. President Karzai is a member of the Popalzai tribe, a tribe that 
constitutes only 10 percent of the total Afghan population. The Karzai connection is important 
because, based on the powers afforded to him by the Afghan Constitution; he has significant 
powers to appoint government officials ranging from the upper house of parliament to sub-
national positions. According to the Center for American Progress, “all roads currently lead back 
to President Karzai, who directly appoints more than 1,000 government officials throughout the 
country and many more positions directly.”228  
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ISSUES RELATING TO LEGAL AND JUSTICE SECTORS  
 
This section examines the strength, or lack thereof, of the formal justice and legal system in 
Uruzgan. This includes the place of law in society and the ability of the courts to successfully 
function. The consistent enforcement of laws at the local level helps to define the overall success 
of a government. 
 
The formal justice system is highly ineffective in Uruzgan. Prior to the Dutch arrival in 
2006, the majority of the official courts suffered from being understaffed, and the staff they did 
have was more often than not severely undertrained. Before the Dutch arrived in 2006, Jan 
Mohammad Khan, who was governor of Uruzgan prior to the Dutch arrival, allowed local 
strongmen to overlook legal procedures in their own personal drive for power and money. While 
Mohammad Khan was replaced before the Dutch arrived, there was little progress made in 
improving the justice sector. In 2010, the formal justice sector consisted of one Appeal Court 
with five judges in Tirin Kot, three Primary Courts, one each in Tirin Kot, Chora and Deh 
Rawud. There are two judges assigned to the Tirin Kot Primary Court, and one assigned to Chora 
and Deh Rawud. Unfortunately, two of the five Appeals Court judges refuse to fulfill their 
duties, only arriving every six months to collect their salary. Of the judges who are present, none 
have earned a university degree, and most are graduates of madrassas, where they learned 
religion and Islamic jurisprudence rather than the law. Throughout the rest of the province, only 
about 20 percent of all judges are in place. In fact, Chenartu and Char China have no justice 
professionals – judges, prosecutors, etc. The inability of the justice sector to flourish in Uruzgan 
is not solely limited to the professional skills of the judges, but rather the perceived widespread 
bias and corruption amongst justice professionals. This problem is not exclusive to Uruzgan, but 
belongs to a larger state-wide trend. 
229
  
 
The lack of trained justice professionals has resulted in many individuals from the 
Afghan National Police (ANP) and the National Department of Security (NDS) to take matters 
into their own hands. While generally well intentioned, these individuals often do not have the 
requisite knowledge of the rules that they are seeking to enforce. Overall, there is little faith in 
the justice system, as the ANP and the NDS are still alleged to abuse detainees. As a result of 
these failings, most judicial issues are handled locally by village elders, community shuras, 
mullahs, or by the Taliban. In Uruzgan, there are no official Taliban courts, but rather several 
Taliban judges who utilize a strong interpretation of sharia law. While harsh, the Taliban 
generally enforce their code of law universally and announce the rules to those under their 
authority, which provides some level of stability for the population.
230
 
 
In January 2010 Matiullah Khan created a tribal council, called the shura eslahi (reform 
council) in which approximately 200 elders from throughout Uruzgan met to work on solving 
provincial and district-level disputes. Some claim that, rather than being for the good of the 
province, Matiuallah Khan started the shura eslahi as a political stunt to raise his importance in 
the province; the council met each week in Khan’s home. As a result of this belief, the level of 
participation has decreased dramatically, although there have been some positives developments 
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in conflict mediation. Overall, though, “the relevant state institutions and international 
organizations had neglected the justice sector in Uruzgan.”231  
 
The inability of the justice sector to function in Uruzgan has greater significance beyond 
what is readily apparent. Take the following example. Stemming from the general lack of 
literacy, most Uruzganis place a higher emphasis on the value of the spoken word over written 
contracts. This means that there is little, if any, record of most business transactions. While 
written contracts were utilized during Dutch development projects, this lack of documentation 
became a serious issue when dealing with private property. “There are no official records 
regarding land ownership, which causes problems when there are plans to construct an object. 
The Dutch armed forces were often confronted with Afghanis who claimed that the land which 
the forces were using was theirs and they demanded money for it.”232 
  
Taking the lack of written contracts and the failures of the justice system into 
consideration, this represents a much larger political problem for the Government of Afghanistan 
(GoA). Private property, the laws associated with the protection of it and the application of these 
laws in court form the backbone of much of today’s society. Joseph Singer, a professor at 
Harvard Law School, describes property law as the legal relations among people with relation to 
things. “Property law is not just a mechanism of coordination; it is a quasi-constitutional 
framework for social life. Property is not merely the law of things. Property is the law of 
democracy.”233 The exclusive ownership of land is “the most destructive and creative cultural 
force in written history.”234 According to Andro Linklater, land ownership has “spread an 
undreamed-of degree of personal freedom and protected it with democratic institutions wherever 
it has taken hold.” 235If you accept the above arguments on the importance of private property 
and its defense in the legal system, then the two trends examined here are troubling. The 
complete lack of a functional legal system in Uruzgan to enforce state laws effectively precludes 
the functional ability of the Government of Afghanistan.  
 
Government in Uruzgan 
 
This section of the chapter will examine the varying strengths of the provincial and district-level 
governments in Uruzgan. The assessment of the provincial government will examine the several 
governors in Uruzgan; the district-level assessment will examine the presence of GoA officials 
and look at the reach the officials who are present have. Finally, the section concludes with an 
overall look at the nature of governance in the province and examines where the true power and 
authority lies..  
 
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 
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Prior to the arrival of the Dutch, the provincial government had been dominated by Jan 
Mohammad Khan, a Popalzai strongman who used his position to increase his own personal 
power by marginalizing others. The Popalzai dominated the provincial government, while the 
Nurzai, Barakzai, and Achekzai were only minimally represented. This had the effect of driving 
tribal leaders who had previously supported the GoA toward supporting the Taliban. One of the 
conditions of the Dutch accepting the mission in Uruzgan was that the GoA would have to 
remove Jan Mohammad Khan from his position as governor, as his presence had a negative 
impact on the political and economic developments in the province. Mohammad Khan was 
removed from office in early 2006, yet he continued to meddle in politics in some ways. 
236
 
 
 In March 2006 Mawlawi Hakim Munib took office as the new governor of Uruzgan. 
Munib was a former high official in the Taliban Ministry of Border Affairs who had defected 
back to the GoA after the war began. As a former member of the Taliban, Munib had the special 
ability to reach out to former Taliban members, hear their complaints, and discuss possible 
solutions with them. Munib used financial incentives in order to entice current members of the 
Taliban to the discussion table, where the goal was to have productive dialogue and potentially 
convince these men to put down their weapons. Unfortunately, Munib’s efforts earned him the 
scorn of the local power brokers, who stood to profit from the status quo. Through their efforts, 
Munib’s policies stagnated, and he resigned in September 2007. Munib was followed by 
Assadullah Hamdam who attempted to address the tribal and ethnic imbalances in the provincial 
government. Hamdam had some success in this regard, but still faced significant hurdles in 
governing the state from the local power brokers. Feeling frustrated by his inability to 
accomplish his goals, Hamdam attempted to resign twice, but eventually stayed in power. In 
early 2010 he was forced to resign as a result of allegations he requested kickbacks for road 
reconstruction contracts. No immediate successor was appointed, and as a result deputy governor 
Khodai Rahim Khan acted as the provincial governor. There was no apparent move to replace 
him prior to the Dutch withdrawal. 
237
 
 
DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS 
 
When the Dutch arrived in 2006 only 20 percent of the district government positions were filled. 
After four years, there was only a moderate increase up to 30 percent. All of the districts have 
officially appointed governors and chiefs of police, while most of the other positions 
(agriculture, public health, education, etc.) were unfilled. Outside of the two main positions, the 
National Department of Security had representatives in all but the Taliban dominated Char 
China. It is important to note that many of the district officials do not reside in the districts they 
govern, instead governing remotely. This has a strong negative effect on the population, as not 
only do the officials have a worse understanding of the needs of their constituents, but they 
project an air of weakness for the district, provincial, and national government. By residing away 
from their constituents, these district officials show that the GoA does not have the ability to 
protect its own officials. 
238
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The following district-by-district assessment examines the presence of the reasonably 
regular functioning of government or non-insurgents informal structures (the shuras). The 
informal structures provide stability in the instances where the official GoA departments are 
unable to. While helpful, the primacy of these informal structures highlights the impotence of the 
official state instruments of control. As a reminder, the three districts that the Dutch focused their 
main attention to were Deh Rawud, Chora, and Tirin Kot.
239
 
 
In Deh Rawud, the government’s control increased. In 2007 International Security 
Assistance Forces (ISAF) in conjunction with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) ousted 
the Taliban from the district. The quality of GoA governance in the district has grown as a result 
of increased communication between the district government, the community, and the Dutch-led 
Provincial Reconstruction Team. In Deh Rawud in 2010 there was an active serving governor, 
chief of police, general political administrators, and three shuras. There was a 29 person 
development shura, a 40 person tribal shura that worked to diffuse tribal tensions, and a 73 
person malikan (village representative) shura, which served as the point of contact for 
international actors in the district.
240
  
 
Overall, in Chora the GoA’s influence and power has grown throughout TFU. During 
2006 and 2007 the Taliban had gained control of the majority of the district. After ousting the 
Taliban structure from the district, the government had the ability to strengthen its position. The 
district has a governor, a chief of police, a court, and general administrators.
241
 
 
In Tirin Kot the government’s control and influence has increased dramatically. The 
construction of the highway from Tirin Kot to Chora has resulted in increased stability and 
overall the average quality of life for the people in the district has improved. There is still the 
threat of Taliban attacks, specifically IEDs. Overall, the government has control in 75 percent of 
the district.
242
 
 
In Gizab the government has made no progress during TFU, and remains completely out 
of the GoA’s control. The Taliban has complete control over the Pashtun areas and operates 
freely. The Hazara areas are self-governed through a 20-person shura that has representatives 
from each of the six Hazara clans as well as prominent religious figures. In the Hazara area, there 
is an independent police force, courts, and a jail.
243
  
 
The status in Chenartu has remained even. This new district, which was created in the 
spring of 2008, is controlled by a Popalzai governor and chief of police. The GoA only has 
control in the northern section of the district, which happens to be dominated by the Popalzai 
tribe. In addition to the governor and chief of police, the district shura is exclusively Popalzai.
244
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In Khas Uruzgan, there is little presence by the GoA. What presence is there is described 
as corrupt, and has no ability to operate or control events beyond the district center. The district 
does have a governor, chief of police, a district council, and a two-judge court.
245
 
 
In Char China the GoA presence has decreased greatly since 2006. In 2010 the GoA only 
had the ability to influence the community within a radius of five kilometers outside the district 
center. There are no government decision-making bodies in the district.
246
 
 
ELECTIONS 
 
The elections that occurred in 2009 had a significant drop-off in voter turnout when compared to 
the 2004 election. This decrease was approximately fifty percent in Uruzgan. In the national 
election, in which 23,646 valid votes were cast, Karzai received 61 percent, Ramazan Bashardost 
got 15 percent, and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah received 9 percent. Amid the national election there 
were widespread claims of meddling by local power brokers in favor of President Karzai, but 
nothing ever came from the suspicions. There was greater participation in the provincial council 
elections, with 28,326 valid votes cast. In this election all of the previous members of the 
provincial council were voted out of power. Still, the Popalzai hold 50 percent of the seats on the 
council. This is probably the result of having a strong constituency with a high rate of voter 
turnout, possibly because the Popalzai understand that their power stems from a disproportionate 
representation in the government. The Achekzai and Barakzai, the largest and fourth largest 
tribes in Uruzgan, respectively, had no tribe members elected to the provincial council. 
247
 
 
 Of the 140,000 voter registration cards that were distributed in Uruzgan only 17 percent 
and 20 percent of the population turned out to vote in the national and provincial council 
elections, respectively. There are three possible reasons for the low voter turnout. First, the 
Taliban stepped up efforts considerably to intimidate the population through violence and the 
threat of violence in the days, weeks, and months leading up to the election. Secondly, an overall 
distrust of the government persists in the province, and many felt that the voting process was 
fraudulent and rigged. Thirdly, in an effort to decrease fraud there were restrictions placed. One 
such restriction was that male heads of households were no longer able to vote on behalf of 
females in their families. As a result of these policies the overall number of votes decreased.
248
   
 
POWER AND AUTHOIRTY IN URUZGAN 
 
Throughout Afghanistan there has been an overall focus on building a strong central government 
through a top-down approach which focused on strengthening the government in Kabul. This 
approach is at opposites with the way that the average Afghan actually interacts with their 
government: at the provincial and district level. This has resulted in a system where the local-
level government structures have been neglected, opening the opportunity for local strongmen to 
prosper at the expense of their community. Compounding this issue is that the central 
government was incredibly inefficient and was often bypassed by international actors in an effort 
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to get things accomplished. This entire process can be seen in Uruzgan, as there is a very weak 
provincial and district government presence throughout the province.
249
 
 
 The lack of strength in the central and local-level government has opened up a political 
marketplace in Uruzgan where strongmen engage in opportunistic behavior for their own benefit. 
According to a study by the Clingendael Institute, there were fourteen different actors competing 
for power in Uruzgan; none of these fourteen men were able to consolidate enough power to 
have a lasting effect on overall security. These fourteen powerbrokers had the ability to influence 
the appointment of government officials, impact the distribution of money within the province, 
and could potentially mobilize militias for security purposes. There are three things that are 
important about the dynamics of the Uruzgani powerbrokers. First, is that importance and reach 
is not limited to the size of the individual’s tribe. For example, three Zirak Durrani tribes, the 
Achekzai, Popalzai, and the Barakzai are nearly 55 percent of the population of Uruzgan, yet 
account for 71 percent of key leadership in the province. Second, is that of the 14 men with the 
power to influence events in Uruzgan not one works in favor of the Taliban. All fourteen are 
considered to be pro-government. Finally, all but two of the fourteen powerbrokers are young, 
which is in contrast to the weakening influence that tribal elders have on the younger 
generation.
250
 
 
 In an effort to increase the authority of the Afghan government, the Dutch, along with the 
Australian and American personnel, worked with the Afghan Government’s Independent 
Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development (MRRD) to coordinate programs that focused on developing good governance. 
There were three programs that the Dutch tried to implement through the IDLG. The first was 
the Performance Based Governors Fund, in which there was a competition amongst the various 
provincial governors over certain performance standards, and those governors that did better than 
their peers were awarded more resources (money) for their province. The second was assigning 
advisers to the governor as a part of the Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Programme. Third 
was establishing training courses for civil servants in province in order to improve their 
governance capacities. The Liaison Office and the Clingendael Institute interviewed Uruzganis 
on the effectiveness of these programs. “Respondents considered most of the governance 
programmes as positive in theory – ‘as they are meant to strengthen the government’ – but 
problematic in their implementation and hampered by a lack of monitoring.”251 Problems that 
hampered the success of these programs includes a dearth of qualified candidates for public 
office, a lack of resources to effectively implement the projects, no oversight on the government 
appointments being truly merit-based, and no oversight or control over the functions of public 
expenditures and processes. Under the umbrella of the MRRD was the National Solidarity 
Programme (NSD). The NSD was a popular program amongst Uruzganis, and helped to 
implement infrastructure, but most importantly focused on “strengthening democratic 
governance at the village level through the establishment of democratically elected Community 
Development Councils.”252The NSD was successful in this regard, and was highly regarded by 
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the Afghan population, as it was seen as detached from the international actors in the province. 
253
 
 
Assessment of the Dutch Approach to Diplomacy 
 
Of the three spheres of the Dutch counterinsurgency effort the diplomacy sphere was the one 
most difficult to judge. Some of the issues that were faced involved structural and cultural 
components that were simply beyond the scope of a foreign force to influence. The political and 
social culture of Afghanistan shifts the power in a community away from any sort of formal, top-
down authority toward local elders and leaders who are more efficiently able to mediate conflict. 
In addition, the importance of tribal and ethnic loyalties makes navigating the political landscape 
difficult.  
 
Considering these challenges, the Dutch approach to developing political capacity did 
about as well as it could do. Dutch personnel understood the role that cultural, tribal, and 
ethnicity plays in Afghan society. In most capacities the Dutch sought to build coalitions 
between diverse groups in order to increase inter-tribal cooperation. Further, the Dutch put an 
emphasis on building local legitimacy and utilized a bottom-up approach to building local 
capacity. By engaging community leaders in the decision making process, the Dutch were able to 
further facilitate development in political capacity.  
 
“A four-year time frame is simply not enough to create a civil servant culture. As 
elsewhere in Afghanistan, government performance and capacity in Uruzgan has been hampered 
by four key problems: lack of qualified personnel; lack of physical infrastructure; lack of 
financial and logistical resources; and lack of oversight and control mechanisms over public 
expenditures and processes.”254 In order for there to be long-term development of the GoA in 
Uruzgan the overall political capacity of the population must be increased. Effective government 
requires effective individuals; there needs to be an emphasis on training programs that develop 
the skills necessary to be a political leader. Only through increased education, training, and a 
conscious effort to enforce the merit-based appointment system will politics in Uruzgan truly 
improve. Without these types of improvements, the government in Uruzgan will remain “a 
political market place where savvy entrepreneurs dominate a merit-based appointment 
system.”255  
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Chapter Six: Analysis 
 
This chapter of the thesis examines the overall effectiveness of the Dutch 3D approach to 
counterinsurgency in Uruzgan. The analysis consists of scoring the presence of the best practices 
advocated by David Kilcullen in his writings and by Christopher Paul et al. in their study Paths 
to Victory. The best practices for each of the analytic frameworks will be listed and the criteria 
for scoring them presence will be described. The analysis will occur in three parts: the districts 
that the Dutch focused on during Task Force Uruzgan; the districts that were not the central 
focus; and an overall analysis for the success of the campaign in Uruzgan. Each of the three 
categories described above will be scored based on the following criteria. The narrative 
description of why each score was awarded will be divided by the following: primacy will be 
given to the three focus districts, as this will emphasize the impact of the Dutch 3D approach; for 
the non-focus districts, the narrative will describe how their experience differed from that of the 
focus district, especially highlighting how some best-practices were still present, while others 
were not; finally, the overall analysis narrative will describe the impact of the Dutch approach 
across Uruzgan from 2006 to 2010. 
 
Finally, the two original hypotheses will be again described and then analyzed based on the 
evidence shown below. 
 
Detailed Descriptions of Best-Practices  
 
This section contains each of the best practices that will be used to analyze the Dutch mission in 
Uruzgan from 2006-2010. The analysis will be done on a points system. There will be three 
different possible outcomes: a best practice was implemented, was partially implemented, or was 
not implemented at all. If the best practice was implemented it would receive a score of “1”; if 
the best practice was partially implemented it would receive a score of “.5”; and if the best 
practice is not implemented it would receive a score of “0.” Each best practice has a series of 
sub-factors that, if present, indicate that a best practice was implemented. For the best practices 
from Christopher Paul et al. these sub-factors come directly from Paths to Victory. The threshold 
for each of Paul et al.’s best practices come from Paths to Victory as well – in their study they 
determined the necessary amount of sub-factors to indicate the presence of the best practice 
across the 71 case studies examined. It should be noted, though, that for Paul et al. the sub-
factors were judged in a binary fashion, without the presence of an intermediate score indicating 
the partial presence of a best practice. The methodology in this assessment differed in order to 
account for greater variability, especially considering the nature of the focus and non-focus 
districts of the Dutch counterinsurgency experience. For the best practices from David Kilcullen 
these sub-factors were created for the purpose of this analysis. To the same extent, the threshold 
for the number of sub-factors necessary to indicate the presence of a best practice was also 
created for this study based on my knowledge of the subject matter. While this makes these 
factors slightly less exact than those from Christopher Paul et al, the thresholds were chosen to 
be relatively consistent with the type of thinking done in Paths to Victory.  
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It should be noted that, as a result of the differing number of best-practices between Kilcullen 
and Paul et al., that the comparison will be done on a relative rather than absolute scale.  
 
 
 
DAVID KILCULLEN’S BEST PRACTICES 
 
In this part, the best practices that come from the work of David Kilcullen will be listed and their 
sub-factors described. Please note that there is overlap in the definitions of criticality of 
intelligence and flexibility and adaptability in both sets of best practices; both sets utilize the 
definitions and thresholds from Paul et al. For the other two best practices, population-centric 
approach and bottom-up approach, the sub-factors were created specifically for this study from 
Kilcullen’s collected work. I chose the threshold for the number of sub-factors needed to indicate 
the presence of these two best practices based on my knowledge of the subject matter.   
 
Criticality of Intelligence 
 
For counterinsurgents, developing actionable intelligence, whether it is derived, for instance, 
from the population, informants in the insurgency, or through satellite imagery, is critical to 
success. Successful counterinsurgency requires the counterinsurgent forces to have a deep 
understanding of the environment they are operating in. Actionable intelligence is the difference 
between capturing an insurgent leader and coming up empty handed.
256
 The presence of this best 
practice is measured by two factors: 
 
 “Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on the COIN force’s 
terms. 
 Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt insurgent processes or 
operations.”257 
 
A score of 1 will be awarded if both of these factors are present; a score of .5 will be awarded if 
one of the two factors are present; and a score of 0 will be awarded if neither of the two factors 
are present.  
 
Flexibility and Adaptability 
 
Flexibility and adaptability indicate the ability of the government and counterinsurgent forces to 
change their tactics based on the circumstances. Counterinsurgency involves two sides that 
struggle against each other, both seeking to utilize new strategies that will give them an 
advantage against their opponent. In order for the counterinsurgent force to succeed against the 
insurgency, they must adapt. There is only a single factor for determining the presence of 
flexibility and adaptability: 
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 “The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or 
tactics.”258 
 
If this factor is present in the case study, it will receive a score of 1; if it is not present it will 
receive a score of 0; there is no .5 score awarded in this circumstance as the best practice is 
binary – the counterinsurgent force can either adapt or not. 
 
Population-Centric Approach 
 
This approach to counterinsurgency focuses on the source of the insurgency’s power and 
resources – population – by addressing social, political, and economic factors. This is in contrast 
to the enemy-centric approach which focuses more exclusively on the military destruction of the 
insurgency.  There are four factors that indicate a population-centric approach. 
 
 The counterinsurgent force established security in the area under their control. 
 The counterinsurgent force effectively convinced the population their best interests were 
served by supporting the government.  
 The counterinsurgents limited their use of lethal force, to the best of their ability, to only 
irreconcilable insurgents.  
 The counterinsurgent force identified local issues and acted to resolve them using social, 
economic, and political measures.  
 
A score of 1 will be awarded if at least three of the four     factors are present; a score of .5 will 
be awarded if two factors are present; and a score of 0 will be awarded if one or none of the 
factors are present in the case study.  
 
Bottom-up Approach 
 
The bottom-up approach to counterinsurgency places an emphasis on building low level political 
legitimacy through the rule of law, reducing corruption, and establishing competent local-
government institutions. This is in comparison to a top-down approach, in which the emphasis is 
put on building the legitimacy of a national government. There are three factors that indicate a 
bottom-up approach.  
 
 The counterinsurgent force focused on building and/or strengthening local government 
institutions.  
 The counterinsurgent force created civil-society based programs that focused on conflict 
resolution, reconciliation, and development.  
 The counterinsurgent force emphasized the use of official state structures in everyday 
life.  
 
A score of 1 will be awarded if at least two of the three factors are present; a score of .5 will be 
awarded if one of the three factors is present; and a score of 0 will be awarded if none of the 
factors are present in the case study.  
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CHRISTOPHER PAUL ET AL.’S BEST PRACTICES 
 
In this part, the best practices that come from Christopher Paul et al.’s Study Paths to Victory 
will be listed and their sub-factors described. 
 
Commitment and Motivation 
 
Simply put, the government and the counterinsurgent force (could be one in the same, or 
separate) are determined to defeat the insurgency over the long haul. This implies that defeating 
the insurgency is the top priority of the government and the counterinsurgent force, rather than 
the increase in personal power and wealth.
259
 The following factors indicated commitment and 
motivation to succeed: 
 
 “Insurgent force not individually superior to the COIN force by being either more 
professional or better motivated.  
 COIN force or allies did not rely on looting for sustainment.  
 COIN force and government did not have different goals/level of commitment and 
neither had relatively low levels of commitment.
260
  
 Government did not sponsor or protect unpopular economic and social arrangements or 
cultural institutions.  
 Government did not involve corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule.  
 Government type was not kleptocracy.  
 Elites did not have perverse incentives to continue conflict.  
 The country was not economically dependent on an external actor.”261 
 
Of the eight sub-factors for success listed above, four of them were needed to indicate that the 
government and counterinsurgent force were committed to succeed. If four or more of these 
factors are present, the best practice will be considered adopted and will receive a score of 1; if 
one, two, or three of these factors are present the score will be a .5; if none of these factors are 
present the score will be a 0. Once the government and counterinsurgent force began using best 
practices, the average insurgency lasts for an additional six more years, indicating the importance 
of this factor to overall campaign success.  
 
Tangible Support Reduction 
 
The way to defeat an insurgency is through reducing or eliminating the insurgency’s sources of 
support. Insurgencies have certain needs, such as “manpower, funding, materiel, sanctuary, 
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intelligence, and tolerance.”262 In classical counterinsurgency, these sources tend to be derived 
from the population. When expanded further, reducing the support system for the insurgency 
goes beyond simply reducing the resources given to the soldiers by the population, but also 
diminishing larger sources of income, from sources such as foreign donations, extortion and 
fraud, and the sale of narcotics. Reducing both the small and large sources of support the 
counterinsurgent sets the counterinsurgent force up for success.
263
 There are ten factors that 
indicate the presence of tangibly reduced support for the insurgency.  
 
 “The flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased or remained 
dramatically reduced or largely absent.  
 Important external support to insurgents was significantly reduced.  
 Important internal support to insurgents was significantly reduced.  
 Insurgents’ ability to replenish resources was significantly diminished.  
 Insurgents were unable to maintain or grow their force size.  
 COIN force efforts resulted in increased costs for insurgent processes.  
 COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent recruiting.  
 COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent materiel acquisition.  
 COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent intelligence.  
 COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent financing.”264 
 
If three or more of these factors are present, the best practice will be considered adopted and will 
receive a score of 1; if one or two of these factors are present the score will be a .5; if none of 
these factors are present the score will be a 0. 
 
Flexibility and Adaptability 
 
Flexibility and adaptability indicate the ability of the government and counterinsurgent forces to 
change their tactics based on the circumstances. Counterinsurgency involves two sides that 
struggle against each other, both seeking to utilize new strategies that will give them an 
advantage against their opponent. In order for the counterinsurgent force to succeed against the 
insurgency, they must adapt.
265
 There is only a single factor for determining the presence of 
flexibility and adaptability: 
 
 “The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary strategy, operations, or 
tactics.”266 
 
If this factor is present in the case study, it will receive a score of 1; if it is not present it will 
receive a score of 0; there is no .5 score awarded in this circumstance as the best practice is 
binary – the counterinsurgent force can either adapt or not. 
 
Unity of Effort 
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At its core, unity of effort indicates that the counterinsurgent was able to effectively coordinate 
the actions of all of the involved actors. This is not an easy task, as modern counterinsurgency 
tends to have significant involvement from the government’s civilian authorities, each of which 
may have competing visions for implementing policy. There was just a single factor that 
represented this best practice: 
 
 “Unity of effort/unity of command was maintained.”267 
 
If this factor is present in the case study, it will receive a score of 1; if it is not present it will 
receive a score of 0; there is no .5 score for this best practice as it is binary.  
 
Initiative 
 
Initiative is a military concept predicated on the idea of conducting operations first, thereby 
actively engaging the insurgency on your terms. While the initiative can be seized by blindly 
attacking insurgent strong points, the initiative is most effectively seized when used in 
conjunction with reliable intelligence to attack the enemy in strategic locations.
268
 Initiative is 
measured by one factor: 
 
 “Fighting… initiated primarily by the COIN forces.”269 
 
If this factor is present in the case study, it will receive a score of 1; if it is not present it will 
receive a score of 0; there is no .5 score awarded for this best practice because it is binary. 
 
Criticality of Intelligence 
 
For counterinsurgents, developing actionable intelligence, whether it is derived, for instance, 
from the population, informants in the insurgency, or through satellite imagery, is critical to 
success. Successful counterinsurgency requires the counterinsurgent forces to have a deep 
understanding of the environment they are operating in. Actionable intelligence is the difference 
between capturing an insurgent leader and coming up empty handed.
270
 The presence of this best 
practice is measured by two factors: 
 
 “Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or engagements on the COIN force’s 
terms. 
 Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt insurgent processes or 
operations.”271 
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A score of 1 will be awarded if both of these factors are present; a score of .5 will be awarded if 
one of the two factors are present; and a score of 0 will be awarded if neither of the two factors 
are present.  
 
Best Practice Analysis 
 
This section of the chapter contains the best-practice analysis of the Dutch counterinsurgency 
efforts in the focus-districts in Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010. 
Each of the best practices will be scored based on the criteria described above; justification for 
each individual score will be given for each factor. The best-practice analysis will have three 
parts: analysis of the Dutch in their focus districts (Deh Rawud, Chora, and Tirin Kot), analysis 
of the Dutch in the non-focus districts (Khas Uruzgan, Chenartu, Gizab, and Char China), and 
finally an overall analysis of Dutch counterinsurgency in Uruzgan. 
 
BEST-PRACTICE ANALYSIS FOR THE FOCUS DISTRICTS 
 
The following chart shows the final scores for the overall best-practice analysis of Dutch 
counterinsurgency in Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 2006 to 2010. The Dutch 3D approach scored 
well under each analytical framework, receiving a perfect score from the best practices of David 
Kilcullen and receiving full credit from four of the six best practices and partial credit from the 
remaining two. Based on this analysis, the Dutch utilized best practices for counterinsurgency in 
the three focus districts. The narratives that describe how and why each score was given appear 
below their respective charts. 
  
                       Best-Practice Analysis for Focus Districts 
272
  
David Kilcullen Score Christopher Paul et al. Score 
Criticality Intelligence  1 Commitment and Motivation 0.5 
Flexibility and 
Adaptability 1 Tangible Support Reduction 1 
Population-Centric 
Approach 1 Flexibility and Adaptability 1 
Bottom-Up Approach 1 Unity of Effort 1 
   Initiative 0.5 
   Criticality Intelligence  1 
Final Score 4/4   5/6 
 
As noted above, as a result the differing number of best practices between Kilcullen and Paul et 
al. the comparison will be done on a relative rather than absolute scale. The best practices 
derived from Kilcullen’s work were all present; only four of Paul et al.’s best practices were 
fully present, while the remaining two were only partially present. Therefore, while there is a 
higher total score for Paul et al. then there is for Kilcullen (5 compared to 4), the Dutch 
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counterinsurgency received higher relative marks for Kilcullen than for Paul et al. (100 percent 
to 83.33 percent).  
 
Analysis of David Kilcullen’s Best Practices 
 
In these districts the Dutch either fully or partially utilized the best practices emphasized by 
David Kilcullen in his work. Within the scope of the larger analysis, each of the best practices 
received the highest score. The following is a factor-by-factor breakdown of each of the best 
practices. 
 
In criticality of intelligence, each of the two indicating sub-factors was present. The 
intelligence gathering and analysis processes were able to assist Dutch personnel in their 
operations. As shown in the Battle of Chora, Dutch intelligence was able to identify the 
incoming Taliban soldiers, giving the Dutch soldiers and Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF) the opportunity to prepare for the assault. In addition to this example, Dutch Special 
Forces were able to operate in the more remote areas of Uruzgan and attack strategic locations 
based on information obtained and processed by the intelligence personnel.  
 
The Dutch received a full score of 1 for flexibility and adaptability, satisfying the one 
indicating factor. The Dutch understood the primacy of adaptability in successful 
counterinsurgency, and an example of this comes from the restricted use of lethal force by their 
air craft. Recognizing that the Taliban were forcibly coercing non-Taliban men to shoot at Dutch 
soldiers and ANSF soldiers, the Dutch armed forces utilized warning maneuvers to attempt to 
scare off these men. It was assumed that they would be more likely to run in the presence of 
Dutch airpower, cutting down on the number of unnecessary deaths and engendering better good 
will from the population. A further example of Dutch adaptability involved their engagement 
with local contractors. In order to reduce graft the Dutch engaged the subcontractors who were 
implementing the work directly, cutting out the middlemen. Additionally, the Dutch personnel 
began requiring references to prove that the contractors had the experience they claimed they 
did.  
 
The Dutch utilized a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency in the focus-
districts. For this best practice, the Dutch received a full score in all four of the sub-factors. The 
Dutch limited their use of lethal force in Uruzgan to only those insurgents who were 
irreconcilable, as the example of the use of airpower above indicates. Further, the Dutch utilized 
social, economic, and political measures to improve the population’s opinion of the government. 
Dutch personnel were able to effectively increase and provide security in Chora, DehRawud, and 
Tirin Kot, as evidenced by the overall increase in GoA presence. Importantly, the increase in the 
number of businesses operating and individuals visiting the major bazaars in the district centers 
showed the increase in security provided by the GoA. Finally, the population seemed to believe 
that the counterinsurgents would serve their best interests, as indicated by their pledges to stop 
the production of poppy – which would decrease the overall revenue for the Taliban.  
 
Finally, the Dutch received full marks in their bottom-up approach to counterinsurgency. 
Throughout Task Force Uruzgan the Dutch made building local legitimacy and connecting all 
improvements to the Afghan government a priority. An example of this was the improvements 
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made in the irrigation canal example described in the Diplomacy section. The Dutch helped to 
negotiate a solution to the inter-tribal conflict but allowed the Afghan government 
representatives to handle the implementation and resolution of the solution, increasing their 
legitimacy and public confidence in their ability. In these three districts, the Dutch emphasized 
strengthening local economic and governing institutions so that they would be able to continue to 
exist beyond the eventual Dutch withdrawal.  
 
Based on these factors, the Dutch 3D approach to counterinsurgency in Uruzgan satisfied 
each of the best practices that are evident in the work of David Kilcullen.  
 
Analysis of Christopher Paul et al.’s Best Practices 
 
In the three focus districts the Dutch either fully or partially utilized the best practices 
emphasized by Paul et al. in their work. Within the scope of the larger analysis, each of the best 
practices received a passing score, although it was not unanimous as above. The following is a 
factor-by-factor breakdown of each of the best practices. 
 
 The overall commitment and motivation of the Dutch government, and their Afghan 
counterparts, received a score of .5, with a cumulative score of 3.5 out of 8 possible points.  Of 
the eight sub-factors examined, two were fully present: the counterinsurgent forces did not rely 
on looting to sustain themselves, and the government did not sponsor unpopular social, political, 
or economic policies. Three other factors – the insurgent forces being either more professional or 
better motivated, the government being corrupt and using personalistic arbitrary rule, and the 
government being a kleptocracy – were all present in some fashion. Each of these three received 
a score of .5. When compared to the Dutch soldiers, especially the Special Forces who saw most 
of the combat, the Taliban were no match; when compared to the under trained and understaffed 
ANSF in Uruzgan, the Taliban forces were superior. While there were certainly improvements in 
ANSF quality, they were not yet on par with the Taliban at the time of the Dutch departure. 
During the Dutch tenure in Uruzgan the political leaders did not rule arbitrarily, but corruption 
was still wide spread throughout all levels of the provincial political system. Consistent with the 
corruption in the system, some members of the government engaged in blatant theft of 
government resources, such as the judges who only turned up every few months to receive a 
paycheck for a job they had not performed. While not present in the indication factors, it is 
important to recognize that the Dutch domestic politics severely impacted the efforts of the 
counterinsurgency effort. It is the general consensus that those involved with Task Force 
Uruzgan wanted to continue to campaign, while members of Dutch parliament dissented, which 
eventually led to the withdrawal of Dutch forces in August 2010 and the fall of the Dutch 
parliament earlier that year. 
 
 The Dutch armed forces were able to effectively reduce the overall level of support that 
the Taliban received, demonstrating the necessary 3 out of 10 reduction sub-factors necessary to 
receive a full score. The Dutch never made an effort to secure the provincial borders, which 
allowed the Taliban to enter and exit the province as they pleased, allowing external support 
resources to enter Uruzgan. The external acquisition of resources from the other Taliban 
networks across Afghanistan and Pakistan remained unchanged. The Dutch were able to impact 
Taliban resources in the province to an extent, but the influx of non-Uruzgani resources, 
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including soldiers, arms, and cash, allowed the Taliban to continue to function. The internal 
support for the Taliban in Uruzgan was reduced by Dutch efforts to secure and gain control of 
the three major economic and population centers. By isolating the Taliban from nearly 60 
percent of the population, the Dutch were able to reduce the individual Taliban soldier’s ability 
to sustain himself, as they relied on the population for basic supplies. Further, the Dutch were 
able to reduce the production of opium in sections in Uruzgan, a valuable cash crop and source 
of income for the Taliban.  
 
The Dutch received a full score of 1 for flexibility and adaptability, satisfying the one 
indicating factor. The Dutch understood the primacy of adaptability in successful 
counterinsurgency, and an example of this comes from the restricted use of lethal force by their 
air craft. Recognizing that the Taliban were forcibly coercing non-Taliban men to shoot at Dutch 
soldiers and ANSF soldiers, the Dutch armed forces utilized warning maneuvers to attempt to 
scare off these men. It was assumed that they would be more likely to run in the presence of 
Dutch airpower, cutting down on the number of unnecessary deaths and engendering better good 
will from the population. A further example of Dutch adaptability involved their engagement 
with local contractors. In order to reduce graft the Dutch engaged the subcontractors who were 
implementing the work directly, cutting out the middlemen. Additionally, the Dutch personnel 
began requiring references to prove that the contractors had the experience they claimed they 
did. 
  
While there were issues at the beginning of the deployment, the various ministries 
involved in Task Force Uruzgan eventually were able to unify their efforts and create a more 
efficient and capable counterinsurgency campaign. Even at its worst, the involved ministries did 
not work directly at cross purposes. As a result of this, the Dutch received a score of 1 for unity 
of effort. 
  
The Dutch only received a score of .5 for their initiative against the Taliban. Dutch 
Special Forces took the initiative against the Taliban, leaving the safety of the bases to conduct 
far ranging patrols and raids against Taliban strongholds. On the other hand, the vast majority of 
Dutch soldiers did not travel far beyond the base and never ventured outside of the district or 
conducted assaults against insurgent targets. These soldiers were reactionary in nature – while 
not necessarily a bad thing it did give the insurgency the free hand to operate almost at will 
outside of the major population centers.    
 
In criticality of intelligence, the Dutch received a score of 1 for each of the two factors. 
The intelligence gathering and analysis processes were able to assist Dutch personnel in their 
operations. As shown in the Battle of Chora, Dutch intelligence was able to identify the 
incoming Taliban soldiers, giving the Dutch soldiers and Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF) the opportunity to prepare for the assault. In addition to this example, Dutch Special 
Forces were able to operate in the more remote areas of Uruzgan and attack strategic locations 
based on information obtained and processed by the intelligence personnel.  
 
 Based on the above analysis, the Dutch 3D approach to counterinsurgency received a 
score of 5 out of 6 best practices from Christopher Paul et al.’s framework.  
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BEST-PRACTICE ANALYSIS FOR NON-FOCUS DISTRICTS 
 
The following chart shows the final scores for the best-practice analysis of Dutch 
counterinsurgency in the non-focus districts of Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 2006 to 2010. The 
Dutch 3D approach scored well under each analytical framework, receiving a perfect score from 
the best practices of David Kilcullen and receiving full credit from four of the six best practices 
and partial credit from the remaining two. Based on this analysis, the Dutch utilized best 
practices for counterinsurgency in the three focus districts. The narratives that describe how and 
why each score was given appear below their respective charts. 
 
                                 Best-Practice Analysis for non-Focus Districts  
David Kilcullen Score Christopher Paul et al. Score 
Criticality Intelligence  1 Commitment and Motivation 0.5 
Flexibility and Adaptability 1 Tangible Support Reduction 1 
Population-Centric Approach 0 Flexibility and Adaptability 1 
Bottom-Up Approach 0 Unity of Effort 1 
   Initiative 0.5 
   Criticality Intelligence  1 
Final Score 2/4   5/6 
 
Of the best practices derived from Kilcullen’s work, only two of the four were present; only four 
of Paul et al.’s best practices were fully present, while the remaining two were only partially 
present.  In this case, Paul et al. scored higher in both absolute (5 compared to 2) and relative 
(83.33 percent to 50 percent) when compared to the best practices derived from Kilcullen’s 
work. Rather than rehash the details described above for each of the best practices in the focus 
districts, the analysis of the non-focus districts will examine the differences between the two for 
Kilcullen and Paul et al. 
 
Analysis of Kilcullen’s Best Practices in non-Focus Districts 
 
In the four focus districts the Dutch did not focus their efforts in they only satisfied half of the 
best practices derived from Kilcullen’s work. The breakdown shows the differences in 
application of the best practices in the non-focus districts. 
 
For criticality of intelligence and flexibility and adaptability the Dutch still received full 
marks. Even though there was a severely limited focus on Khas Uruzgan, Gizab, Chenartu, and 
Char China it did not impact either of these two best practices. The Dutch intelligence gathering 
operations remained intact and effective. Similarly, the lack of presence of the Dutch within 
these districts does not detract from Dutch personnel’s overall adaptability. Their overall 
approach remained flexible, and whenever Dutch personnel, specifically Special Forces or air 
support, operated in these districts they continued the flexible approach followed by their fellow 
comrades. 
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When it came to a population-centric approach in the non-focus districts the 
counterinsurgent force did not receive high marks, only satisfying one of the four sub-factors. As 
there was a highly limited presence of Dutch personnel in these districts, security in the region 
deteriorated – with the Taliban generally gaining control of increased amounts of territory in 
these districts. In conjunction with this, the counterinsurgent force was unable to address any 
local grievances or conflicts. The lack of the two previous sub-factors directly impacted the third, 
which is that they counterinsurgent force was able to convince the population that their best 
interest was served by aligning with the government. The only sub-factor that was present in the 
non-focus districts was the limited use of lethal force, as this factor sub-factor related to the 
overall Dutch approach to counterinsurgency. 
 
Finally, for the bottom-up approach best practice none of the three sub-factors were 
present for the non-focus districts. This is primarily the case because of the basically non-
existent presence of the counterinsurgency. Simply, the lack of a substantial Dutch presence in 
these four districts precluded the ability to build political, social, and economic institutions that 
would contribute to stronger GoA strength.  
 
Analysis of Paul et al.’s Best Practices in non-Focus Districts 
 
The overall scores for the best practices derived from Paul et al.’s work in the non-focus districts 
are the same as those given for the focus districts. The only difference between the two sets of 
analysis is that the underlying sub-factor score for commitment and motivation is .5 lower here 
than in the focus districts, as the insurgent forces were superior to the counterinsurgent force in 
these districts.  
 
 This situation poses a potentially ugly problem analytically. Without any of the other 
background information from the rest of this study, if someone was to examine these raw scores 
than the assumption would be that the increases in security that were seen in the focus districts 
would have occurred as well in the non-focus districts. The scores indicates that the Dutch 
followed more of Paul et al.’s best practices than those of Kilcullen, although based on the above 
it is clear that these scores do not provide the best explanations for the observations made in 
these districts. This situation will be looked at further when examining which of the two sets of 
best practices best explains observations.  
 
OVERALL BEST-PRACTICE ANALYSIS FOR URUZGAN, AFGHANISTAN 
 
The following chart shows the final scores for the overall best-practice analysis of Dutch 
counterinsurgency throughout Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 2006 to 2010. The Dutch 3D approach 
scored well under each analytical framework, receiving a perfect score from the best practices of 
David Kilcullen and receiving full credit from four of the six best practices and partial credit 
from the remaining two. This is not simply the averaging of the scores that were separately 
assessed for the focus and non-focus districts, but rather a separate analysis taking the whole 
province into consideration. Following the chart will be the reasoning behind the best-practice 
scores taking the focus, non-focus and total provincial picture into consideration. 
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Overall Best-Practice Analysis for Uruzgan, Afghanistan 
David Kilcullen Score Christopher Paul et al. Score 
Criticality Intelligence  1 Commitment and Motivation 0.5 
Flexibility and Adaptability 1 Tangible Support Reduction 1 
Population-Centric Approach 1 Flexibility and Adaptability 1 
Bottom-Up Approach 1 Unity of Effort 1 
   Initiative 0.5 
   Criticality Intelligence  1 
Final Score 4/4   5/6 
 
The overall scores for the entire province mirror the scores for the focus districts.   
 
Overall Best-Practice Analysis of David Kilcullen’s Best Practices in Uruzgan, Afghanistan 
 
All four of the best practices that come from David Kilcullen’s work were present based on the 
analysis of the case study. Unlike in the focus districts, where every sub-factor was present, for 
the whole province the results were not unanimous. Two sub-factors that indicated the presence 
of a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency were only half present. These two sub-
factors, increasing security and convincing the population that their best interests are best served 
by supporting the government, received a grade of .5 mostly because they were only 
implemented in three of the seven districts in the province. The Dutch were able to increase GoA 
control to approximately 60 percent of the population, yet for the other 40 percent the Taliban 
provided security and were the dominant political figure in the area. The assessments for the rest 
of Kilcullen’s best practices were not changed when looking at the province as a whole.  
 
Overall Best-Practice Analysis of Christopher Paul et al.’s Best Practices in Uruzgan, Afghanistan 
 
Interestingly, the over-all scores awarded for Christopher Paul et al.’s best practices were the 
same all across the board. The sub-factor scores for the overall analysis and the focus-district 
analysis were identical, while the two differed from non-focus district assessment as noted in that 
section. Overall, there was not any significant difference amongst the three levels of analysis 
even though the realities within each level of analysis would indicate otherwise: the almost 
complete lack of Dutch influence in four districts, and the resulting lack of positive 
developments within these districts, is not evident in the results. This will have a serious impact 
on the analytical utility of Paul et al.’s best practices. 
 
Assessment of the Hypotheses 
 
One of the main contributions that this paper makes to the literature on successful 
counterinsurgency is testing the analytical utility of best practices derived from the work of 
David Kilcullen and Christopher Paul et al. in their study Paths to Victory. In order to test these 
two sets of best practices, they were to be tested against a central hypothesis, as shown below: 
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Increase in Best Practices (IV)  Movement toward Stabilization (DV) 
 
Remember, as described in the limitations section of chapter two, this paper makes the 
assumption that the above hypothesis is true. This assumption is made with the understanding 
that it is only ever completely true in closed, laboratory like settings which are never actually 
possible – it is still possible to do all of the right things in both counterinsurgency and in life and 
still not improve your circumstances. Understanding this limitation, this paper is not seeking to 
explain the general hypothesis, but only use it as a vehicle for testing the best practices that can 
be derived from the work of David Kilcullen and Paul et al. These two more specific hypotheses 
can be seen below:  
Hypothesis 1: 
Increase in David Kilcullen’s Best Practices  Movement toward Stabilization 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
Increase in Christopher Paul et al.’s Best Practices  Movement toward Stabilization 
 
Considering this, what follows is an assessment of the two hypotheses in order to understand 
which of the two sets of best practices was best able to explain observations on the Dutch 
approach to counterinsurgency in Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010. 
Remember, though, that the hypotheses are not examining success or victory, but rather 
movement toward stabilization. As defined in the methodology section of chapter two, 
stabilization is: the movement of the province toward a secure, peaceful mode of interaction on 
terms favorable to the government. 
 
TESTING HYPOTHESIS 1: DAVID KILCULLEN’S BEST PRACTICES 
 
The best practices from the work of David Kilcullen were able to accurately explain the varying 
differences in the level of stabilization across the three different levels on analysis.  
 
In the focus districts of Deh Rawud, Chora, and Tirin Kot, the overall level of 
government control increased greatly over the course of Task Force Uruzgan. This was as a 
direct result of the actions taken by the Dutch counterinsurgent personnel, as they utilized a 
bottom-up, population-centric approach to counterinsurgency in these three districts. 
Additionally, the Dutch were a flexible force that used its advanced intelligence gathering and 
analysis capabilities to give its forces the upper hand. Kilcullen’s best practices accurately 
explain the observations in the focus districts – their presence over the four years corresponded 
to the increased security. This confirms hypothesis 1.  
 
In the non-focus districts of Char China, Chenartu, and Khas Uruzgan, the level of 
government control either stayed the same or decreased. The fourth non-focus district, Gizab, 
saw an increase in GoA presence, but as a result of Dutch counterinsurgency efforts – there was 
an internal revolt by a Pashtun tribe against the Taliban which reclaimed the district center for 
the GoA. Even considering the improvements in Gizab, the security situation in these districts 
did not improve as a result of Dutch efforts. Intelligence capabilities and adaptability were 
present in those Dutch resources that were occasionally expended in these districts, but a bottom-
up, population-centric approach to counterinsurgency was never seriously implemented. The 
assessment of Kilcullen’s best practices of the Dutch in the non-focus districts, in which only 
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two of the four best practices were followed, aligns itself with the results on the ground. This 
further confirms hypothesis 1.  
 
Finally, across Uruzgan province there was a general increase for the level security and 
GoA control for the majority of the population. At the end of the Dutch four year engagement in 
Uruzgan approximately 60 percent of the population lived in areas that could be considered 
controlled by the GoA. This was large increase, as the GoA did not have majority control of any 
district when the Dutch arrived. Considering this, the assessment of Kilcullen’s best practices 
mirrors the overall progression of events in Uruzgan: all of the best practices were followed, and 
security on terms favorable to the government was achieved. This confirms hypothesis 1. 
 
When taken together, the Dutch experience in Uruzgan is almost perfectly explained by 
the best practices derived from the work of David Kilcullen. In the areas where they were 
followed, the situation was stabilized on terms favorable to the government; in areas where they 
were not implemented, the situation was not stabilized on terms favorable to the government. 
Taking this into consideration I can confidently say the hypothesis 1 explains the situation in 
Uruzgan from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010.   
 
TESTING HYPOTHESIS 2: CHRISTOPHER PAUL ET AL.’S BEST PRACTICES 
 
The success of Paul et al.’s best practices to accurately depict the results of the Dutch 
engagement throughout Task Force Uruzgan is suspect and requires examination.  
 
 For the focus districts, the best practices do a very good job of explaining the success of 
the Dutch counterinsurgent force. The Dutch military and civilian personnel worked toward a 
single purpose, utilized advanced intelligence operations, and were adaptable throughout Task 
Force Uruzgan. They were also able to actively reduce the sources of Taliban support across 
these three districts. They did not, however, always have the initiative in combating the Taliban, 
often entering into and retreating from engagements on the Taliban’s terms rather than their own. 
The Dutch personnel and their Afghan counterparts were only partially committed and motivated 
to win – and it can only assume that had the mission continued this would have led to fuller 
commitment as the Afghan National Security Forces increased in strength. Having four of the six 
best practices present in the focus districts, and the other two both being partially present, 
corresponds to the increased levels of security and stability within Chora, Deh Rawud, and Tirin 
Kot. This confirms hypothesis 2.  
 
 In the non-focus districts, however, Paul et al.’s best practices struggle to explain 
observations, receiving nearly the same assessment score for both the focus and non-focus 
districts despite the varying differences between them. There was only a .5 difference under the 
commitment and motivation best practice that separated the two from being identical. If Paul et 
al.’s best practices were the only ones used to assess the Uruzgan case study then the general 
assumption flowing from the hypothesis would be that, based on the numbers, both the focus and 
non-focus districts would have would have seen increased security and stability.  This, however, 
was not the case, as there was significant discrepancy in stability between the focus and non-
focus districts. This strongly discredits hypothesis 2. 
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 Finally, in the overall assessment of the province the best-practices of Paul et al. 
relatively reflect the overall progress in the province over the course of Task Force Uruzgan. The 
score that was awarded for the presence of best practices was almost identical between all three 
levels of analysis. Even considering this, the large increase in the overall security and stability in 
Uruzgan is reflected in the general following of Paul et al.’s best practices during the four years 
of Dutch engagement in Uruzgan.  
 
When taken together, the Dutch experience in Uruzgan is only partially explained by the 
best practices derived from Paul et al. in Paths to Victory. While the best practices do explain the 
observations of both the focus districts and the overall assessment of the province, they are 
completely unable to explain what occurred in the non-focus districts. Going beyond this, they 
actually provide the complete opposite assessment of the facts. As a result of this, I can 
confidently say that hypothesis 2 is unable to accurately explain the situation in Uruzgan from 1 
August 2006 to 1 August 2010.  
 
OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES 
 
Based on the above analysis of the two hypotheses being tested, the first was better able to 
explain observations of the case study of the Dutch military and civilians conducting 
counterinsurgency in Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010.  The 
hypothesis is reiterated below: 
 
Increase in David Kilcullen’s Best Practices  Movement toward Stabilization 
 
Even though the best practices of Paul et al. technically lost the explanatory contest to the best 
practices of David Kilcullen, it in no way diminishes or tarnishes the quality or the importance of 
the work done by Paul et al. Within this capacity, though, and based on the results of this case 
study, the best practices of Paul et al. were unable to fully explain observations. 
 
It should be remembered, though, that this was only a single case study, in a single 
province that occurred during the middle of a fourteen year long war. Further, while faithful to 
the descriptions and basic guidelines underpinning the scoring for Paul et al.’s best practices, 
there was a slight change in methodology. In Paths to Victory, the scoring was done on a worst-
case scenario – if the factor was not implemented across the entirety of the theater being 
examined then it was not indicated as present. In order to account for greater variability, and 
especially to take into consideration the nature of the focus and non-focus districts of the Dutch 
counterinsurgency experience, this analysis did not follow this methodology. This, therefore, 
could explain the potential issues that Paul et al.’s framework had in explaining observations in 
Uruzgan. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
 
Barring unforeseen circumstances, the United States and other Western nations will not be 
actively seeking to be engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns in the future. The large scale 
commitments in blood and treasure that have been expanded by the United States and its allies in 
Afghanistan and Iraq since the beginning of the 21
st
 century have been massive, especially 
considering the relative levels of success that have been had in these two states. As a result, 
counterinsurgency has fallen out of favor, especially in the United States. But as history has 
shown, conflicts that can be described as contests between insurgents and counterinsurgents have 
been the most prevalent form of conflict in history, and this trend will more than likely continue 
into the future. Current examples of areas that are or could in the near future experience the rise 
of an insurgent force are Mali, Somalia, Yemen, and the Philippines. These cases of instability 
are especially pressing, considering the tendency of terrorist organizations to use lawless areas 
for sanctuary. If the United States and its allies want to be better prepared to face the security 
challenges that await them in the future, the lessons from the past fifteen years must not be 
forgotten, much like how the lessons of Vietnam were forgotten in the aftermath of that military 
misadventure. 
 
 It is for this reason that the Dutch experience in Uruzgan is so important. Amongst all of 
the chaos and conflicting strategies that were employed in Afghanistan throughout the thirteen 
year long war, the Dutch in Task Force Uruzgan represent a pocket of successful practices that 
should be recognized for the stability that they were able to bring to one of the most heavily 
Taliban-dominated provinces in all of Afghanistan. Their complete and total commitment to a 
population-centric counterinsurgency strategy indicates that the general approach that was taken 
by the United States under General David Patreaus had potential if properly applied. Further, it is 
also important to realize that population-centric tactics utilized by the Dutch are applicable in 
situations outside of a counterinsurgency environment. Specifically, it can be argued that there is 
considerable cross-over between counterinsurgency and United Nations peace keeping 
operations, and that both communities of scholars and practitioners would benefit from an 
exchange of ideas.
273
 
 
The Dutch experience has shown that a whole-of-government approach using bottom-up, 
rather than top-down, state-building in conjunction with judicious use of force has the ability to 
improve conditions in a war-torn area. This comprehensive approach utilized an advanced 
intelligence system that provided the Dutch military and civilian personnel the opportunity to be 
flexible and adapt at will to the threat posed to the Government of Afghanistan throughout the 
four-year engagement in Uruzgan. The inclusion of civilian actors so heavily in the mission in 
the political and economic sectors of development helped to assuage the difficulties of overly 
relying on the military for development responsibilities the soldiers were not adequately prepared 
to address. The Dutch utilized a comprehensive approach that stabilized the majority of Uruzgan 
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while limiting the casualties amongst its own personnel as well as those of the population caught 
in the middle of the conflict. These apparent successes must be kept in perspective –they 
occurred in during a four-year period in the midst of a larger conflict – but scholars and 
practitioners alike have a lot to learn from the bravery and sacrifices made by the Dutch military 
and civilian personnel and their experiences in Uruzgan, Afghanistan from 1 August 2006 to 1 
August 2010. 
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Appendix: 
 
Figure 1.1: Best-Practice Analysis Table Template     
Christopher Paul et al. Framework 
Sub-
Factor 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Present? 
Commitment and Motivation (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 4, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than 
or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1) 
      
Insurgent force not individually superior to the COIN force by 
being either more professional or better motivated. 
      
COIN force or allies did not rely on looting for sustainment.       
COIN force and government did not have different goals/level of 
commitment or both had relatively low levels of commitment. 
      
Government did not sponsor or protect unpopular economic and 
social arrangements or cultural institutions. 
      
Government did not involve corrupt and arbitrary personalistic 
rule. 
      
Government type was not kleptocracy.       
Elites did not have perverse incentives to continue conflict.       
The country was not economically dependent on an external actor       
Tangible Support Reduction  (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater 
than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than or 
equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1) 
      
The flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly decreased 
or remained dramatically reduced or largely absent.  
      
Important external support to insurgents was significantly reduced.        
Important internal support to insurgents was significantly reduced.        
Insurgents’ ability to replenish resources was significantly 
diminished.  
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Insurgents were unable to maintain or grow their force size.        
COIN force efforts resulted in increased costs for insurgent 
processes.  
      
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent recruiting.        
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent materiel acquisition.        
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent intelligence.        
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent financing.       
Flexibility and Adaptability  (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater 
than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum 
is equal to 0) 
      
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary 
strategy, operations or tactics. 
      
Unity of Effort  (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal 
to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0) 
      
Unity of effort/unity of command was maintained.       
Initiative  (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal to 1, 
.5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0) 
      
Fighting initiated primarily by the COIN force       
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater 
than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than 0, and 0 
if the sum is equal to 0) 
      
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or enagagements 
on the COIN force's terms.  
      
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt 
insurgent processes or operations. 
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David Kilcullen Framework 
Sub-
Factor 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Present? 
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater 
than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than 0, and 0 
if the sum is equal to 0)       
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or engagements 
on the COIN force's terms.        
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt 
insurgent processes or operations.       
Flexibility and Adaptability  (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater 
than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum 
is equal to 0)       
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary 
strategy, operations or tactics.       
Population Centric Approach  (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 but greater than 
2 , and 0 if the sum is less than 0)       
The COIN force established security in the area under their 
control.       
The COIN force effectively convinced the population their best 
interests were served by supporting the government.        
The COIN force limited their use of lethal force, to the best of 
their ability, to only irreconcilable insurgents.       
The COIN force identified local issues and acted to resolve them 
using social, economic, and political measures.       
Bottom-Up Approach (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or 
equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than or equal to 1, 
and 0 if the sum is less than 1)       
The COIN force focused on building and/or strengthening local 
government institutions.       
The COIN force created civil-society based programs that focused 
on conflict resolution, reconciliation, and development.       
The COIN force emphasized the use of official state structures in 
everyday life.       
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Figure 1.2: Overall Best-Practice Analysis for Uruzgan, Afghanistan 
    
Christopher Paul et al. Framework 
Sub-
Factor 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Present? 
Commitment and Motivation (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 4, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than 
or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1) 
  3.5 0.5 
Insurgent force not individually superior to the COIN force 
by being either more professional or better motivated. 
0.5     
COIN force or allies did not rely on looting for sustainment. 1     
COIN force and government did not have different 
goals/level of commitment or both had relatively low levels 
of commitment. 
0     
Government did not sponsor or protect unpopular economic 
and social arrangements or cultural institutions. 
1     
Government did not involve corrupt and arbitrary 
personalistic rule. 
0.5     
Government type was not kleptocracy. 0.5     
Elites did not have perverse incentives to continue conflict. 0     
The country was not economically dependent on an external 
actor 
0     
Tangible Support Reduction  (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than 
or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1) 
  3 1 
The flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly 
decreased or remained dramatically reduced or largely 
absent.  
0     
Important external support to insurgents was significantly 
reduced.  
0     
Important internal support to insurgents was significantly 
reduced.  
1     
Insurgents’ ability to replenish resources was significantly 
diminished.  
0     
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Insurgents were unable to maintain or grow their force size.  0     
COIN force efforts resulted in increased costs for insurgent 
processes.  
1     
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent recruiting.  1     
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent materiel 
acquisition.  
0     
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent intelligence.  0     
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent financing. 0     
Flexibility and Adaptability  (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 
0 if the sum is equal to 0) 
  1 1 
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary 
strategy, operations or tactics. 
1     
Unity of Effort  (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or 
equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is 
equal to 0) 
  1 1 
Unity of effort/unity of command was maintained. 1     
Initiative  (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal 
to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal 
to 0) 
  0.5 0.5 
Fighting initiated primarily by the COIN force 0.5     
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater 
than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0) 
  2 1 
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or 
engagements on the COIN force's terms.  
1     
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt 
insurgent processes or operations. 
1     
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Overall Best-Practice Analysis for Uruzgan, Afghanistan      
David Kilcullen Framework 
Sub-
Factor 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Present? 
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater 
than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)   2 1 
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or 
engagements on the COIN force's terms.  1     
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt 
insurgent processes or operations. 1     
Flexibility and Adaptability  (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 
0 if the sum is equal to 0)   1 1 
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary 
strategy, operations or tactics. 1     
Population Centric Approach  (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 but greater 
than 2 , and 0 if the sum is less than 0)   3 1 
The COIN force established security in the area under their 
control. 0.5     
The COIN force effectively convinced the population their 
best interests were served by supporting the government.  0.5     
The COIN force limited their use of lethal force, to the best 
of their ability, to only irreconcilable insurgents. 1     
The COIN force identified local issues and acted to resolve 
them using social, economic, and political measures. 1     
Bottom-Up Approach (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater 
than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than or 
equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)   3 1 
The COIN force focused on building and/or strengthening 
local government institutions. 1     
The COIN force created civil-society based programs that 
focused on conflict resolution, reconciliation, and 
development. 1     
The COIN force emphasized the use of official state 
structures in everyday life. 1     
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Figure 1.3: Best-Practice Analysis for Focus Districts     
Christopher Paul et al. Framework 
Sub-
Factor 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Present? 
Commitment and Motivation (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 4, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than 
or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1) 
  3.5 0.5 
Insurgent force not individually superior to the COIN force 
by being either more professional or better motivated. 
0.5     
COIN force or allies did not rely on looting for sustainment. 1     
COIN force and government did not have different 
goals/level of commitment or both had relatively low levels 
of commitment. 
0     
Government did not sponsor or protect unpopular economic 
and social arrangements or cultural institutions. 
1     
Government did not involve corrupt and arbitrary 
personalistic rule. 
0.5     
Government type was not kleptocracy. 0.5     
Elites did not have perverse incentives to continue conflict. 0     
The country was not economically dependent on an external 
actor 
0     
Tangible Support Reduction  (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than 
or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1) 
  3 1 
The flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly 
decreased or remained dramatically reduced or largely 
absent.  
0     
Important external support to insurgents was significantly 
reduced.  
0     
Important internal support to insurgents was significantly 
reduced.  
1     
Insurgents’ ability to replenish resources was significantly 
diminished.  
0     
Insurgents were unable to maintain or grow their force size.  0     
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COIN force efforts resulted in increased costs for insurgent 
processes.  
1     
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent recruiting.  1     
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent materiel 
acquisition.  
0     
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent intelligence.  0     
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent financing. 0     
Flexibility and Adaptability  (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 
0 if the sum is equal to 0) 
  1 1 
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary 
strategy, operations or tactics. 
1     
Unity of Effort  (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or 
equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is 
equal to 0) 
  1 1 
Unity of effort/unity of command was maintained. 1     
Initiative  (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal 
to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal 
to 0) 
  0.5 0.5 
Fighting initiated primarily by the COIN force 0.5     
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater 
than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0) 
  2 1 
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or 
engagements on the COIN force's terms.  
1     
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt 
insurgent processes or operations. 
1     
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Best-Practice Analysis for Focus Districts      
David Kilcullen Framework 
Sub-
Factor 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Present? 
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater 
than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)   2   
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or 
engagements on the COIN force's terms.  1     
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt 
insurgent processes or operations. 1     
Flexibility and Adaptability  (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 
0 if the sum is equal to 0)   1 1 
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary 
strategy, operations or tactics. 1     
Population Centric Approach  (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 but greater 
than 2 , and 0 if the sum is less than 0)   4 1 
The COIN force established security in the area under their 
control. 1     
The COIN force effectively convinced the population their 
best interests were served by supporting the government.  1     
The COIN force limited their use of lethal force, to the best 
of their ability, to only irreconcilable insurgents. 1     
The COIN force identified local issues and acted to resolve 
them using social, economic, and political measures. 1     
Bottom-Up Approach (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater 
than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than or 
equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)   3 1 
The COIN force focused on building and/or strengthening 
local government institutions. 1     
The COIN force created civil-society based programs that 
focused on conflict resolution, reconciliation, and 
development. 1     
The COIN force emphasized the use of official state 
structures in everyday life. 1     
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Figure 1.4: Best-Practice Analysis for non-Focus Districts     
Christopher Paul et al. Framework 
Sub-
Factor 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Present? 
Commitment and Motivation (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 4, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than 
or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1) 
  3 0.5 
Insurgent force not individually superior to the COIN force 
by being either more professional or better motivated. 
0     
COIN force or allies did not rely on looting for sustainment. 1     
COIN force and government did not have different 
goals/level of commitment or both had relatively low levels 
of commitment. 
0     
Government did not sponsor or protect unpopular economic 
and social arrangements or cultural institutions. 
1     
Government did not involve corrupt and arbitrary 
personalistic rule. 
0.5     
Government type was not kleptocracy. 0.5     
Elites did not have perverse incentives to continue conflict. 0     
The country was not economically dependent on an external 
actor 
0     
Tangible Support Reduction  (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 and greater than 
or equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1) 
  3 1 
The flow of cross-border insurgent support significantly 
decreased or remained dramatically reduced or largely 
absent.  
0     
Important external support to insurgents was significantly 
reduced.  
0     
Important internal support to insurgents was significantly 
reduced.  
1     
Insurgents’ ability to replenish resources was significantly 
diminished.  
0     
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Insurgents were unable to maintain or grow their force size.  0     
COIN force efforts resulted in increased costs for insurgent 
processes.  
1     
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent recruiting.  1     
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent materiel 
acquisition.  
0     
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent intelligence.  0     
COIN forces effectively disrupted insurgent financing. 0     
Flexibility and Adaptability  (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 
0 if the sum is equal to 0) 
  1 1 
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary 
strategy, operations or tactics. 
1     
Unity of Effort  (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or 
equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is 
equal to 0) 
  1 1 
Unity of effort/unity of command was maintained. 1     
Initiative  (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater than or equal 
to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 0 if the sum is equal 
to 0) 
  0.5 0.5 
Fighting initiated primarily by the COIN force 0.5     
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater 
than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0) 
  2 1 
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or 
engagements on the COIN force's terms.  
1     
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt 
insurgent processes or operations. 
1     
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Best-Practice Analysis for non-Focus Districts      
David Kilcullen Framework 
Sub-
Factor 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Score 
Best 
Practice 
Present? 
Criticality of Intelligence (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater 
than 0, and 0 if the sum is equal to 0)   2 1 
Intelligence was adequate to support kill/capture or 
engagements on the COIN force's terms.  1     
Intelligence was adequate to allow COIN forces to disrupt 
insurgent processes or operations. 1     
Flexibility and Adaptability  (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 1, .5 if score is between 1 and 0, and 
0 if the sum is equal to 0)   1 1 
The COIN force did not fail to adapt to changes in adversary 
strategy, operations or tactics. 1     
Population Centric Approach  (Score is 1 if sum of total is 
greater than or equal to 3, .5 if score is less than 3 but greater 
than 2 , and 0 if the sum is less than 0)   0 0 
The COIN force established security in the area under their 
control. 0     
The COIN force effectively convinced the population their 
best interests were served by supporting the government.  0     
The COIN force limited their use of lethal force, to the best 
of their ability, to only irreconcilable insurgents. 1     
The COIN force identified local issues and acted to resolve 
them using social, economic, and political measures. 0     
Bottom-Up Approach (Score is 1 if sum of total is greater 
than or equal to 2, .5 if score is less than 2 but greater than or 
equal to 1, and 0 if the sum is less than 1)   0 0 
The COIN force focused on building and/or strengthening 
local government institutions. 0     
The COIN force created civil-society based programs that 
focused on conflict resolution, reconciliation, and 
development. 0     
The COIN force emphasized the use of official state 
structures in everyday life. 0     
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Figure 2.1: 
                       Overall Best-Practice Analysis for Uruzgan, Afghanistan  
David Kilcullen Score Christopher Paul et al. Score 
Criticality Intelligence  1 Commitment and Motivation 0.5 
Flexibility and Adaptability 1 Tangible Support Reduction 1 
Population-Centric Approach 1 Flexibility and Adaptability 1 
Bottom-Up Approach 1 Unity of Effort 1 
    Initiative 0.5 
    Criticality Intelligence  1 
Final Score 4/4   5/6 
    
    
Figure 2.2:    
                                 Best-Practice Analysis for Focus Districts  
David Kilcullen Score Christopher Paul et al. Score 
Criticality Intelligence  1 Commitment and Motivation 0.5 
Flexibility and Adaptability 1 Tangible Support Reduction 1 
Population-Centric Approach 1 Flexibility and Adaptability 1 
Bottom-Up Approach 1 Unity of Effort 1 
    Initiative 0.5 
    Criticality Intelligence  1 
Final Score 4/4   5/6 
    
    
Figure 2.3:    
Best-Practice Analysis for non-Focus Districts  
David Kilcullen Score Christopher Paul et al. Score 
Criticality Intelligence  1 Commitment and Motivation 0.5 
Flexibility and Adaptability 1 Tangible Support Reduction 1 
Population-Centric Approach 0 Flexibility and Adaptability 1 
Bottom-Up Approach 0 Unity of Effort 1 
    Initiative 0.5 
    Criticality Intelligence  1 
Final Score 2/4   5/6 
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